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The Securities Analyst as Agent: 
Rethinking the Regulation of Analysts 
jill E. Fisch
,, 
1-Iillary A. Sat/'' 
ABSTRACT: Recent press has highlighted shocking e.wunples of bias, sell 
dealing, and inaccumC)' in the behavior of the securities analy;t. Critics 
have attributed the bubble and subsequent crash in the technology sector to 
analyst h)•pe and jJosited that undue analyst optimism cont-ributed to 
scandals such as Enron. After nwny years of minima l regulatmy oversight, 
a·nalysts are now the subject of extensive reg ulatmy reform jnoposa/s, 
including a mandate in the Sarbane.s-Oxley Act of 2002 requiring that the 
Securities and }.'xchange Commission adopt a variety of restrictions on 
anaZ'Vsl behavior. 
Despite the media attrmtion, the re have been few allemfJls to conaptualize 
careful(y the mza()•st 's role. This Arlicle of ers such an anal_)'sis. First, tlu: 
Article challenges the traditional conception of the analyst as independnlt 
gateheeper. The Article draws upon empirical, legal, and anecdotal evidence 
to evaluate cri tically the existing behavior of securities anaZvsts and the 
extent to which their activities increase '1/l.arket cfficienc)'. As the Article 
dem.onstutles, atwlysts are sul�ject to a variety of conjlicts of interest that 
constrain their behavior. The resulting costs itnposed b)' I hese conjZicts w-e 
classic agenc_)' costs. 
Accordingly, the Article develops a 'Ju:w concejJtualization of the securities 
analyst as quasi-agent. Although analysts have not traditio1wl(v been 
treated as agents under stmulard agenC)' law princijJlf�S, jimn a broader 
ecrmmnic jJerspective, ana(ysts are jJmjJerly undnsiood to act in an ageiU)! 
capaci(y. Anal_)'sts oct on behalf of multiple nwrh!'L jHirticijHlnls, including 
their enzjJloycrs, issuen. and investors. These interests are in tension. "'lgenc)' 
principles illuminate breahdowns in the analysts role mul jJrovide guidance 
in identifying ajJ/JrojJriate solutions. In jJarticulm� we argue that nform 
efforts should j(Jcus on the minimization of rtgenC)' costs, through the 
apjJlication of a quasi-agemy afJjJroach i11cluding a dut)' rj'n:liabilitv. 
-----------------------------------·-----
Professor of L:m·, Fordham Uni\·ersitv School oC Lm·. This ,\nick '.·:�t'' p�lrliallv m·ittcn 
\l·hile Professor Fisch �tlso was se rving �IS Slo�u1 Visiting Professor. Georgetown Uniw·rsit1 Lt11· 
Center. 
:;:::: Profes�or of Law and F . .--\n1old Oaun1 C:orpnrare L�nv Scholar. L·ni,·ersil:· nf lo\\-:l 
College of Law. For their comments �mel helpful suggc:-:tions, the �utt!lors thankJennift:r Arlen, 
Stn·c Chui, 1Vl.itu Gubti, Peter l uang, Dunalcl Ltngn(.>ort, P�uti !\Ldl<>ncy, ,\cl�llll Pritch�trcl, ��ncl 
Robert SitJ.:.o!f The authors tklllk Robert Gadrke, �·[ich;�t·l Russcil. Jetllie·;s l';�rkcr. Doug 
Ponder. and Brian Vander Pol for r.heir research �tssisrance. 
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The A1tidc focuses on the sjJecijic cxwn/Jle of selective disdosurc to 
demonstrate !hot !he failu!-e to conceptualize the quasi-agen(�\' status of the 
anal_yst's m!,, led to an inappropriate tolerance of sclrctive disclosure. 
Instead, the Article offers a new efficiency justijication for the adoption of 
Regulation }D based on agmc)' principles. The Article then discusses the 
implirations of agency them)' for recent pmposals to address other types cf 
anal_vst conjlicts . The Article conciudes b_v offering some suggestions for 
further debote. 
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"From i'vla_y 2000-FebnW1)' 2001, while the i\�-1S1JA.Q index declined by over 
one-third, anal:vsts'. '[sell]' 1ecommendations held stwd_v at . . . 0% "1 
lNTRODLJCT!ON 
On April 8, 2002, New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer announced 
shocking findings from an investigation of securities analysts at !\Ierril l  
Lynch.
� 
In papers filed with the court, Spitzer reveal ed that i\'Ierril l Lynch 
analysts consistently skewed their research reports and stock 
recommendations in an effort to generate investment banking business for 
the firm.
'l 
According to Spitzer , senior official s  were aware that the research 
reports were tainted and often misleading, yet continued to assure public 
investors that the information was independent , o�jective , and unbiztsec\."1 
Court papers detail repeated exam ples in which Merrill Lynch publ iclv 
recommended stocks to investors while disparaging those same stocks in 
internal e-mails as "clogs," or 'junk," or warning that the companv was 
"fal ling apart."
� 
Indeed, as the market for Internet stocks plummeted in 
2000, those papers reveal that l\'lerri!l maintained a rating of "accurnulate" 
or above on all the companies it coYerecl, never once advising im cstors ro 
sell as stock prices plunged , sometimes ·'all the way to zero."'; 
Spitzer ' s investigation is merely one example in a series of recent 
developments highlighting the problematic rol e  of the securities ;malv:st. 
Both the media and the Securities and E�change Commission (the ··sEC") 
have warned of analvst bias, self-dealing, and other abuses. In addition, 
analysts have been criticized for rheir failure to spot problems <ll t:nro11. 
Finally, plaintiffs ' lawyers cominue to pursue novel liability theories i11 
litigation against analysts. Amid all of this controversy , the SEC adopted 
Regulation FD in '2000 to prol�ibit issuers from selectiYelv disclosing 
corporate information to analvsts.' Belateclh, the SEC also announced <lll 
l. B<trbacr '.lo:<es, RI'SI'tlrlh Aniii\'>IS Clllft'i·l·"ile, :\l.l-.-\BA Bruker Dealer ReguL!riorr C:"urse 
ufStudy Uan. 10-ll. �110:!). 
�- S1't Press Relt::rst·. Office of '\t:11· York .. -\tt"nte\· Getrer:rl Eliot Spitzer. \krrill l.1·nrlr 
Stuck Rating Svstcnt Found Bia.-;ecl b1· l.'rtcli,;closecl C:onflicb of Interests (.-\pril 0. :!llil:!). 
ouoilo!J!,, r/1 http://11\\'IUJ:Jg.sutc·.ttl'.ll>'/prt·,;s/�i.lll:!/:tpr/:1pr08b_()2.htllll (Lr;;r 1isitul '.Lrr. 2,-,_ 
�OOcl) (on tile wirh the:· Jm,·<r Lrw Re�·iew). 
;>,_ Stl' it!. 
-L .')wid. 
:1. Petitioner\ .-\llicl:rl·it in Srrpp<>r·r "f .\pplicrtion for <lll Order PursrLttlt ''' Cerrt·Lrl 
BusincssL111Secrion Yl-f, ;rt IU-1'\. Spitzer 1. \krrilll.1nrh S..: Co, '\o. U:'--IOl:'>:.':! ('\.\.Sup. Ct . 
. -\pr. t\, 2002). m•aiiofJ/e a/ http:/ 111\l·'.l·.o:tg.,;t;rie.lll.th/imcsrurs/press/:!()02/:rpr/\knilll.pc!f 
(on fi k 11·i r It the I CJ11·a Ll\l Rc1 ie11·!. 
15. Set id. at �-1 0. 
7. Sclectin: Disclosme and irbiclcr Tr:tcling. 6:-J Feel. Reg.,-,] 7lti-Cil (.\ug. '2-L :.'lll)(l) (to be 
codified at 17 C.F.R. Jlls. :2-lfl. �1:1. :utd 2-llJ) (on tile 11·irlt rhe lu'''a L111 Rnin1). Tilt· SF.C kts 
nuL li<JII·en·r. :tduptcd :rm· clircct n·gul�11i"n' ,;t itll;th'sr 1Jeh:r1ior. In l:<ct. lhL· SEC's i.>durt' '" 
!ake an\· �lctiun in 1hc din-:ction �,r !·cg·uiati11g ;ut;tl�·�ts ,,-:t� p;tl'l of ,,·\Lu pr1 nnptt·d \:tor!lt''. 
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i nq u i ry i nto analyst conflicts of i nterest.K In spr i n g  2002, the New York Stock 
Exchange (th e  "i\TYSE") and the Nat ional Associatio n  of  Sec uri t ies D ealers 
( th e  "NASD"), as self-regulatory orga nizations (the "SROs"), also adopted 
n ew standards for analyst disclosure and tradin g  activity, which were 
subseque n tl y  approved by t h e  SEC.� The latest deve l opment is  a mandate 
under the new Sarbanes-Oxley Act that the SEC or the SROs pro m u l gate 
rul es to address analyst conflicts of interest. 1 0 The goal of these various 
m easures was to i m pleme n t  a more thorough regulatory regi m e  to al leviate 
the conflict of in terest probl e ms that have plagued analyst reco m m e n dation s  
i n  recent years. \Vhe th er these steps w i l l  succeed, h owever, remains  u ncl ear, 
i n  part, because of the con ti n ued ambiguity i n  the concepti o n  of the 
analyst's role . To see why, consider bow analysts are tradit ionally treated bv 
courts, com m e n tators, and regulators . 
Historical l y, analysts have b e e n  relatively free from regul ati o n .  lncleecl, 
in  some respects, analysts have ei"Uoyed preferred status u n der th e federal 
securities laws . Courts carved out  an analyst exception to the prohib i tion o n  
t h e  u s e  o f  non public i n formatio n  in securi ties tradi ng,  justifying this pol icy 
by a twofold claim. First, courts and com m e n tators argued that seiective 
disclosure to securiti es analysts is b e n e ficial to the securi ties marke ts because 
it i n creases the dissemination and i ncorporatio n of inform ation i nto stock 
price . Second, some comme n tators argued that analyst use of i ns ide 
i nformation does n ot pose risks analogous to those presented by traditio nal 
insider trading.  Both justifications  rely, in part, on the th e ory that analysts 
f�mction as unbiased marke t gatekeepers. This  "gatekeep i ng" rhe01y is 
prem ised on the assurnptio n  that analysts act as conduits of i n formation 
fro m  company to shareholder and from shar e h ol der to com pany. Because of 
the information flow provided by analysts, informati on is  diss em i nated to 
the market, and the market becom es m ore efficie n t. Based on the 
conclusion that analysts actually p erform this gatekeeping function, courts 
and reguia tors have l e ft analysts largely unregulated so as to avoid 
in terrupting the flow of  i n formati o n .  Even i n  l ight of the analyst probl ems 
outl i n ed above, these arguments are sti l l  used to defend a privi leged role for 
securi ties an a lysts ,  includin g  t h e  clai m that Regulatio n FD IS both 
unnecessary and undesirab l e .  Although this  argu m e n t  h as recently been 
Cener;1l Eli"t Spitzn rn Lttmch his own investigation into the area. See Charles Gasp;trino. \Vall 
Street lias 1111 ( 'ulikl"fy Xnu Cojr SjJiLn, W.-\LL ST . .J .. ,-\pr. 2:\ :!00:2. at C'l. 
0. Sl'e Cktrk:, C;"L,parinu & Scot. J. Paltrow, .%'C .Joins I'orl!, Ojmls Inquiry into .'luu!ysts. 
\\".\Ll. Sr J. \pr :21i. :200:2, ar .-\I. 
�!. Sn· '<.\SD ;tile\ :'-iYSE Rulemaking, Exchange Act Release �u. 34-4:)90tl (i\Ltv IU. :200�). 
m•nilublc ot http:/ 1\\"1\ll.,;ec.gol/rules/htm (last 1isitcd i\hr. '2:1. '2003) (u11 liie 11ith the)(>\\";\ Ltl\ 
Rel·ic11·). 
IIJ )1'1 S;�rh:ltles-Chln ,-\ct ul2D0'2. l'ub L. No. 107-2lH. � :101. l J() St:tt. 7·L"i. /lJl (2002) 
(tHjltiring SH: 11i1hin one lt.·:tr ro adopt rules ··rt•;N>n;tbh, ricsig·ned I<> :tdclrl·ss (;mahslj 
Ct>llflicts uf'illl.t.TL"Sl .. ) .  
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muted somewhat in the wake of revelations l i ke those at Merril l Lynch, the 
actual role p l ayed by securities analysts rem ains open to debate. 
This Article challenges the traditional view of analysts as i ndependen t 
gatekeepers. We question whether, given their jobs as employees, it is 
reasonable to assume analysts are actually "in dependent." To explain why 
securities analysts are not "in dependent," the Article draws upon empirical , 
legal, and anecdotal evidence to evaluate the existing behavior of securities 
analysts and the extent to which their activi ties i ncrease m arket efficiency. 
Based on this examination, the Article demonstrates that analysts are not the 
independent information gatherers the courts and other academics have 
purported them to be but are, instead, subject to a variety of conflicts of 
interest that compromise their independence. 
One possible response to this conflict of interest problem is simply to 
improve disclosure of these conflicts and to acknowledge that analys ts are 
essentially s alespeople, seiV'ing the i n terests of their firms '  investment 
banking clients. T h is response is unsatisfactory. Issuers, investors, and the 
m arkets themselves are heavily dependen t upon the ability of the analyst to 
function as an information i ntermediary. In addition, the existing regul a tory 
treatment of analysts h as been prernised on p rotecting this fu nction , a n  
objective that persists in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.11 Nonethel ess, the 
substantial role that analysts play with respect to i n formation flo\\' and 
securities pricing is significantly u ndermined by conflicts of interest that 
create a variety of incen tives for analysts to distort the info rmation they 
present .  
The resu l ting costs that these conflicts impose on the market a re classic 
l"' agency costs . - Analysts h ave not traditionally been treated as agen ts, at least 
for anyone other than their employer, and there are significa nt 
im pediments to classif)'ing them as agen ts u n d e r  standard age ncy law. 
Nonetheless, because their intcnnediation effectively resu l ts i n  their acting 
on behalf of issuers , investors, a n d  the markets, from a broader economic 
perspective, an alys ts are properly u nderstood to act in an agency capacity. 
To capture this conceptualization while distinguishing analysts from 
traditional agents, this Article  describes analysts as "quasi-agent s ." vVe do not 
argue for the application of standard agency law pri nciples, hut we do 
propose that analyst regulation be viewed from an agency perspecti\·e. By 
uti l izing this agency approach, it is possible to illumi nate breakdowns i n  the 
analyst's role and to provide guidance in  identifYi ng appropria te solutions. 
In l igh t of this analysis, 1ve a rgue that reform efforts should focus on the 
mi nimizati o n  of agency costs. Toward that end, we argue that analysts owe 
l!. Stt id. (clirt:cting tln� SEC: to adopt rules designed ··to protect the uhjecri,·it,· �lllcl 
illclepelldellCC of o;ecurities analysts""). 
1'2. S!'t ivlichzwl C. .fensen & \\"illi�llll H. ,\icckling, Flu'IJI\' of !lit Finn: •\lrlllll_!!,"l"!'io! /),·/un•iur, 
Agnu:y Costs ond Uii>lloshijJ Stmrlurc. ?> J Fl\:. ECO'-!. :>0:), ;{OS ( 19/ll) (c:,pbining nawre �tncl 
l\pes uf agency costs). 
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duties to the market-duties that we term ''reliability duties"-ancl that those 
duties should be enforcecl.l: l 
To proYide a framework for analyzing these duties, the Article 
conceptualizes the security analyst's role and outlines a quasi-agency model 
for understanding and regulating analyst behavior  based on that 
conceptualization. This model serves three important purposes. First, it 
clarifies how conflicting duties inherent in the analyst's role cause analysts to 
fail as gatekeepers. Second, the model provides a more coherent 
explanation for Regulation FD than that provided by the SEC's focus on 
fairness. Finally, the model provides direction for further regulation. 
The Article proceeds in the following manner. Part I formalizes the 
identitv and role of the securities analvst. Pan II identifies the conflicts of ' I 
interest that securities analysts face, detailing empirical literature on their 
jobs and roles, and explains how these conflicts create incentives for analysts 
to use inside information in wavs that are inconsistent with market ) 
efficiency. Pan Ill briefly reviews the history of analyst regulation and 
describes key components of recent proposals for regulatory reform. Part IV 
expands on the deficiencies in  reform proposals by demonstrating how the 
proposals fail to conceptualize the analyst's role properly. Pan V extends this 
analvsis to develop a quasi-agency model of the analyst. The Part applies the 
model to create an analyst duty of reliability and to offer an efficiency-based 
justificuion for Regulation FD. The Article concludes wi th some reflections 
on the role of the SEC in regulating securities analysts. 
I. THE ROLE OF THE SECURITIES ANALYST 
Securities analysts perform research and analysis on companies in order 
to eYaluate securities ann estimate their \'alue as investments. In theory, they 
sen·e as information conduits, or  intermediaries, between the companies 
they in\·estigate and actual or potential investors in those companies.11 Their 
work im·olves collecting and processing information from a variety of 
sources, both inside and outside of the company.''' As a result of their 
research. an;clvsts tYpically produce two products: a ·'report" and a 
··recomrnen(LHion." In the repon, analysts offer facts and opinions about the 
subject compam ancl its securities.1'; The recommendation, which is 
1:>. .\r·r· Rtd;cn C. CLtrk. :\g;!'llcy Cnsls \'nsus Fir/wirn)" /)ulit·s. in PRI\TII'.\L.S .Y\D :\Cf\:TS: TI!F 
SneLl 11 RF OF Bt.�I\:FS� :-1:-1 (]<Jim\\". Prall S.: Richard). Zcckkut:<er elk. 1�1:-\:1) (describing the 
rule 11! lidttcidn duties i11 n· clucing :tgeJlC\ costs). f<Jr an :trgumctlt that :tn:th·st>' ticlucian 
responsibililit>s ·'hould be lill\itcc! to im·estors, see Per.er II. Huang. J.�·pd lmj;/imlions ofCuill r111rl 
f'ridtofiil.'il"rurilinl!tgulolirm. \:'il) c·. I'\.! .. Rr-Y (fonhcoming 2003). 
1-L TF.n Tt\.\LT\tX\\: �>.: _)\\iLS ll.·\\III.TO\. 1\Fl>R\1.\L C<JRPOR.\TL Disci.OSL.Rr U:-.;nm 
FtlHIZ \I :iU l. Rlt !LS L\ \I" I W-l ( C:C:H '2UOU). 
l:i. S1·t \\1. \it_.\IT . .  \ss·\ . .  \ C:0\11'.\:\Y Cl"ll)L TO EFFIXTI\E STO<i-JIU!.IlFR RU .. -\TIO\:.S '2c\. 
RF.S. 1�11'. �;o. '2 1 ( ICJ:-;'\). 
lti. .J:t.'><>il \licil:wl l:nh. \\hal�' :ill lilt' t:rnJii/11!/ir!ll": .-\11 1:\olllill{{lillll rf lht• .\i'illlilif"·, nnrl 
F.11iw 11.�r l."ull!n:isstoll \ fi,·gul11liun !D. 1-+ DLf'.\l 1. i)l·s. LJ. I i 'I. 1 '2:'> ('21 J{) I .1. 
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gen e rally a se lec tio n  from a seri e s  of ra ti ng categories, ach·ises t h e  inYesti n g  
public t o  buy, sell ,  o r  c o n t i n u e  t o  h o l d  the securi ti es i n  questi o n .  \Vhe n  
a nalysts act " indepe n d e n tly a n d  o�j ectively, i nvestors gam from th e 
publication of their  i ns ights . "
1 '  
Analys ts conduct t h e i r  research for various types o f  i nves tors.  This  
Art i c l e ,  l i ke most recen t  c o n gressi o n al and media a ttent ion,  focuses o n  sell­
side analysts. 1 '� Sel l-s ide a nalysts ,  who comprise approxim a tely 30% of the 
a nalys t i nclustry, 1 ' �  are ge n e ra l ly employed by broke rage fi rms a n d  produce 
research for brokerage firm c ustomers a n d  other  i nvestors. Many of these 
brokerage fi rms a lso h ave a n  i nvestmen t  ban ki ng divisio n .  I n  aclcl i t ion to 
doi n g  research for custo m e r  reports,  analys ts who work for th ose fi rms also 
may perform research fo r th e u nderwrit i ng of an issuer 's  secu rit ies ,  
partic ipate in the road s h mv (actuall y  travel i n g  to p i tch securit ies) , o r  h e l p  
c l i n c h  the u n d e rwri ti ng deal .  The i n formation produced b y  se l l-si d e  analysts 
is widely disseminated in the finan c ial m arkets. I ndividual recom mendati o n s  
are a n n o un c e d  to t h e  marketplace, a n d  "erv1 ces l i ke T h omson 
Fi nancial / Fi rs t  Call  publ ish regu lar reports poll ing analyst  predictions and 
rec o m m e ndations .  As a rTsult ,  changes i n  a n alyst recom mendations typical ly 
trigger substa n t i a l  price movemen ts .  
A n alysts generally t e n d  t o  c o n c e n trate o n  a particular i ndustl}.  J n  
theory, they search for �l ! l d  anah·ze corporate i nfo rma tio n . Ana lysts read and 
d i gest company report s  �m el other secon dary sources,  speak wi th  com p<m;' 
offi c e rs and em ployees, ;:n c! ,  where appropriate, vis i t  company si tes IO h el p  
t h e m  fo rm a n  i ndepe n d e n t  i m p ression of t h e  busin ess. An alvsts review 
c o mpany d o c u m e n ts fi led with the SEC and oth e r  regula to rs as wt:ll as 
material s e n t  cl i re c tlv to s hare h o lders.  Th i s  information is a\·a i l ab!e from the 
compani es ,  the SEC,  ��nd :;e coP clal)' ::;o u rces l ike Stan dard & Po() ]·\ that 
compile,  su m m <u-izz� ,  ._mel re publ ish i L . Analysts a lso may l'C\ i e ,�,· t rade 
publicati o n s ,  i n cl uc'.i 11,� i nd u:,t i-,·-c;pec i fic  m a gazi ne5 . � 1 1  
1 7 . �fR.-\LT\i . \�� .-..; 8.: I L\ \ f l LT< ) :\ ,  S t:/JU! 1 \ ( ) f_(:-'  l -+ , : l i  1 o::s. 
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Zit· ! i nski.  Rt tn;.t;·ks : t t  tht· 'SEC Rnt mcit:·Jbie Di.>c ussiun o l t  Fin: 1 ncial  l)i,do-;u;"<.: ; rnd . \t tdi r"r 
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Tradit ionally, analyst research also has i ncluded hands-on 
i nvestigation . � '  Analysts may hold personal meetings with m e m be rs of the 
company's  management team.  Those same managers may atte n d  analysts' 
conferences to buil d  relati o nships and share i nformation .  In the course of 
their  discussions,  analysts acquire information  that they use to make their  
earni ngs estimates. They share those estimates with company official s  who 
comment on and respond to them.  Analysts may then refine the estimates i n  
<)<) 
response to company reactions . --
The an alyst generates h i s  or  her recommendation from the information 
collected. The analyst assesses the issuer ' s  value based o n  that  i nformation 
and the issuer 's  place within i ts i ndustry. Thus, processing the i n formation 
on a particular company also requires analysts to process i nformation on 
other companies wi thin the i ndustry, and it i s  commo n  for analysts to 
specialize i n  a specific industry or  sector. Typical ly, the analyst also wi l l  
em ploy h i s  o r  her fi nancial ski l ls  t o  create and revise fi nancial  valuation 
models . 
Th e e n d  resu l t  of this research i s  a report that i s  distributed both o ral ly 
an d in wri tten form . These reports not only describe the company and 
l ocate i t  wi tl1 i n  the  industl)', but  also provi de predicti ons .  The m ost 
import a nt  of th ese predict ions i s  the analyst ' s  esti mate of the company's 
future ec1mi ngs. The securit ies m arkets have become h ighly sensi tive to 
rev1s1on�; of <1nalyst estimates and to discrepancies between analyst 
predict i ons and issuer announceme nts of actual operati ng resul ts ,  ofte n 
responding to either wi th substantial price fluctuations.  The report also 
co n tains a bottom-l i ne recommendation based on the analys t's proj ections 
fo r the short , and sometimes the l o ng , te rm . The exact terms used for th e 
bottom-i i n e  recomm endations vary across analysts, but the categories and 
purp ,;se----traus lat ing the research into a one-word assessment, l ike buy, sel l ,  
o r  h n i d ---i s  e:;scn tial l )· the same. 
Th:: ' <due ()f the re pon depends i n  large part on the extent  to which  
the a n ,dys t\  research and analysis are in dependent.  The i ndependence of  
aJUl)'":t  <nLtJvsis h as,  h oweve1·, i ncreas ingly become the exception rather than 
Tht· o r< · l ic : > i l ; · l n funn ccl Co n t e n t  Analys is 4 ( O c t .  21100) ( u n publ i s hed l l l <t n uscri p t .  o n  f ile ,,·i r l i  
2 i .  .\ ; ·  •. : c c < H  H"rtll StJYd .Journal :1rt ic le .  for cc-.:al l l pk ,  clcscrihcd t h e  approach o f  on e 
r•: · s t <i l l ! d l l c  ' ' '  as i t11.: i u d i n g  t i l e  digest ion of c o m p a n r  repons and com pany food . JdT D .  
Opch :.f . f ."!ii·r!:. j>f..·rtst· · Sol!lc Stnr/: A 1/nfy.,f.\ Ct•f Back to llosirs i n  Wok,• of .'iauliny, W.\1. ! .  ST . . J  . .  ScpL 
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J r , c;H i : : : :.s i ; ·, " c h a i n  to clercrm i nc w h c i lwr the  n>s r. a u ra n t  i s  bt 1sy, whether m e n u  changes ::trt' 
pop!:hr.  : !ll ! l "·l ! u h c r  Li1l' staff is p le:JS:In l a ncl  k n u wleclgcahle.  [f she fi n ds a l l <Jsty s l < l �f. <I  d i n\· 
Ltc i i ! [ ··: ,  : :- ! ·  ! l � l  \\·�-, i t i n g  l i n e  � t t. :1 pn�\·i ou�ly  oYersnbscribecl re�ral l rtl n t ,  :'he co1nb ine:� t h : t t  
i ni: >JT. ' : : t i < > ! !  •. ·:i \1 :  the l inanc i :d n> p " r ! S  :md J T C C J H  acquisi t ions i mn h c r  researc h .  !d. 
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the rul e .�:\ Many analysts h ave come to rely on company i nsiders to share 
i nformation about the c o mpany with the m ,  creating a symbiotic and 
conflict-ridden relationship. 2'1 Rath e r  than performing i ndependent analysis ,  
a nalysts h ave i n c reasingly served a s  conduits for manage m e n t  t o  convey 
i nformatio n  to the securities markets. Moreover, as detai l ed i n  Part II below, 
a nalysts are subj ect to a variety of other conf l icts that c o m p romise their  
i ndependence.  As a resul t, the traditi o n al hands-off approach to analyst 
regulati o n ,  which was premised on the theory that analysts fun ctioned as 
i ndependent gate keepers, is no l o n ge r  appropriate.�'' 
II .  fu'-!ALYST CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
Con trary to the traditional j udicial  view,�6 securities analysts currently 
face a variety of confl i c ts of i n terest. These confl i c ts can b e  divided i n to 
three gen e ral categories. First ,  analysts a n d  thei r fi rms m ay h ave an 
owne rship i n terest in a company that is  the subject  of  the analysts ' report. 
Second, analysts may be subject  to p ressure b e cause of the fi rms '  business 
i n te rests; i nvestment banki n g  relationships b e tween broke rage fi rms and 
i ssuers have been particularl y  p roblematic .  Third ,  an alysts' reports may be 
affected by efforts to main tain supenor access to corporate i n formation ,  
typically from company offic ials.  
A. OIVNERSH I P lN77:"liEST'i 
The fi rst group of confl i c ts arises o u t  of the i nvestme n ts made by 
analysts and their employe rs. Analysts co nsisten tly i nvest in the companies 
they cove r. Their own self-regulato ry o rgan i za ti o n  rules  requ ire disclosure 
and moni toring of such i nvestm e n ts ,  but disclosure requi rem e n ts 
trad i ti onally have been minimal ,  and m o n i toring has been virtually 
n on existent.  The .t'NSE requires disclosure o f  all fi nancial  posi tions held by 
a firm and i t s  analy::;ts in the sentri ties of a rec o m m e n ded issuer, but permits 
the disclosure to be c o n di t ional . �' Conseq u e n tly, the NYSE req u i re m e n ts 
could be satisfi e d  by i nc l u d i n g  the b o i l e rplate state m ent,  " t h e  firm or 
e m ployees m ay own securities of a recom m e n ded Jssuel-, m an analvst 
23.  Sw Opdvke, sujnn nott: '2 1 .  
2:} .  See Gre tchen 1-:[orgc nso n ,  St'l' i\'u Evil, Spml: 1'/o l�vil, FORBES, D e c .  l S ,  1 9 9 7 ,  a c  1 6'2 ,  1 fi-1 , 
m •n ilulile a! 1 99 7  WL I I) 1 778"i() ( q 1 1 0 1  i ng ;t nwney m;u 1 ;1ger ;1s s ;1yi ng that ·· [ < � ] l l ;dy:;rs h a'.'C 
become reporters t<x the con tp:1 1 1y"" ;md t h a t  ·· [ i ] f  nnnage m t l l t  says cYc ryth i ng " s  
C\ ervth ing"s ob/ ) [ here i nafter i\ [orgen:-;o n ,  St·e ;\'o ;�·, ,if] . 
:2 S .  Sf't. fy.g. ,  iti. (explaining r h a r  then:· is a ·'conspiracy an1ong V\'all Street a n a l}':iLS not  tu 
not ice·· that  stock priu:s arc ab(l l l l  to fal l ) .  As ea rly as 1 9:13,  the Americ1!1 �. l a n agc m c n t  
Associ;nion cxhonccl l l l a ! l ;tgcrs ro c t d t i\·;Ltc a n a lysts :  " I t  i s  i m po rta n t  tu C l l l t i \ ·atc t h i s  gro u p ,  fur 
i rs rcpons on yo u r  cnrn p<U l\·, recon : m e n di ng t h e  p t t rc h a:'e or .-;ale of ::o t l r  SL"cu r i r i t- s ,  nny have 
\ ·c ry b road c i rc u Lni u 1 1  : tnd �l i 1  i n l p ( J r t a n t  effe c t  011 t h e  rnarket a c t i o n . �· .-\.\ 1 .  i\fC\ iT .  Ass ' ;·<  . . -;njJJlt 
n ote 1 S, CtL �:-) . 
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report.�� NASD Rule 22 1 0  required member firms and th e i r  offi c e rs or 
partne rs to disclose owne rs h i p  of option positions,  but not of  common 
')lj shares.- ·  The rule d i d  n o t  requi re the analyst who prepared a research 
report to disclose owne rs h i p  of any fi nan cial position in a recommended 
. :IIJ ISSUer. 
Analysts ' abi i i ty to invest in cm·ered compa n i es led to some egregious 
abuses.  A rec e n t  i nvestigation by the SEC d iscovered widespread i nstances of 
analysts tradin g  con trary to the i r  publi c  recom m e n dati ons. :'> � Such trading is  
problematic because , at  a m i n im u m ,  i t  suggests a lack of fai t h  by the a nalysts 
i n  th e accuracy of their reports . Analyst trad i n g  that is consiste n t  wi th a 
recommendation is also p robl e m atic ,  h owever, as th e analyst m ay h ave an 
incentive to distort the i n formation for personal gain .  For exampl e ,  Ban e of 
America analyst Je rry Treppe! was placed on admi nistrative leave i n  May 
2002 i n  l i g h t  of questions about h i s  trad i n g  recomm e ndations i n  
pharmaceutical stocks. :12 Treppe] apparen tly  re i te rated a number of "buy 
recom mendations" for a com pany in which he owned 2 1 ,000 shares a n d ,  at 
the same ti me,  downgraded the sto c k  of a m � o r  competitor . :1:1 
Si m i l arly, the SROs h ave not  e n forced even the m i ni m a l  existi n g  
disclos ure req u i re m e n ts .  T h e  SEC rec e n tly completed a revie w  of n i n e  l arge 
broke rage fi rms a n d  fou n d  that "compliance with the SRO rules that require 
fi rms to m o n i tor the private eq u i ty i nvestme n ts of e m p l oyees , i n cluding 
analysts ,  was poor. "'1 1 Addit ional ly, " n early a l l  of the fi rms exami ned \\'ere 
u n able to ide ntify a l l  of t h e i r  e mployees'  i nvestm e n ts in companies that th e 
firm took p ubl i c . " :) '' As a resul t, the fi rms could not  determ i n e  t h e  exte n t  to 
whi c h  their analysts held confli cti ng i n terests i n  covered fi rm s .  
A n  SEC i nvestigati on revealed that nearly one-th i rd of  th e analysts 
i nvestigated o•,.m ed secUi·i t ies in compan i es th ey cove red and so rne t i mes 
acq u i red the i r  securi ti es i n  private place m e n ts occu rri ng p r i o r  to i n i t ial  
pu b l i c  offe ri ngs. 'o � ;  Pre-IPO purchases by an a lys ts are particularl y p roblematic 
because the analysts obtai n t h e i r  securi ties  prior to the pu b i i c  o f ering fo r a 
fraction of th e 1PO price and have a s take i n  the effect of th e re p o rt s  th ey 
help to authC'·r. " O n ly one finn could accurately iden tify all p1-c-IPO 
28.  M 
2lJ. \.: -\SD Rule '2'2 1 0. 
'\0 .  !rl. 
3 1 .  s·, ,� , .Jc�s i ca  SuJ n Jnar. Rt·d�l(lCnl .)1��(.' Tr.np,PL.,; Two-Forr't! .:\ nolysts. 0: .\·. POsT. �L t Y  2-J. �00�.  
at 41  ( l' :·:p lai n i ng rhat  SEC task force \\· i l l  i rn·csr igare analysts '  conll ins  of in rcrc·s t ) .  
:12 .  C :h ris t i < l l l  Bcn helscn.  Boj:-\ Figh tens Ru lnjin A n{(/_lsls, S . F. Cl !RO:\ . , .) u m: 2 1 ,  �002.  ;\ l B 1 .  
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investm ents by i ts analysts. :1s Another firm engaged i n  re troactive approval of  
pre-IPO purchases . 1\1 These factors suggest that analyst confl i c ts of  interest  
are extensive and unmonitored. 
B. BUSIXESS !S?ERJ:STS 
Analysts also face pressure aris ing from the business interests of  their 
e m p l oyers. This pressure comes i n  two main forms,  recomm endations that 
are connected to brokerage commiss ions and recommendations that are 
t ied to underwri ting business.  Significantly, brokerage firms are l i m i ted i n  
t h e  extent t o  which they can profit directly from the informa tion produced 
by their research departments. Competi tion among brokerage fi rm s ,  the 
extensive i nformation avai lable to investors at  no charge through the media,  
the vVeb, and other sources , and th e general public-good c h aracter of  
information l imit  the abi l i ty of brokers to  charge for their  research . As a 
res u l t, in today's worl d, research departments do not earn revenue;  oth er 
departments support the m .  
S o m e  of t h i s  financial support i s  provided by t h e  firm ' s  brokerage 
business. Anal ysts provide information to investors . Through their  
transac ti ons i n  securities, those investors generate com m issio n  revenues for 
the analysts ' employers. Analyst recommendations that res u l t  in trades 
increase the c o m m ission reve nue of their brokerages. Notably, because th e 
po tential unive rse o f  buyers is greater than that of sel l e rs for any given 
securi ty, buy recommendations are l i ke ly  to have a gre a ter effect  on 
brokerage reve nues than sel l  rec o m mendations .  A posi tive analyst  report, 
th erefore , is l i kely to generate more transactions in th e securi ties covered, 
and those sa les wil l  gei;erate a greater a mount. of commissions fo r the fi rm .40 
Posi tive reports also h e lp the fi rms to attain a nd maintai n c l i ente l e ,  t h e reby 
attracting addi tional sales and c o m m i ss ions . Thus, analysts face firm 
pressure to i ssue pos i t ive reports because those reports have greater 
potential to ge n erate comm iss ion revenue for their corn panies .  
A recem e m p i rical study supports this c oncl usion. T h e  study finds that 
analysts '  reco m m e n dati ons are consistent with the i r  e m p l oye r ' s  i n ce n tives 
but not those of the investing publ i c . ' '  Analysts tend to reco m mend growth 
and mornentu 1n  s tocks , 1� and t h ey gene ral ly  clo n o t  i nc o rpo rate the 
pred ic t ive power of n egam·e or "contrarian" i n d i ca to rs-indicators th at , 
:i8 . !d. 
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-1'1 according to the study ' s  auth ors, actually acco u n t  for future retu rns .  · T h e  
study ' s  authors p o s i t  that the focus o n  growth stocks i s  co nsiste n t  w i t h  the 
i ncen tives of  sell-side analysts who work for firms with h igher trading 
. .  H actJvtty.  
A second and m ore problematic source of confl i c ts arises out  of the 
employers' i nvestme n t  bankin g  i nterests .  Because of the e l i m ination of fixed 
com missions  and i n tense competi ti o n  in c o m missio n  l evels,  c o m m i ssi o n  
revenue curre n tly reflects a relatively m i n o r  componen t  of  broke rage-fir m  
reven u e .  For m o s t  maj or fi rms,  i nvest m e n t  banki ng reven u e  is  far m o re 
significan t.  For example,  i n  1 967, prior to the el im in a ti o n  of fixed 
com missions,  commission revenue accoun ted for approxi m ately 57% of 
Merrill Lyn c h ' s  revenues, and i nvestm e n t  banking accou n ted for less than a 
ten th of that sum .r' I n  con trast, the Securities I n dustry Association reported 
i n  1 997 that com m issions generated only 1 6% of industry revenues .-11 ;  
Industry i nvestme n t  banking reven ues,  h owever ,  h ave i n c reased fifty-fol d  i n  
the last twen ty-five years.-17 This revenue i m balance i s  refl ected i n  the 
m akeup of i nvestm e n t  firms'  m a n age m e n t ,  whe re the ave rage rati o of top 
managers fro m  corporate finance versus e q u i ty i s  seven ro o n e . 1K 
The i mpl ications of this  develo p m e n t  for analyst operations  are 
substan tial . Alth ough at one t ime a fir m  and i ts brokers could generate 
profi ts on the basis of a strong research depart m e n t  a n d  a reputation for 
i n tegri ty, today th e big m o n ey comes fro m  a firm ' s  abi l i ty to attract 
i nvestment ban king busi ness.  This tre n d  raises serious d o u b ts a b o u t  analysts '  
abi l i ty to remain i ndependent .  Because analyst research i s  an i mportant 
e l eme n t  o f  a fi rm ' s  i nvestm e n t  banking operations,  potential  c o n fl i c ts arise 
between the analyst 's  d u ty to provide accurate, honest  re port s  and the 
analyst 's  duty to i mpro\'e the firm ' s  (and therefore the an:�lys t ' s )  fi nancial  
sta n ding. These confl i c ts arise because firms typically rely o n  the i r  research 
departm e n ts ,  in part, to develop and main tain a strong c l i e n t  base, which 
enables the  fi rms to s e l l  securi ties in  public  offe ri ngs. Firms fu rther i nvolve 
their  research analysts in the pro cess of sel l ing securities by e n l isti ng th e i r  
particip<Hion i n  roadshows and o th e r  marke ting activities in  w h ich analysts 
43 . !d. 
44 . !rl. 
-1::> . BE:'\j-\\ I I N  f\. L\Rk Cou:. Ti l E  PIED P i PER.� OF \\',\LL STREFT: I l0\1' AS\LYSTS SU . l .  \'OL' 
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largest i m esrm c n t  ban k i n g  clq.J�trtm ents :  the cli:;parit\' at other firms was CI'C i l  g-rea t e r . fr/. 
46.  St·c id. at :>7 ( q uoting forn1er Sec u ri tie.-; lncl t tstry A-;sociat ion sen i o r  --·ice presidetH a n d  
c lircctur u t' rescarch Je ffrt:\' M .  Schac�fer) . 
-17 . /tl. : vr rii.\P :'vlauhe,,· l . . . '\. H aywMd & \l'arren Boekn, Pmon anr/ Conjlil"l., oj' fntnest iu 
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w i t h  t i H" l c m·:1 L1w RC\ iew ) :  Rogers & Fog:tnv. s ujno IWI.e 20 ( ,amc) . 
4�--\ .  H;l) "\,·ard S .. : Boekt:r, su;;ut note 4 7 1  < L l  6 .  
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pitch securi ties to prospective purchasers .4!1 A finn also enhances the 
attractiveness of i ts i nvestment banking services if  it can provide conti nued 
analyst coverage that wi l l  he lp  to maintain the price of  the securities 
subsequent to the offering. A firm 's  commitm e n t  to provide analyst coverage 
and the visibi l i ty of i ts analysts are key components of the fi rm' s  abi l i ty to 
attract i nvestment  banking business. ';11 
In today's world ,  therefore,  the analyst i s  the "star of the show" i n  a 
typical  i nvestmen t banking bake-off, or c l ient  competi ti o n . 'i 1  The issuer 
wants coverage from th e analyst because a " rousing endorsem ent  from a 
h ighly ranked analyst" is bel ieved to send the stock of a "fledging" cor:npany 
i n to "orbit . ""� The pressure that sel l-side analysts face from their  i nvestment  
banking counterparts to  cover parti cular c l ients has been widely exposed by 
the media in recent  months. '
'' Moreover, it is crucial that a firm i nterested i n  
gen erati ng investment  banking business m ai n tai n a reputation for 
promoting i ts i nvestment  banki ng c l ients . ';.) The ulti mate goal i n  i nvestmen t  
banking i s  to sell  securi ti es ,  and a fi rm 's  i nvestment  bankin g  business gives i t  
a stake i n  the  outcome of an issuer ' s  offering. Positive reports and 
recommendations ge nerate securi ties sales. The correlation  between  positive 
reports and increased securit ies sales  is so strong, in fac t, th at some issuers 
have stated publi cly that they avoid working with analysts who are c ri tical of 
them and wi l l  ch oose underwriters based, in part,  on  \vhether  the associated 
analysts ' VIews are Lworable . �� This revelation sh ows that securit ies 
promotion i s  inherently in tens ion with securi ti es eval uation . vVhen analysts 
who evaluate c ertain com panies are involved in the i nvestment banking 
process of those same companies ,  an inh ere n t  confl i c t  occurs .  
The financial  im portan ce of  i nvestment  banking to  i nves tment  finns 
partia l ly  explains the consistent  fin di ngs that analyst re ports and 
recommendat ions are ove rly opti misti c .  Downgrades are rare . .. ' 'i According to 
the SEC, clownQrades occurred o nlv in  1 %  of the securi ties covered in :2000. 
u ' 
Studies also reveal sign ifi cant  differe nces between posi tive and negauve 
49. Analvs ts �m:: uften i n c l uckd 0 1 1  s�des pi tcl t es p recisely because they h �t\'e kno11·leclge 
about t h e  ind ustry-and because they \ITite th e reports t h a t  sell the s l u c k .  See gmemfly 
i\•[orgenson,  Stt 1\·o 1:"uil. :.ujml n o te :2�.  
SO .  Sn· J-J a;'''arcl & Boeker, .\ lljm1 n o te 47, at 5 ( 1998) (tlml i ng th at an<t lysts·  prese nce and 
reports affect  the finat 1cc  department\ abi l i ty to attract c l i e nts ) .  
S l .  . Jetfrey M .  Laclerman, Wa!! Sft·ei'I \ SjJil1 Came, BLS. \\·h. . ,  Ocr. :, , 1 99�.  at 1-lS.  
5:2 .  ftl. 
0 3 .  Sl'l' Michael Sicono l ll . .  \ l?ure Climjise a /  How ,)./reel Covns Clinzts. \Y.-\LL S T .  J . . Ju ly l -1 ,  
1 99:1 ,  < l t  Cl ( n ot i t lg" tktr <t J u h s t  was �tskccl by i nvestment  b�1 1 1 k i n g  c u u t l tnpan : o  i n i r i �t te 
co,·erage o n  cl ie11 1  w h ose stock ,,·as . .  reel i ng") . 
'i4.  l-Lt>·"·arcl 8 • .: Boeker . .  111jm1 n o te 4 7.  <I t 7J . 
: > :> /d. 
:1 1i. . ')el' .!!/'ll i'm//y \ l � u J rt�t:n \ l c '! i c h t > l s  & Pat r ic ia  C. O ' J)ri e n .  ,'JI'IF�·rletliou n u d  . \ n11iYsl C :o t t mgr. 
3'i J r\CCT. RYS. I t  i7 ( I �J<) / ) .  
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.-), rati ng rates.  Often analysts persist  m adheri n g  to pos1 twe 
recommendations despite negative op111 1 0 n s  about future prospects for th e 
stock.0� Many anaiysts do n o t  even downgrade companies that  fai l  to meet  
the i r  p redi cations _ ,-,�� This  bias  is  evi d e n t  i n  sel l-s ide analysts ' p e rfo rmance as  
wel l .  For exa m p l e ,  one recen t  empirical s tudy showed that the real ized price  
growth i n  securiti es positivel y  rated by sell-side analysts is  o n e-sixth , while  the 
realized price  growth for securities receivi ng positive buy-s ide analyst ratin gs 
is one-thircl. 1;11 Sim i larly, oth er studi es have revealed that analyst ratin gs are 
all overly optimistic and that se l l-side reports are worse than the co nsensus.6 1  
One m i g h t  predict that th e market woul d  discoun t  for this excessive 
analyst opti m is m ;  h owever, e m pirical studies suggest that, at  l e ast in the past, 
the m arket has fai l e d  to do so. 1;2 Spitzer 's  i nvestigatio n ,  for examp l e ,  
revealed t h a t  Merri l l ' s  securities ratin gs consisten tly ref1ected a positive b i as .  
Even though Merr i l l  p urpo rted to c lassi fy securities accordin g  to a five-po i n t  
scale ,  M e rr i l l  n ever used t h e  l ower two ratings, thus turn i n g  the scale i nto a 
de facto th ree-p o i n t  sys te m . ';:\ The investigation furthe r  revealed that 
downgrades and sell recomm endati o n s  were vi rtual l y  n o n-existe n t. ' ' '  
Al though rv'I e rr i l l  quiet ly terminated i ts coverage of a few stocks,  rath e r  than 
reducing i ts ratings, for the most part it s i m ply m a i n tained i ts posi t i ve ratings 
5 7 .  Sec r;mcmily Ken t  \l"nmack, Do !Jmhn·agl' A nlll)'.lt 's Rnul!lllli'/ld((t iu n s  Hm•e !nvrstllll' l l t  
lilllue 1, :'i l. J. F I :\ .  l (t'vbr. l 99 f1 ) ;  R . E .  D i e fen b�tc h ,  Huzl' Good !1  Instit utional Hmlmng·,, Hnm rch ?, �K 
F I :\ .  A\1.\LY\TSj. , .J an .-Feb. 1 9 7'2 ,  at  :A. 
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General 2usi ncss Ltw Sec t i on 3:,4, at 1 0 , S p i tzer \'. l\ inr i l 1 L\nch &: C o . ,  No.  0�-40 Fi:l� ( 1\ .\'. 
Sup. ex Apr. S, �00� ) ,  IIVUilolilr at  http:/ /mi"II'.O�tg.s t � l te . ny. us/i nvestors/ p ress/2002/ap i"/ 
i\ l e rr i l l L. pclf ( un ti l e  ,,·irlt th e Iowa Law Revie11• ) . 
5 9 .  See Ron haszn i k &: M;u t reen F. i\•i c :'\: ichols ,  Does i\ lceti n g  Expectations t\-!atter: 
Evi dence from .-\n a h s t  Forecast Revisi o n s  ;md S hare Pr i ces (Aug. l �)99)  ( u n pub l i sh ed 
ma nuscri pt ,  0 1 1  ti le 11·irh the [""''' Ltl\' Re1·iew) . Yet dm,·ngrade,; are m o re acc ur<t l e  than 
upgrades. Womack, s ujna n o te :1 7 ,  at  1 6:1 . The c x t e m  or over-op t i m ism that occ u rs i n  securi t i e s  
rati ngs decreases as the rat i n g  decreases. So,  t h e  bt tl' rati ng i s  less accurate t ku� the hold,  <tnd 
the hold L H i ntz ; s  l ess �tccu rat.e tkll l  the se l l . Jen t t i fer Francis  &: Donna P h i l b ri c k ,  A nah·srs · 
Derisions 11.1 f'rudu!I' uj a M  u/ti-Task l�·ll <'illJIIIill'!lf, :) i . J .  .-\ccr. RES. :2 1  () , 225 ( 1 9�U ) .  
60 . Str· P'll l'rllfly Pa tr i c i a i\ 1 .  Dec l u m  t:t d i . ,  Tile Reb t i c> n  Between ,\n;th·srs'  Fore cts ts uf 
Lung-Tenn Growth < l l l cl Stnck Price Perform;mcc Fol l o11·i ng E q n i tv Offerings (j u n e  1 999)  
( u t t publ i ,; l tt :c l  m � u t uscript .  o n  l i le  11 i t h  r. l l e  l uw�t Lm· Re1·iew) ; Lau rie Kri gm an c t  �d . .  \\'l l v  Du 
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. () ·-} eve n w h e n  stock pnces collapsed.  · Moreove r, as the 1 n te rnt:t market 
collapsed from spring 1 999 to fal l  200 1 ,  and M erri l l  a nalysts i n ternally 
described cove red s tocks as 'j u n k, "  M e rr i l l  p u b l i cly c o n ti n ued to i ssue buy 
and strong buy ratin gs fo r th ese securit ies .
"(' 
M e rri l l ' s  story i s  h ardly atyp ical .  B e nj am i n  Mark Cole has described h ow 
the fou r  broke rage firms that l e d  t h e Plan e t  Hol lywood IPO issued th e i r  
h i ghest rati n gs o n  t h e  stock a n d  c o n t i n u e d  t o  support th ose rat i n gs wi t h  
o u tlandish p redictions about  the c o m pany t h a t  were i n consiste n t  even wi t h  
the company' s  own fi n a n ci a l  i nform ation.
1'7 
B e a r  S tearns '  s t a r  analys t Joseph 
Buckley m ai n tained his buy rati n g  o n  the com pany as the stock sank from i ts 
post-IPO price of $26 p e r  share down to $3 p e r  share. r
>s 
B uckley even tually 
downgraded the stock to n eutral j ust m o n th s  befo re the company fil e d  fo r 
bankrup tcy. 1''� 
I n  1 992 ,  the V1fall St'l-eel Journal publ ished a copy of a m e m o ra n d u m  fro m  
t h e  manag i n g  di rec to r  of corpo rate fi nance a t  ?v1organ Stanley m a k i n g  the 
finn ' s  expectations fo r i ts an alysts exp l i c i t : 
As we are all  too aware,  the re have been too many i nstances wh ere 
our Researc h  Analysts h ave been the source of n e gative c o m m e n ts 
abo u t  c l i e n ts of the Fi rm . . . .  Om obj ect i ve i s  . . .  to adop t  a p o l i cy ,  
ful ly u n d e rstood b y  th e e n ti re Fi rm ,  i n cluding t h e  Research 
Depart m e n t ,  that we do not m a ke n egative o r  c o n t roversial 
com m e n ts about our c l i e n ts as a m a tter of sound b u s i n ess 
prac t ice  . . . .  Wen del you pl eas e i nsure that th ese po l i cy obj e c tives 
are ful ly i n corporated i n to the Research Com pliance Man ual we 
are c u rre n t ly p repari ng.  :\.gain ,  the p h i l osophy and p racti cal resul t 
l 1 . . l- I " , Ill n e ec s to )e . n o  ne gatJ\'e co m m e n ts a o o u t  o u r  c 1en ts. 
Em p i r i cal  evidence demonstrates that the i nvest me n t ban k i n g  co n f1 i c ts 
of i n te rest a r e  d i rect ly  correl ated with analysts '  predi ct ions .  vVh e n  analysts ' 
e m p l ovcrs rece ive h igh e r i1westm e n t  ba n ki n g· fees,  th e analvsts genera te 
m o re ;)osi tive predic tions. " Th e pred i c t i o n s  ��1ggest  th a t  t h e  'underwri ters 
and t h e i r  analysts are try i n g  to boost th e market for the i r  c l i e n ts '  s e c u ri ties . '� 
Ano t h e r  study re ported that a n alys ts <l re m o re l i keiy to u pgrade stocks of 
u n d e rwri t i n g  c l i e n ts tl : <m of n o n - u n clc nvri t i n g  c l i e n ts. "1 
li:1 .  !rl. �ll l)- 1 '2 
(il i .  lrf. 
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This p ressure e:uTies over to the firm 's abili ty to d eliver i nvesto rs, an 
essen tial componen t of conti nu e d  underwri ti ng success. I nvestors wan t  good 
buys and they wan t  th e m  to stay that way. I n s ti tutional i nvestors, t h e  key 
i nvestors from the underwri ting p e rspective , are unwil l i n g  to tol e rate an 
analyst who d owngrades a stock in which they h o l d  a substantial positi o n ,  
l eaving the m  t o  take t h e  l oss. As a resul t, analysts face pressure t o  support 
the stock price after the u n d e rwritin g  is  complete.  As Beru a m i n  M ark Cole 
explai ned,  "The best  analysts, brokerages and m utual funds agre e ,  are those 
who keep the buy signals on. At l east u n ti l  large cl ients h ave exite d  the 
s tock. " 7 1  I n te resti ngly, those same i nsti tutional c l i e n ts are also responsible 
for publicly rating analyst performance,  thus l i mi t i n g  t he p o te n tial 
e ffectiven ess of  reputatio n  as a constrain t on analyst optimism . ''  
The ven ture capital role played by investm e n t  banking firms is 
particularly p roblentatic.  Th e ven ture arms of many fi rms search out 
companies before they go p ubl ic ,  assisting th e m  i n  findi n g  fun di n g . 71 i  In 
return, the groups often take stock in their c l i e n ts .  The resu l t  of this  process 
is that the venture capitalists e n d  up with a significant stake i n  the successful 
sale and subsequ e n t  sustai n e d  stock price of the securiti es once th e company 
h as gone publ ic ." Give n this  s i tuati o n ,  th e i nvestm e n t  b a n k  o r  i ts ve n ture 
arm h as a stro n g  i n terest in what i ts analysts say about the stock fol l ow i n g  the 
offering-at least u n ti l  the lock-up expires.7K 
The pressure o n  analysts conti n ues after the offering i n  o th e r  ways . 
Unde rwri ters su pport stock through market stabil ization after  t h e  o ffe ri n g, 
which creates pres:; u r e  fo r the analysts to continue to issue posi tive reports ."1 
For offeri n gs with i ock-up agre e m e n ts,  th e confl ic ts are eve n m o re layered. 
A lock-up agree m e n t  typically requires certain peopl e  not  to sel l  thei r s tock 
unti l  a specifi ed date ( for exampl e ,  s ix m o n ths after the offe ri l lg elate ) . 
U n d e rwriters, h owe\·er,  have the right to rel e ase c o rnpany o fficials  from a 
lock-up agree m e n t. Thus, the u n de rwri te r  con trols the date o n  which the 
lock-up e n ds.  The underwriter also may own shares that are subj ec t  to the 
lock-up .  The existe n c e  of a lock-up agre e m e n t  may consequ e n tly lead to 
"booster sho ts , "  or pos i tive reports issued by analysts that give the securities a 
pnce b u m p  j ust p rior to the expi ra ti o n  of the l ock-up agree m e n t. so T hese 
I ·L Cou:. sujnn n o r t: 4:) .  at 1 26.  
75 . Stt' inj�n n o te l :�8 .  
7(i .  See C :OLE.  sujml note 4:, ,  at  58-59.  
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the !P(J . \jin1narkrt. 5 :) J Fl :\ .  1 0:'\�) ,  l O:'iG (:2000) .  Firms h:tve created C: i l i 1 l ese \\·a i ls ,  o r  i n tcrn:1 l 
rules  <l l l cl procedures designed to d i m i nish the confl i c ts of i n te r est.  In 1 ·e:t l i tv ,  t h ost� ,,·: d ! s  : r rc 
r:trcl;· rl'S(Jt'ctccL Thn· :tr:: "c < Jmm o r l iv .  even tbgr:t n r h· disregarded w l 1 e n  r l )( :.''. p rese n t  obst : tc l e:; 
t" C l l l l l i l l tTC i :.d < lb j c c t il·t·s . "  H : t lw:t rd . sujim n o t e  47 .  at  :1-ti. 
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booster  shots benefi t c l ients as wel l  as undenvri ters and analysts who have 
stock in the ir  c l ients .  
lu1ecdota l  evidence supports the  conclusion that th ese confli cts 
influence analyst behavior. For example , at one poi n t  o n ly one analyst at a 
m aj or underwriti ng fi rm was covering Employee Solutions.'� 1  The 
undenvriter, Merri l l  Lync h ,  was trying to win a secondary offering j ob.�� In 
another case , a Piper ]affray analyst " heaped praise" on a company wh i le  
" lobbying" i ts CEO for un derwri ti n g  business.:;
'; vVb en that  company chose 
other undenvri ters, the analyst wrote a "scathing'' report on the company.''� 
As the reporte r tel l ing the s tory observed, " [0 ]  ne can only wonder what [ the 
analyst] would say had he [ instead] won a cut of the . . .  IPO. , ,,-, 
A 1 997 Forbes magazine series p rovides furthe r  evidence on analyst 
in dependence-or th e lack thereof. The Forbes reporter compared rati ngs of 
i ndependent analysts to those attemp ting to obtain underwri ti ng b usi ness . 
One example  covered by the Forbes piece i nvolved Steven Eisman, an analyst 
at Oppenheimer who thought that the prepayments on rnongage pools at 
GreenTree Fi nancial seemed to be "distressingly speedy."e�'' Unable to obtai n 
company numbers ,  h e  compiled the information on h i s  own and expressed 
h i s  concerns  publ i cly.' '' Six weeks later, th e com pany announced a pretax 
earnings charge of $ 1 50 mil l ion ,  based on the prepaym e n t  problem E isman 
had cliscovered.KK Despite GreenTree's  statement, Ei�rnan was the only 
analyst at a "major  firm who [was] l ess than enth usiastic about the 
company. ""9 He also vvas the only analyst at a fi rm that had n eve r 
underwritten one of Green Tree ' s  securi tizations .!
111 
Joseph ]olson, a SC'cond analyst covered ,  was, at the time of the stoJ), zm 
analyst at then Montgomery Securi ties. !1 1 He was one of fo ur trJ.cking 
R l l T I "'' H . ,b 11 ·  J " 1 · · ' ec wooc rust,  nc . · - e was · u rs 1 on t.1e company untr l  an analys t  ?tt 
another  fi rm-one that did " l i t t le  i nvc:;tment ban ki ng''-2<1\'t: th e c o m Danv <J 
nega tive rati ng . ' ' l  One clay later, Jo lson '\la:sh�d ' ' l;is t�s tiEnte; . l;m 
31 . Morgenso n ,  .'iee No Evil, snfmt note 2-±.  
8�. See it!. 
83 . Pe ter Bu iTO\\ S ,  A Sudtlm Changt' of 1-lewl at Pij)(:r, l3l'�. W:;. . .  Dec. 6. i 999. aL 6. rn•rii(ahf;· 
at l 999 \\"L 2 "i2'Hi�J :) l .  
t14. !tl. 
85 .  it!. 
Sli. Gretchen  i'v! ()rgcnso n .  See No hull . .  �jmi/; Nu Evil: !hr• !Jog ,\{!' Ow Horru·:uod;. Fo�UlC'-
Dec. 1 5 , 1 90 7 . at  l li 7 , 1 G7 , mJoi/(lb/e at i 097 WL l 6 1 7794:) .  
8 7 .  !d. 
88 .  ld. 
lJO.  !d. 
9 1 .  Gretchen \lorge 1 1son , St•e No /�vii, Sj;mk ,\·u h•il: l"oz•c f;,r Salr•, Fo:un:s.  Dec.  J :1 . l. :i�l / ,  :.I t  
l ii 6 ,  ava ila!Jie I / /  I tJ9 7  \\"!. I. f·i l 779H. 
v :: .  !d. 
l)�) . frl. 
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c o n tinued to rare the s tock  a b t ty. �14 Redwood was a l'vio ntgomery 
underwriting cl ient. '"''' 
The importance of investme n t  ban king also h as a d i r e c t  i m pact on 
analyst success and compensatio n .  For example , an analyst at l'vlo rgan 
Stanley atten ded a meeting w i th a c orporate finance c o l l e ague.  S h e  h ad 
assessed the proposed offering price of securi ties  i n  an i nvestme n t  banking 
cl ient to be approxim ately h alf of the amount on which the banking s ide of 
the fi nn had clecidecl .
'Hi At t h e  m ee ting h e r  col league "snapped open his  
briefcase an d pulled o u t  [a]  rec e n tly released compensation m e m o . "' '7 The 
m e m o  proposed that analysts be grade d  fro m  A to C on th e i r  abi l i ty and role 
m attracting i nvestm ent  banking c l i e nts and th e n  c o m p e nsated 
accord i ngly.�··� According to t he VI/all Street journal, the analyst was 
"stunnecl . "�'9 S h e  fel t  that she was rais ing an "obj e c tively q u a n tifiable issue,"  
a n d  h e r  col league was not " i nterested at all i n  the substance of [ her] 
work. " 1 1 111 He wan ted to know only whether she was "go i n g to h e l p h i m  get 
th e deal clon e . " 1 1 1 1  Once the d eal i s  d o n e .  of course,  the i nvestment-bankers 
wan t  c o n ti n ue d  coverage because wi t h o u t  it they cannot build busin ess .  As a 
f . l P'' result ,  thev p ressure analysts n o t  to d rop coverage o .  che n ts as wel l .  -
1v1 cdia and academic studies con ti nue to report that seil-side an al ys ts a re 
pa id ,  i n  part ,  o n  th e basi s of fi nance business generated i o:l vVh en they h e l p  
l a n d  c l i e nts,  t h e i r bon uses retl e c t  i t ,  e i th e r  a s  a perc e n tage of th e con tract  
bn clecl o r  i f1 absolute clol lars . 1 'H  For example ,  one �m alysr con tr:J C t  co n ta i ned 
a for m u l a  t h at could have resulted i n  np ro $ 1  m i l l i o n  i n  compe nsat ion ove r 
a two-vear  c c r i o d  based on l a nd i n �r u n d envri tinF busi ne�;s. 1 " -, In te res t inglv , 
,' t. l) L1 C J  • 
h o weve r, a n alys t  salari es typi cal l :" are not  base d o n  any d i rect atte m p t  to 1 £. 1 . j i ll i - l 
m e asure t ·1 e accuracy o analyst recom m e n c  at1 o n s  or r e p o rts .  l n s teac , 
�l- i .  !d. 
�l :"l . /d. 
'11). :. i ichael S icunulli .  Cnr!n fJ; ,•_, , u u·: ,\!  Mrn;�·r; ;; Sta n !n-. A n rr!ysi.' i l i·n· h:!.!,nf to Sojll'il 1-!utsft 
l 'ir;us. \\'.\Ll .  S I .  J . . J uh 1 -! .  1 9� 12 ,  al .-\ 1 .  
�-l/ .  ld. 
L):-) fr/. 
�}�} . lr/. 
1 1 10 .  M 
! i l l .  Sicon o l f i .  sujJIII I I u l<� � I I i .  
1 0'.? .  M 
C : l ;  \ l i ch �tcly 8�· \\ .o t n �lc.k,  sujJUI i H > t e  l } i ,  at ()�-) � ) :  Sc ( 1 t. t E. �� L i ck(:_' L  
Sn1 1  rity . \  n n lrsts, -1 7 J F l '; .  1 8 1 1 .  l S l '.? n .  � ( i �J\J:.' ) .  
()( I 
I U-1 . Scr· c:�bJXtri n u .  5UjJJll l1 C lC I u:�. 
1 u:-, _ fd. 
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analyst salaries reflect  th e i r  perceived "star qual i ty ,"  which h a s  m o re t o  d o  
with  their ski l l  a t  publ ic  relations t h a n  at obj ective evaluati o n . 1 07 
Consider the case of Jack Grubman,  a telecommunications  i ndustry 
analyst. Grubman was, for years, o n e  of the h ighest paid analysts on \Nai l 
Street. I n  the 1 990s, h is  annua l  compensation was reportedly i n  the range of 
$20 m i l l ion . 1 0s His recom m e n dations ,  h owever ,  fared l ess we l l .  In 200 1 ,  fi\·e 
telecommunicati ons concerns a l l  ti l ed for bankruptcy. 1 119 Jack Grubman was 
in the middle of this  group of i ndustry fai lures. Grubman issued buy 
recomme ndati ons on thi rty s uch companies in the two years precedi ng the 
bankruptcies . 1 1 0  Of course Grubman was, at the same t ime, he lp ing his firm, 
Salomon Smith Barn ey, wi n secu ri tv deals  fro m  the same compan ies . 1 1 1  
According to the New York Times, from 1 997 to 200 1 ,  Salomon cornered the 
tel ecom i nvestment banki n g  market, "tak [ i ng] in more i n  fees from telecom 
companies than any other fi rm on the street. " 1 1 �  D u ri ng the years in which 
Grubman was hypin g  the stocks, Sal omon col lected $809 m i l l ion for 
underwri t ing stocks and bonds and $ 1 78 mi l l ion  for strategic combi nation 
advice .  Although im·estors who fol l owed Mr .  Grubman 's  recom m e n dations ,  
and h eld on to securi ties i n  th e firms h e  was hypi ng, "fared cl ism al ly," 1 1 :1 
Grubman fared wel l .  A portion of the undenvri t ing fees we n t  d i rect ly to 
Grubman . Inc idental !v, Grubman received lnstit utional lnves!or's top ra n king 
l 07 .  :\ ! t h o ugh dl ldlvst s;tbries  m ;t\ i n co rpor;ne i he 1 \'ul/ Sl rn·/ Jo u m ol :m ;til"st ran k i ngs . 
which arguabl1· reflecr :tcruran i n c l i re c t h·. analYs ts a re k n01m ro 1·i s i t  lll a l l ; tgc m c- n r  . i us t  pri or to 
the Jo u ma[s lTI·iew. l ead i ng· tn poten ri; t l  bi ; t s  i u  t h e  Jo u m o(s n t ;tnagc m e n t  s u JYL'I· . . \n• S t i c keL 
sujnu n o te 1 03, at �1-i. S i m i larlY. the  ;malYsl ran k i ngs p ubl ishecl lw fllslilu l io n o l / u , ,, .. ,,rn uLtg; t z i n e  
a re reporteclh· based on su t>:n·s in  "·hich big mon e1· m;u1:1gers :tre asked t < l  Lmk a n;t h·sts b;tscd 
o n  factors that  i n c lmle i ndus r n  k iH J\\kclgc ,  access i h i l i r1·, ; l l lc l  1 :1rious o t h e r  c r i k r i : t .  .-\ccurcl i n g  
t o  o n e  c m p i 1· ict l  studv, t h e  rcs u l t i 1 1 g  ran ki n gs ;u-c ]);·tsecl more u n  rcp u u t i < >n : t l l l l  rt" u ,g n i t i " n  
t h:m o t t  ;u l ; t iYs t pc rl(lr l l lancc a n d  rese; trc l l c fi i m s  . .\r·r· Xi  ! . i .  Career C : o t l ct-rns f l f  :-\n:th·s ts :  
C :otnpc n sati oi J ,  Ter m i n:nio n ,  ; Jnci Performance ( .-\pr. :-> .  �00�) ( un publ i sh ed ! l l ;t i l l tscri p t. 0 1 1  f i le 
w i t h  the Iowa L111· Rn·ie\\·). 
l OS .  See C:h a rlc.s  G;lsp;tri t l ! i .  F lu· .\omi11g ·9os: /Jelii1 1ri the /n; •rsli11g (;/u / 1 /s 1 1 1 1d Sioihs lh11 1  :i lurlu·d 
rt DtYrule, W.\I .L. ST. j. .  Dec. l c� .  1 1 i�)� l .  at C l  ( report i n g G rubnl�tl l " s :tn n ual  compc 1 ; s: l ! i o n  i n  i �J�l().s 
tu be .. as m uch :ts S�:i m i l l i o n  .. ) :  f';nd S\\·t-e l t ,·Y, Slll lri 11p; iu till' /Jo u u l.y : Ooi-\ :r;!l/.1 ruul J-!yjH>r 
CtnnjHiitioll Hm•c linised \ \ .nil Sin'!'! ( ."o ll!jit 'l / .1111/u!l /_n 'l'fs lu Cnjmn·dtu t,•r/ fitigh/ 1. f, u l  \ \ .ill It i.rrsf 1. 
[;\\· .  DL\l .E RS D I L I·.S I " .  . J u n e  I � . � ( ) 1 1(1 ( c i t i t t g  rcpurts  t.hat G r u b m a n  '':;t,; c:u n i_ , ,g �;� ( )  m i l l i < > n 
a n n ual!�- ) . 
1 09 .  Stt' Cretc l t e n  \l u rgc i iS! i l l . li·!nr!ll/ .. l f 'inl !'ijNT: \ \ '/r o.\1' Sir!t \ \ "us [j,. 011 i, :\ .\ ·. T ! \ I F.\. :\o\ . 
1 8 ,  2(J() I .  at 3 .  
l l O .  Sw it!. 
I l l .  Perh aps l 1 l01T tru t t b l i n g  is t h e  !": t c t  tl ui  CrubllLi l l  ''l ' l i c i rcd pr ! !:-; i L'-' i n  t l i c' C ! l l l i n . l 
con tesr bc lwecn \ \T(' r ldC(J t ! l  �u 1 d  B r i t i s h  Tek,;._-( J i l l l 1 l L L t 1 i c a ti u t l S  l'ur \ 1 L 1  ( \ J i l l l l1 t t l l � C � H i (J 1 h  �tl .  t he 
same l i m e  tktl  he ,,·;1s purport i ng lu C ! i\ . ._-r \\·urlciC:om a.'i a rese; trc l ;  ;uL t h :' i  .\r·,, \b i t h t· ,,: 
Colcl.stc i t l ,  \ \ 'u r/dColll Cu !istnl Cnrlmuu1 in .\ IC! Fak''· ThcStrec t . C < > l i l  (luh l l . �l )i l� ) .  n l  h u p : / ..­
"'""��"· t l intrc c t. c o m / i l l a rker'i / t l t a rt hc'.' golcbre i n 1 I ( ) ( );', I �I IO. l u m l  ( < J l l  ti le 11·i r l t  t h e:  lu\, ;1 L1"· 
f�c1·i t'll.) . 
I !  '2 .  ld 
l L-L id. 
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m 1 998, 1 1 -1 despite 
pe rformance-based 
estimates. 1 1 � 
h is  conspicuous absence from th e magazin e ' s  
lists such as best stock pickers or  best earnings 
C. ACCE:'SS lNTf_'RESJ'S 
A third type of analyst conflic t  is created by analysts' n e e d  to m ai n tain 
access to issuers to obtain com pany information . These potential conf1 icts 
are perhaps the most dangerous from the perspective of the securi ties 
markets . As indicated above, securities analysts h ave beco m e  i n creasingly 
rel iant o n  covered companies themselves as sources of research information . 
At the same t ime,  corporate officials face substantial pressure to maintain 
the company's  stock price. T hese corporate offic ials tend to vi ew analyst 
skepticism or criti cism with disfavor. As a result, analysts who issue negative 
reports  or recommendations face harsh criticism I I t; or  worse fro m  corporate 
offi cials . 1 1 7 
Indeed, analysts who exercise i n dependent j udgment  are often frozen 
out of future access. 1 1 '' Corporate offi cials may refuse to take analysts ' phone 
cal l s ,  proh ibi t employees from speakin g  with them,  avoid the i r  questions i n  
f f . 1 1 ' 1 con erence cal ls ,  an d re use to atten d  analyst-o rgamzed confe re n ces .  · 
These stonewal l ing efforts by i ssuers interfere with analyst efforts to conduct 
research on the companv. As a resul t, analvsts question whether  thev can be 
h o n est and sti l l  do thei:- j ob. 1 �0 One ;mal�st,  who had repeatedly f�1i led to 
rate a bank's  securi ties as a "buy," for example,  was denied an opportunity to 
meet  with th e bank's c h ief executive officer. 1 � 1  Instead , the com pany 
suggested that he meet with a l ower-ranked managem ent  m ember wh o was 
. I �  n o t  eve n l ocated 1 11 the ban k's  h eadquarters. -- Another analys t atte mpted to 
a t lencl a Bosto n Chicke n ,  Inc . ,  research analyst confe rence,  but was greeted 
with the fol lowi ng comment  from the company's  ch ief fi nancial  officer:  '·vve 
do n ' t  \l'ant vou h e re .  \Ve don ' t  wan t  you to confuse you rself wi th the 
I l -1. Ser id. 
I l ;,_ St'e COLL sujJm note 4:':>,  at 1 25 .  
l 1 6 . Dug�tr, 1 /ljJI'rJ note 40, at 1 35 ;  SCI' Susan Pul l iam,  A n a lysts tu '/(•// Cung;res.\ tlurt S/;ejJtirism 
Gets Fhe111 . \ busr'. W.\LL ST. J, ?vlar. 1 9 ,  2002, at  C: J (quo t i ng two f\·l organ Stan ie; analysts \dlO 
'' e re " l amlJas t [ed ] "  bv the ch ief  exec mi,·e at Q"·cst Com m u n ications l n te rnat ion�t l ,  Inc .  afte r 
thu questi oned the compan:•'s accounting practices. and noting that SEC is c u rren tlv 
i m·e;;tig�t t ing Q"·e,; t 's  �tCCO\ l l l ti n g  p ractices) . 
1 1 7 . See S tephen Barr ,  1-\ lzal ChinnP \ V({ll?, ] () CFO M.·\C . ,  f\'lar. ! ,  2000, at G3 (describing 
sni :�s uf rt' tal i ;: r iuns  IJ1· issuns agai nst analysts whu issu e n eg�Hi1·e repons ) . 
I I � .  Sec f'u l l i � tm,  sujmt n ote l l () ( discussing treatmenr of anah·srs b)' \-\'�i l l  Street firms ) .  
l ) CJ !rl. 
! �( )  lrl. 
1 � 1  M 
1 ':! � .  lrl. 
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facts . " 1 �:1 The analyst had issued a sell  recomm e n datio n  on Boston Chicke n ' s  
stock. S imi l arly, w h e n  i n depende nt analyst An ne Anderson i ssu ed a sel l  
rating on Oxford, Inc. ,  Oxfo rd ' s  response was to "disinvite" her fro m  i ts 
I ''4 analyst conference and refuse to return h e r  calls .  -
I n  extre m e  cases, analysts who issue accurate but u n favorab l e  reports 
m ay even be fired. 1 �,., In o n e  of the m os t  h igh-profi l e  cases, star analyst Mike 
Mayo issued a controversial recom m e n datio n  i n  spring 1 999 that c l ients sel l  
ban k stocks . 1�6 Despite the fact  that Mayo 's prediction was s triki ngly 
accurate-bank stocks suffe red th e i r  worst p e rformance, relative to the 
market, in fifty-four years-he was subse q u e n tly fired. 1 27 After c o n ducting 
i n te rviews wi th dozens of securi ties professi onals,  Fortune magazine 
concluded that  Mayo was fi re d  for h i s  h o nesty. 1 2� 
A cas i n o  analyst at Jann ey M o n tgome ry Scott,  Marvin Roffman , was also 
fi red after forecasting that Donal d  Tru m p  would defaul t  on i n terest 
payments for his T<:� Mahal cas ino i n  Atlanti c  C i ty . 1 2\1 Roffman subsequen tly 
won an arbitration suit  agai nst  Janney for $750,000. 1 �0 I n ci d e n tally,  Tru m p  
did default on t h e  i n terest paym e n ts as Roffman h ad predicted .  
Si m i l arly, Donaldson ,  Lufkin and jenrette, I n c .  ( "DIJ")  a nalys t Thomas 
K B rown was "a Master of th e Universe i n  bank stocks: fiftee n  vears o n  \Va l l  
Street a n d  i n  eigh t o f  t h e  past n i n e  years, t h e  top-ranked analyst o f  regional  
banks on the prestigious I nstitu ti onal Investo r Al l-Ameri ca Research 
'Ti l · Team . · After seven years at D LJ ,  h owever, Brown satd h e  was fired because 
1 
.� <) 
h e  had been too negative on D LJ c l i e n ts .  '-
Analyst pressure m ay come i n  other forms as wel l .  Analysts may face 
l i tigation from disgrun tled issuers .  Iss u e r  Posi tive Response Tel eYis ion Inc .  
sued Pai newebber analyst Sta n  Tri l l i ng, blam i ng i ts stock plunge on a cr i tical 
artic le  in Forbes rnagaz i n e . 1 'n Likewise,  another company "slapped'' two 
.1 :23.  \l ichae l  S icono lfi , !nuerlible "Buys ": Many CollljJan ii'J Press A nnlyst., to S!1'1'r C!Nn of 
Negativr Ralings. July 1 9 , 1995,  \\'.-\LL ST. J ,  at Al . 
1 2<t. .\lorgcnson, Set No l:'r!l , s upra note 24. 
1 2:) . Sre, l'.g. ,  Deborah Lohse. A nalyst .Feels Vindiw/1'(/ on Conseco. \L\Ll. ST J .  :\ lav 1 4 . :200() a t  
C 1 (describi ng CEO oF Conseco, Inc .  a s  approaching stock anal)·st who issued negative report 
on c o mp:rn;·, t h re a t e n i n g  analyst, and cal l ing a nalyst 's  superi o rs and not ing th:.tt Cnnseco l a t e r  
reponed earn i n g:-; p roblem' ) .  Fo r a n other s t01y, ren years earl ier ,  on t l 1e  :<<r m e  anah st .  see 
.Jeffrey C'vl . Ladcrm:lll e t  al . .  How Much Should Vou Tmsl l'our ,-\ n a lyst >, BLS.  \\'K. , Jul;· �'> .  1 990, a t  
S L  
1 26 .  S,•e Da1·icl Rynecki . 'Fhe Prire of Being Righl, FORTL' '-:E,  Feb. S ,  200 1 ,  a t  1 26.  
1 2 7 .  !d. 
1 28 .  !rl. 
1 2lJ . Cai!SI'UJ Droj!s Ml'rrill for ;\1()1grlll AjiN nowngmde, BLOO�l llERC i\ 1::\I.S, Oct. I ''., 1 0� J . l .  
1 30 .  !rl 
I ;) I .  .)dfrc1· [l:l .  Ladcrman, \ \ 'all Strl'l'i �� Sj1i11 Crnnl', BL'S.  \YK . .  Oct .  S ,  1 908. :rt 1 -1 8 .  
i c�2. !d. DL[  c Lt imcd t h a t  t h e  dism issal was h�tsecl on "a l o t JgsL<J nc l ing : u 1 cl : rcri n J n t J i ( I I I S  
c o n fl i c t  \\ i th c" lkague,; i n  the i n .-;r.i Lut iotLtl-e q t t i t ies  cli1·i s ion '' of D I J  lrl. 
1 ')3 \\'i l l i am Po"•er, Colllj){} ll_\' Sues Bml1n. Forbe:> .for Sh on' Foil. \ \'.\LL S r. J .  Ot:c .  -i. 1 9� l:'i.  : t t  
c: l .  
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analysts wi th defamation sui ts when th ey issued reports q uestion ing i ts profi t  
potential . 1 :H 
The analyst-i ssuer relationship does no t  compromise just  the analyst. 
The relationship can also distort the issuer's decision-making. For example ,  
corporate officials are loath to  report performance numbers that  differ from 
analyst predic tions .  This apprehension h as two effects. First, officials provide 
analysts with earnings "guidance" in an effort to insure that the ir  predictions 
do not create unrealistic expectations o n  the part of the market. 1 :1,
-
, Second, 
once the predicti ons have been released, officials face ovenvhe lming 
pressure to meet those numbers ,  i nc luding the risk of l i tigati o n .  As a resul t, 
officials may resort to " managing" their  fi nancial  figures i n  o rder to meet 
analyst predictions . 1 :11i Increased earnings management by corporate official s  
has recently  led to  widespread restatements .  
In l ight of these mu l tip le  and sign ificant conflicts ,  i t  is apparen t  that the 
real i ty of the analys t  role i s  far differen t  from the theoretical  independent  
gatekeeper. Analysts and  their employers own s tock in  covered companies .  
Analysts work for investme n t  banking fi rms and a re tied i n to the cl i en t­
wooing process. Analysts are forced to give posi tive coverage to win c l ients ,  
to keep c l ients ,  and to keep the i r  j obs. Even nominal ly i ndependent  analysts 
face pressure to issue only positive coverage or risk be i ng frozen out  of 
access to corporate information .  As Pan III explai ns ,  court s  and regulators 
h aYe clone l i t tl e to dampen these conflic ts and the refore h ave fai led to 
protect im·estors adequately. 
I I I .  R E C U L\TI O :\f OF THE SECURITIES A::'\i.-\LYST 
rL F/:!JI-.R \1. PJ�GUL\ T!O:\-THJ�· COL'RT'i 
In performing the roles described above , the securi ties a nalyst has been 
s u rpris i ngly free fro m  regu latOJ]' OYersigh t. Feder<1l bw does regulate SEC­
registered investment advisers, albe i t  "l ight ly ." 1 :17 The fede ral securi ties laws 
1 :1-L E l i z;tl)t' t i l  \ L t c D o n ;t l c l .  Li/J,,I Suits PIJ.\1' a Nisi! Jin i\ nalysls. W.\ l . l .  ST . .J . ,  Dec. '.!9.  1 9()9.  at 
C l .  
i c·\:'i . l nc l e c c l .  <t gro u p  o f' scho brs fou n d  ('l ic lence r h ;l l  post-l 9�l2. anah·sts consiste n tly ·'walk 
dn\\· 1 1  .. r h e i r  c;t m i l t gs csti m;ttes to a le,·ei l l l < t t  the fi rm can bc;tt b1· the e n d  of' the ;·ear. Scot.t ,\. 
R i c kmlson t·t <tl . . Tl t e  \\.;t\ kclui,.IJ to Bca table ,-\ n a lysr  Forecasts: Tl i r· Role.-; of Fqt t i ty l.ssuancc 
ancl l m i dcr Tr;tcl i 1 1g l n c e n t in·s ( :\ug. :200 1 )  ( un puhl ishecl m ;J m!SC r ipr  . . ( ) ! l  i ik ,,·i t h  t h e  low:t Law 
Rc,·i t·,,· J , m•oilnhf,· nl l ntp: ,.'/ ; n i t.eclu/"Ysoki p/"."''"/ papns.hul t .  T i l t· p r : 1 c t i c c  is  1 1 1 0s t  
pro ! ! l l ! I I J Ccci  <l l l i <' J l lg l inns th < ! t  < trc e i t h er n e t  issuers u f  e q u i t y  o r  ,,· lwre lll < t ll <tgers ,: e l l  stock 
l'o l l m,·i , J g  ;uJ t " <t r n i n gs ;mnu t m c e m e n t .  lrl. 
1 :�1i . . lost:ph Fu lkr S.: \ l i cktt>l C :  . . Jen,.:en . .Just S<tl· i\!n 1 0  \\.;: 1 1  S t re e t  ( Feb.  1 7 . '.!00 '2 )  
( un p ubl ished m ;mu,.:cri p t ,  ' ' n i i le  l\·i l i 1  t h e  [o,,·a L111· Rt:l i t·l, ) .  m •o i/n/;/,· n l  h u p : / / p;q.Je rs .,;srn . 
u ) Jn/ ab . ...: t r: l c  t::=��. ;  7 1  :�) : 1 .  
I ':'. 7 .  Ruht'l l.<t S. k<U"I I l c· l .  Thl' Clu:llni_!:J' lo Fiuanrinl liegu !alors fJii.\l'fi by Stu/Ill Snuuly  
! )rh •rtli:otion .  h - l  (� ROOk. L .  RL\ · .  l U-t?� .  \ () ()>) ( 1 �-)q0 ) .  K�tn n t· l  dc:�cr iL:.:·s t l l t ' rt·L·ordke t · p i n g ,  
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d o  n o t ,  h owever, s e t  forth any requi re m ents o r  p rerequis i tes specifi c t o  the 
role of secur i ties analysts, primari ly because as long as analysts d o  n o t  
p rovide personalized i nvestmen t advice o r  reco m m e n datio n s ,  they are n o t  
v i ewed as c l i e n t  fiduciaries.  l :;x S i m il arly, t h e  analyst function does n o t  usual ly 
i n vo lve han d l i ng custo m e r  m o n ey or securit ies .  l :l'l l'vloreover,  because sel l ­
s ide a nalysts typi cally are employed by b roker-deale rs and are comp e ns a ted 
i n di rectly th rough brokerage c o m mi ss ions rather  than pai d d irectly fo r 
investment  advic e ,  th ey are exem p t  from the Investm e n t  Advisers Act 
p u rsuan t to secti o n  202 ( a) ( l l ) . 1
10 
Significantly,  existi ng law perm its analysts to operate u n d e r  a varie ty of 
con fl icts of  i nterests such as those discussed in Part II above . U n ti l  recently, 
in most cases ,  the law i m posed l i ttle or  no affirmative obl igatio n  to disclose 
even th e existence of these confl icts apart from the l argely the o ret ical risk 
that fai l u re to disc lose would consti tute securit ies  frau d .  Furth e rm ore ,  
because o f  t h e  narrow constructi o n  of the Investment Advis e rs Act, i t  i s  
d iffi c u l t  to determi ne the precise scope of act ionable  frau d  u n d e r  i t .  Anv 
such fraud would seem to requ i re a di rect p e rsonal relati o n s h i p  of advisor  
and cl ie nt. 1 1 1 
Alternatively, an analyst could be l iable under secti o n  l O (b) a n d  Rul e  
1 (), - t- . S . . d n 1 . f 1 " 0 1 1 4., T 1· . I ' h . o-!:> o tll e , e c n n u es an .t.xc 1ange l-\.c t o. :-; :.� L . - . rae t ti o n a  . JY, sue s Lu t�. 
report i n g , and d i s c! Psu rt· require m e 1 1 ts �tp p l i cable to i m·es tm c t t l  �t c h i sns �1 1 1 d  obse n cs that 
" there are nc>  qtt;diticlt ions f'( ) r  becomi ng an i nYestn l C l l l  a ch·i,er.'' !rl. 
1 :\� .  ·rile J n, est n l t' t: r  .:\ch·isers Act of ! �HO regula res 
;; 1nY pc r:�on Y•:ho.  ! 'or co�-npci � :-:.:-�t il )n , cng;lgt_.� in the b: t� i l l t"'  . ..;s \ )f adYi . ..; i n g  ( } t h t" r::. , 
t· i r h e r  d i rt· l : l h· or th n_)ugh pt: bi ic�l i". i ol"L'-' nr '.\Tit i ng�;. cts ro the ,·alut� of :.;ec ur .i t ics c; r as 
f C J  t h e  ; t cl·-: is: t b l 1 l t � ·  uf i n \ e s t i n g· i n .  purc h asi ng. or _..;el l i n g  ��ec u .ri t ics .  or \\·h o.  for 
C < Hn p:--· n:.�u i o r i  : :nd  �ts parr or a regular hits i nc-·.ss, issue� or pr<.n l l u lgatcs � tnaly:;cs u r  
reports conccru ing secu rities. 
l t lH''tm e n t  .-\CI "�· Ll-!0 � SOb-� ( a )  ( .1 1 ) . J :-, L; . S . C.  :��  �Ub- 1 lO -� l ( '2000 ) .  ! ts focu.s .  hc >\·:n·er. i,; 
on d i rt ·c !  i n ':t·stnH� i 1 i  n·co n l n 1 e n cL-!tions to cl i ents . .  \rc p.J'!U'rally Ln\,·c \·. SEC�. 4 /lj_ L� .s .  1 � 1  ( J �)ft1) 
( fi n d i ng t h a r  :\c t  1\ �t :i d i rec ted to bmincss ( )f pnJ1· iding persona l i zed i m c·s rmcm a(l\ icc ro  
:..;pc-c i l· ic  c l i en t s ) .  CcJ J n n1 C n t ; l t(>rs h tn·c ohsen·e�cl t h�! l IAFf.l1r'' :::.. t i t 1 (1 1 :·sis � h o u l d  :� i rn i Lt rly  h r i n g  
fln anci; t !  c o l u n i n i� t::. 1d H >  ;:rc 1 1 0 1  n;al;.i n g  di rect rc· c o m n i e n cb r i u n s  l < l  spt: c i llc  c l i c n rs .  o u i s i cle 
t i l e  scorw uf !he .-\ct. Se!'. l'.g .. Ddl·i d  l .el·ant ,  Fill(l /l(lr:/ r:oi/1 11 / I I IS!S (/\ 1117 11'111111' 1 1( .·\ tlvisi'I'S: :\fin I .< !\\'<:: 
u nr/ C::lrp t. · n t -c r .  7-l (\ 1  .. L RL\'. :;mi l , 'W79 ( i ' Ji-:11 ) .  
I '"1'1 . r\n � thsrs  wi H >  �trf cmpln::nl i n  broker ck�1 lcrs m �•s he subject 1 0  scc l l ri t i c·s : ·cguLH i o ns 
regard i n g  financi i l i  st .. curi r�: and n::cnrdkccping.  ·rhus. for e\:; uYl p l e ,  : t n aly:�t.s COi l l l l 1 0 i l l y  �1re 
requ i red ! 1 1  r : tke tht· Scrie . .; I �:.:ai11 bectuse th,·\· are a��snci ;Ht>d pt"rsons uf regislerccl hrnker­
ck� J i f'rs . .  \,· ... 1 7  C . F . !�. :::; '2-l( I . F> i:.-7 . 1 ( '2 ( 1 ( 1:; ) .  
1 -lO.  T i l l· .-\c r  l'v: l l lcies f n >m t h e  cle1i l l i l i u n  nf i nH�stmCt l l  ad'. i .scr J broker <. > 1· cle �der \,·hose 
i n\·e� l l l l c t H  �lch·i s{ l r·-.· ; t c t iYl r i t>�' arr� sol c:h· i nc i d e n tal to ih L; rukcrag-t' bus i :H ·s:·; < t JHl \\· h o  doe:-; n n r. 
� ·ecei .. :c a 1 1:,· :\t-p;�r��t ::: cun1 1 H_'i1S�H ion fur p ro\·i dil lg  1 n\·es!.ll1i� l 1 l  �ichi c e .  l :1 L . S . ( � .  � 80b-� ( a )  ( I l l  
( :2 ( ) ( ) ( \ ) .  
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have been rare . 1 -1:: Recently, h owever, i nvestors have begun to bring claims 
against analysts based o n  f�1lse or mis leadi ng recom m e n dations or 
predictions.  For example,  in M ay 200 1 ,  i nvestors fi l ed an NASD arb i tration 
claim against Morgan Stanley and i ts controversi a l  analyst Mary M eeker, 
alleging that they were m isled by that firm ' s  overly optimistic and i naccurate 
recommendations of technology stocks. 1 14 On August 1 ,  200 1 ,  another class 
of i nvestors filed suit against six brokerage firms for issui n g  m i sleading 
favorable recomme ndations and research reports on a variety o f  I n tern e t 
securi ties . 1 1" The extent to whi c h  these suits wi l l  be successful remains an 
open questi o n .  On one hand, in  July  200 1 ,  Merril l  Lync h  paid $400,000 to 
settle a case by a former c l i e n t, al leging that h e  was duped by a M erri l l  
Internet analyst. 1 4'' On the other hand, a federal court quickly dis m i ssed the 
. . M S 1 d Ivf k 1 47 swt agamst organ tan ey an ee er. 
The most con troversial regulatory area i nvolving analysts has been the 
extent  to 1vh ich the i r  use of n o n  public i nformation creates the poten tial for 
ir:s ider trading l i abi l i ty. Historically, an alysts h ave enjoyed superior access to 
corporate informati o n .  Issuers routi n ely shared i nformati o n  with a favored 
gro u p  of analysts before disclosing the i n formation to th e general public .  Hs 
Issuers \Vcnlld h ol d  i nvitati on-only m eeti ngs and conference cal l s  to rel ease 
updated corporate i n formation and answer analyst q u est i o n s . 1 ��� Moreover, 
i ssuers 1.muld respond privately to analyst  i n quiries and, i n  some cases ,  would 
. ·1 1 ' t . l l ff - l . \ ·)II rev1ew t 1e a n<Lyst s wor"- proc uct anc o er gu1c ance as to 1 ts accuracy. · 
Duri ng th e 1 970s, the SEC p ursued analysts and their c l i e n ts i n  several 
cases for using i nformation selectively disclosed by corporate i nsiders . In In 
re Investors JHanagcment, for example, th e SEC censured analys ts at M erril l  
Lv;1 ch and the i r  tippees for tradin g  o n  the basis o f  n on-public n egative 
----- -- - -- --- --------------- ---------
l -±:1. B1t1 st'l' In rt' Credi t  Su isse Fi rst Boston Corp. Sec L i t i g . ,  �) 7 Ci\·. -1 7 60 , 1 998 U.S. Disc 
LEXJS l ti5()0, < l l  ''' :lG (S. D .N .Y. On. 19 ,  1998) ( denying m otion to dism iss private su i t by 
i l l \ Cswrs �li legin g  that analyst nt<tclc und uly pessimistic recu m m enclati u l l s  clue tu h is firm's short 
pc� i t i tH1-"' i 1 �  co\·ered securi ri es) . 
i 't4 i•L-.h i n  \'. Morg<m S t;mlcy Dean Wi tter & Cu . ,  0 1  Ci\-. 7248, 200 1 US D ist .  LEXIS 
l S 3 7 : \  �tt  ::: 1 (S .D . I'.J .\'. 1\ug. 23, 200 1 ) .  
l -L") .  Fadcrn -rru.-;r v. (�redit  Suisse First Boston Corp . ,  0 ! -C\'-7 1 () 1  (S .[) . N .Y. /\ug. 1 ,  200 1 ) .  
t:vrli(!li,,'e rri h t t p : /  / \\"sw. lo·.:elbtewan.com/bomejump. : 1 t tm l : page�ctsel is t . : h t m l  ( o n  file 11·ith the 
j ( ,,,·:t L i''' F_c, i e\1' ) ; ,\:'1' dsu :··,Jc:'�arn�tra v. Bre-�\: Mi nerals LlcL . ::200 1 U.S.  DisL LE:\:IS 4:i 7 l  (E .D .  
�ft: x .  :'.L!:·. ��0 .  �00 1 )  ( refusi ng t o  c!isnli:..;s corn p l a i n t  against  . J P  !\ f orga n .  issur:r's in\'est ln e n t  
ach·i:; c: :. h r  p u b l i c  ::, t a re m e n t:; 1 1 1 :1de b\' ivl o rgan analysts) . 
i -l-ti. x,\S!) Barks ,-\ !irdys!-Conjlirl DiscloSI.IIPS, MRmbns Soy, l)L_()()\ i  \'.FRC: \1 \C\\'S, Ocr. 1 0 , �no 1 .  
l -l 7 .  1\ t' i l  F�.oLm d  & 11\': t l i t: r  H a m i l to n .  KetjJing ' Fabs o 1 r  ihl' limrstigolirm.l, L:\_ T i \ I ES ,  :\br. :'> ,  
�dO�. �i t C:). 
l - H l .  S:'<" :. ujno t H J �.t' "7. 
: �i 1 : .  .':':';' ,i r/. 
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i n form ation about Douglas Aircraft. 1 c, 1  I n  Bausch & Lomb, the SEC sought 
i njunctive rel ief after analys ts covering Bausch & Lomb met  with the 
company's chief executive officer and obtained non-publ ic  negative 
i nformation regarding future earni n gs and business operations. 1 c,
� I n  
another case ,  J\!lonarch Fund, the SEC attempted to obtain d isgorge m e n t  
from an i nvestment  advisor a n d  the funds h e  managed,  whic h  had traded o n  
the basis of i nformation obtai ned from a corporate director abou t  th e 
company's future funding. 1
-
' 1 I n  SEC v. L um 's, Inc. , the SEC pursued Lehman 
Brothers after i ts broker, who had obtained nonpubl ic  i nformation abo u t  a 
down turn i n  earnings at Lum's,  communicated that i nformation to an 
ins ti tutional c l ient  that th en sold i ts stock. 1
''4 Fina lly, in Dirks v .  SEC, the SEC 
censured Raymond D i rks for communicating informatio n  about  an 
undisclosed fraud at Equity Funding to h i s  c l ients ,  who subsequently traded 
on the basis of the information . 1 ''" 
The SEC j us tified i ts efforts to target se lective disclosure to analysts o n  
fai rness grounds. 1 c,1i Its position was that all  i nvestors shoul d h ave equa l  
i nformation o r ,  a t  least, equal access to i nformation . 1 '" Accordi ngly, th e SEC 
reasoned that  w·hen analysts or the i r  c l ients traded o n  the basis of n o n­
public ,  selectively disclosed i nformation ,  they viol ated Rul e  l Ob-5 . 1'" The 
Lum 's court summarized th is posltl o n ,  explaining that  "se l e c tive 
disclosure . . .  u l ti mately works unfairness in the markets :  some people are 
better i nformed and th us can conduct better analyses,  in reaching decis ions  
to  act,  because of unfair  advan tages n o t  enj oyed by o thers . " 1 ·, , )  
Judicial reaction to analysts '  l iabi l i ty based on th e ir  receipt  and use of 
selectively disclosed corporate info rmation was l argely cri t ical  of the SEC' s 
posit ion.  T h e  criticism was of two types .  First ,  the courts placed greater valu e  
than the SEC on th e role of analysts in  u n covering and dissernin<lting 
. f 
. [ ( ;)) 0 l b f . 1 . corporate 1 11 onnatwn . ,-:->ec o n c , a nurn · e r  o .  court:; questw n e c  the  scope 
of nde l Ob-5 and reaso n e d  that i ts appl i ca tion was l i m i ted to cases i nvolving 
a breach of fiduciary duty. 1 'i 1 The Supreme Court u l ti m ately acce p ted bo t h 
of these arguments .  I n  Chiorel!a, th e Court rej ec ted t h e  ·' i n fo rmation" theory 
Fi l /11 re I nw:'srors \lan �1ge m c n t  C :u . .  4 , (  S .E .C .  ()?,:-'\, ()4R ( 1 �)7 1 ) .  ivl c rri l l  Ln1 c h  '' � ' s  ani n g  as 
pro:;pc-CJ ive m a n agi 1 1 g  \ l l lderwri tcr fu r a new iss 1 w  of Douglas Ai rn�lft :>t·c uri t i cs � � t  the r i m e  o f  
the seknin:' d isclusure. /rl. a t  bc)·l. 
1 :)2 .  SEC v. Bau:�.ch &.: Lornh, l i 1 c . .  :JG:) F.2d k .  9 (2d C i r. 1 � "1 7 7 ) .  
1 0 :-'\ . SEC 1 .  Mo narch Funcl ,  iiOk F.2d t) '·\S ,  9:l�i ( 2cl C:i r.  EJ 7� ) .  
1 04.  SFC , . .  L u m · s  I n c . ,  :)(10 F. Supp.  1 04 6 ,  lOt)() (S .D .N .Y. I CJ T\ ) .  
1 :)0 .  D i rks '' ·  SEC : ,  -Hi?> U .S.  G-1 \ i ,  {i) 1 ( 1 C)f'c) ) .  
1 :-) 6 .  Set· in  u· C:ach·, Roberts 8.: Cu. , -lO S . E . C. lJ07 ,  i)] ::! ( J lH5 l ) .  
1 :) 7 .  Si'e iri. 
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of l iabi l i tv in  favor  of  the "ficluciarv" theory. 1 1'� Superior i nformati on alone,  ; I ' 
the Court concluded, did n o t  give rise to a duty to the marketplace to 
disclose or abstain from trading. 1 1':" Instead, corporate i ns iders violated 
federal law by trading on non public i n formati on because such trading was i n  
breach o f  their  fiduciary duty t o  stockholclers . 1 1' 1  Because Chiarel la lacked 
such a duty ,  he was not l iable . 1 6� . 
I n  Dirks, the Court directly considered the implicat ions of i ts fi duciary 
theory for securities analysts. 1 1;1; The Dirhs Court treated the analyst D irks as a 
t ippee, and articulated a standard gove rn i ng when analysts, as t ippees, 
inh erited a fiduciary duty from the corporate source of nonpublic 
i n formation .  The Court conc luded that l iabil i ty for the use of info rmation 
selectively disclosed by corporate i nsiders required that the insider obtain a 
personal beneft t  from the disclosure. 1 !i7 The Court specifical ly concluded 
that application  of a parity of  i n formation standard to analys ts could inh ib i t  
the  aggressive research that  is  necessary for an efficient  securi ties market. 1 1;,..; 
Significant ly, the Dirks holding was premised on the "un disputed" 
proposition "that Di rks hi mself was a stranger to Equi ty Funding, wi th no 
pre-exist ing fiduciary duty to i ts shareholcle rs . " 1 1'' 1 According to the Court ,  
despite D i rks ' actJVl tles a s  a n  analyst, wh ich included disseminating 
i n fo rmation to i nvestors about Equi ty Fundi ng, " [ h ]  e took no action , 
directly or indi rectly, that i nduced the shareholders or  officers of Equity 
" j '  fi J . 1 • , I 7 1 1  r une mg to repose trust or con t c  ence li1 1 l l l1l . 
Despite Dirks and Chiarella, questions remain regarding the perm issible 
scope of selective disclosure . First ,  i t  is  unclear what type of pnsonal ben efi t  
\ ()2 .  _<;,.,. id. 
l (i:', . .'it£' id. at 23"1 . The decision was motivated, i n  part . by a des i re tu prote c t  the �l i l �1lyst 
cum m l l ll i t:· . .),.,. A. C : .  Pri tchard ,  . J ust ice Lewis F. Pm,·e l l ,  . J r. and t i le  C:oun t e r-Re,·o lwion in r h e  
Federa l Securit ies Ll\I'S ll l -67 (J ulv 2002) ( u n p ublished m a n uscr i p t ,  U l l  ri ie  ,,·i rh i \w Iowa L1\\" 
Rc,·it'w ) .  This !\ni cle q uestions t h e  lxtsis for that  desi re.  
I G-t. Chia1P!I11. 4-t:) U .S.  at 227-20.  The C:u u rt d i e\ J l O L  fu l lv articu la u:: i ts  1·a r ion;lle ii.>r i nsider 
tr<tcl i n g  regubtion in Clz ia rello, an d that cldi c i c ncy p ers i st s . Onl' j t l S t i licat ion for reguLtt ion t h a t  
i s  s uggl'sted.  al though n o t  fully de,·e lopecl. bv Z u k t r  Goshen a n d  Cicleon Parc!JollHWSkl', i s  < t t l  
agenn· rationale . .'irl' Znhar Goshen & Gideon Parc honw1·sb·, On lnsidrr Tmding, i\'!11rhrts, a n d  
"Nep,atiw " Pmpnty Rights in lnjomllllion, R7 V,\ .  f . . REV. 1 22�1 . 1 2 :)�)-(j } ( 2 U0 l )  (demonstrati n g  
t h a t  i n :.; ic\er tr<td i ng p rm i c\es co rporate m a nagers w i t h  i n ce 1 1 t in�s t h a t  rc' c luce the i r dfec t i 1 c n e.ss 
as cnrpor�ue agTn ts) . 
Hi;) .  The C :oun idemi fi ecl r i te possibi l i ty th a t i micier trad i n g  cou l cl be prem ised on :t 
fid t lci:uY dut)· owed by the trader to .'iom eone o t h e r  t l l; tn t l t e issuer or i r' :',toc k h o l c\ers. but did 
not  address t i le  iss u e .  Chiorc//o, -t45 U.S.  at 2:�2 .  Subsequc t l t h· .  t h e  Co t l rt e x te n de d ri t e  scupl' of 
llcl uci :uY obligat i o ns u p o n  which i ns ider t rad i n g k1 h i l i t1· CC> i i lcl  be prem ised i n  L' n i tecl Stares , . . 
O ' J l ag:u t .  :) 1 9  L . S. 1 01\ 7  ( 1 99 7 ) .  
1 6!5. D i rks ' ·  SEC, -l iiol U S. 6-th ( l CJR.)) . 
1 117.  .\1'1' id.  : 1 1  6ii2 ( '' [ 'f] l l e  test is  ,,·h e t l t e r  the i n <> ider pn.sun;d h- 1-. i l l  bu t dir ,  cl i rec th· or 
i n c l i rcct l)·, fr( ) I J1 his cl iscioSI!rC . .. ) . 
I iiS . !d. :t r G:">� .  
1 (jl) .  !d. :l i lili :'> . 
I 71J !d. 
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1 s  necessary after Dirks. Second, ne i th e r  Dirhs nor Chiarella addresses the 
extent to which  an analyst may engage in  personal trading on the basis of 
selectively disclosed information.  Thi rd ,  the cases do not consider the extent 
to which analyst i nsider trading l iab il ity may be premised on confl icts of 
in terest. Nonetheless, after a 1 9 9 1  acti on against CEO Stevens  for selectively 
disclosing corporate information  to analysts "in order to protect and 
en hance his reputation,"  which was settled through a conse n t  decree but 
widely criticized by commentators, th e SEC stopped bringing  selective 
di sclosure actions based on section  1 0 (b) . 1 7 1  
B. FEDERA L PJ�GULA TION-THE SEC A ND REGULA T!OAS FD AND A C 
1 .  Regulation FD 
a. Background 
As described above , the Suprem e  Court ' s  decisions in Chiarella and Dirhs 
created a privi leged status for analysts wi th  respect to ins ider t rading 
regulat ion .  Analysts benefi ted from traditional insider trading regulation 
because they, unl ike corporate insiders,  were allowed to profi t  from the 
rece ipt  of non-publ i c  corporate i nfo rmation .  By prohibi t ing corporate 
ins iders from using the i nforma tion but granti ng  the "property righ ts" to 
analysts, i nsider trading regulat ion plc1Ced analysts at the h ead of the l ine . 1 72 
This  preferred status is of part icular importance because of th e nature of 
information as a publi c  good. The value  of non public information dissipates 
q uickly.  Th ose wi th the fi rst access to th e info rmati on can therefore reap the 
greatest value if they are permitted to use i t . 1 7:1 
The pract ice of selectively disclosing significant co rporate i n fo rmation 
ge n e rated complaints that small  i nvestors we re being treated unfai rly. 1 7 1  The 
l 7 1 .  i\·le rri t t  B.  Fox, Ri'gulotinll IJ) rrllll l-inrign fss u l'rs. Globali:otion \ Stmi11s and Oj;jJorl un itin, 
4 1  V.\ . J I :-.:-r-' 1 L (j;);·\ . 662 (200 1 ) .  
I 7'.!. .  Sr'r' .Jill E .  Fisch ,  Star/ t\loki11g Sr•n5r: :·\ n A ualysis and Proj!Osol for fnsidr:r Tmdiug Regulation, 
'.!.() C.\ .  L RF.\'. i 79 . 2'12 ( 1 99 1 )  ( n ot i ng that  ·· [ a l l  t hough they do no t kt\ t· t h e  access nf a n  
i ns idn.  [ i m·esunent profess ional s ' ]  reso u rc es en �rb k t h em ro be ' u exL  i n l i n e '  i n  term.s o f  
q t L r l i ry o f  i n form a t i o n'' )  ( q u o ting Donald C. Lmge\·oorL Selling ! h e  :\g,•nda jiH f.rgislatiJ•c fiij'onn: 
SOIIII' Frrllorii'S, A IIOIIIfllies, rwrl Othn Cluiosilii'S in thr l'rmailiug lJ/1[1 of l nsidn Tmr/iug. c)�) .\L.-\. L 
RE\ . ��99 .  cJl)() t l . f) ( 1 980 ) ) .  
L T', S,·e id. a t  227-'28 ( " l t  i s  t h e  b e t  that  a n  i micler h as ubtai necl  h is  i n forma t i o n a l  
adva nctge beca use of h is posi t ion ,  and the bet t ! t : t!. I r is posi t ion is  attr ibu t�tble to the  presence 
of other !t-ss-pri\·i l eged transac tors in t h e  nnrket, t h a t  m a kes the i ns i der\ use of n n n p ui J i ic 
i n f<m n : r t i on u n fa i r. " ) .  
1 / ·L Str' Susan P u l l ia m .  :i iH•rrmJu!Jil' G' Fitrh �f!;l l itn Crn r lrol'I'ISY ();on l'ossiblr !.mk of Sluggish 
Sol,·s Onto. 1.\'. \ i .L .ST. J .  O c t .  1 4 . 1 99LJ. at C : l ( n < > r i n g  that  smal l  i nYestnrs art· often l : rst  t<> kno;,· 
: r b" r t t  i r n pur! :mt com p:my cln·c lopm e n t s ) : .Sus�1 1 1  P t d krm & Cary i'vl c\Y i l l i :un:;, CoilljHiij Is 
(ritiri:ed (i>r Hm>' !t !Jisriosrr/ f'(.' 'i 'm>;h/n. 1.\'.-\ l . l .  S i . J .  i\hr .  2, I 'J:l9, at C : l  (sam e ) :  R:lmb l l  S m i t h .  
( .'IJn_!;Ti'ilO' Coils / u  J)ig !nt 'i'S!on (!fin; f., �,-n,, ' l.il!lr· Guys 1-lun,g l .'j1: \ \  .. \ i .L ST  . J . , .June 2 1 .  J q9:-=-; . a t  { : 1  
(s :r : n c ) .  
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p roblem took on increased u rgency as  market volati l i ty i n c reased in the late 
1 990s. The m e d ia reported various stories in which investo rs i n  possessi on of 
n on publ i c  i nformation were able to earn l arge profits o r  avoi d  substantial 
losses. 1 70 Market fol l owers i n d icated a concern that such i n cidents would 
cause i nvestors to lose confidence in the markets. The problem was 
aggravated by th e fact that the i ncidents did not appear to be isolated 
occurrences; a substantial  number of issu e rs apparen tly made selective 
disclosure a regular p racti c e . 1 76 
b. Regulation FD 
On December 20, 1 999,  the SEC responded to concerns about selective 
disclosure by proposing Regulation FD . 1 77 From th e outset ,  Regulati o n  FD 
was a departure from th e h istorical treatme n t  of selective disclosure thro ugh 
antifraud regulation.  The proposed regulati on created an independent  d u ty 
of disclosure to be enforce d  through SEC enforc e m e nt act ions rathe r  than 
private c ivil  l i  tigati o n . 1 7K In addi tio n ,  Regulation FD dealt with selective 
disclosure by regulating issuers ,  not analysts. 1 7�1 
The SEC acknowledged that h i s torically selective disclosure had been 
addressed as part of the regulati o n  of securi ties fraud. 1 K0 Noneth eless,  i t  
reasoned that new regulati on was warranted for se\·eral reasons .  I n  addition 
to the fun damental unfairness associated \Vith unequal access,  th e SEC 
noted that by allowing corporate officials to use i nfo nnation as a 
comm odity ,  selecrive disclosure c reated an incentive for the m  to delay 
public  disclosure. 1 x 1  Delays i n  publ ic  d isclosure e n abled corporate o fficials to 
manaQ:e earn i n Q.·s a n d ,  i n di rectlv, maniiJ ulate market exoectations. 1 x� {,_.) I...J / 1 
Selective discl osure also faci l i tated issuer use of discl osure practi ces to 
pressure analysts to gen e rate favorable reports and reco m m e ndati ons by 
allowi ng issuers to c reate relati onshi ps that gave pre f erred analysts the first 
1 70 .  .'il'e Smi th  . . \ 1/jna note 1 74 ( explaining how "big" i 1 1 \'estors ,,·i t h  access lO non publ i c 
i n formation proYiclecl  t h rcugh confe rence c:J.!ls im pacted marke is) . 
1 76. l n  <tcl d i t i o n .  a s tudy of c orpo rare discl < >surc pr<lC i ices lw t he  l'\'at ional  Investor 
Re la t ions l nst i tt 1 tc: reported t.h <lt 26% of resp o n d i n g  compa n ies SLll.t�d r h a t  they engaged i n  
some t)'j)CS nf sel c c t i 1 e  d isc losu re pract ices. Nr\T' L  l 'I\TSTOR RFI .. \TIO�S I '!ST. ,  A STU DY OF 
Ccn:.!'OI< .\TE D IS< :LOS L ' RE P R.-\CTiCES, S u :o;-;n ML\SL' RF\I E:\T I S  ( I  ���)8 ) ,  citerl in Selective 
Disc1Dsurc a n d  l nsickr Tr<1cl ing,  ti-± FeeL Reg. 72, :1�10, 72 .0'1'2 1 1 . 1 1 ( p mposecl Dec. :28, ! 999) ( tu 
he codi fied d 1 7  C: .F . R. pt . :!-!?>) . 
1 77.  Selecti1 c D isclosure <l l l ci l nsider Tradi ng, ()-± FeeL Reg.  at 72,:>90. 
1 7'3 .  S!'f' id. Z l l  7:! .:�>9S. 
1 79 .  Si't id. ; tt 7 2 , :·> �1-! . 
J SU.  I ndeed. a l l t t m ber of com mema rors argued fill· the con r i n l l < l t ion of '  t h i s  <tppn ><tch.  
Sclcct i \e  Discloo; t l !  e < tnd I ns ider Trading,  6:) Fc·cl . Reg. :, l ,  7 1  1 ) ,  :'" >I .  7 1  ,') ( .·\ t t g .  �4. :!000) ( l C ;  be 
codiflt·d at 1 7  C . F . R.. pt . .  �4?) ) .  
I S l . 
! '."' ·J� 
SC' Iect i \·c l) isc !osu re and Ins ider T1·adin�.  11-i Fed .  R(·g. ;n 7:2,:-; � )2 .  
!rl. 
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shot  a t  internal company information . 1 R l  Finally ,  the SEC noted that 
advances in i nformation technolog)' had reduced the importance of analysts 
as information i n termediaries and made i t  easier and less costly for issuers to 
disseminate information d irectly to the publ ic . 1 �4 
In l ight of these conclt1si ons ,  the SEC posited that i ts new regulation 
would provi de a number of advantages . In  addition to i ncreasing i nvestor 
confidence in m arket i ntegri ty,  the SEC predicted that issuers would benefi t  
from participating i n  more open disclosure practices. 1 R" Those open 
disclosure practices, the SEC argued, would have the effec t  of l owering the 
cost of capital . 1 :-l6 In addit ion,  the SEC reasoned that analysts would benefi t  
from a n  "equal competi tive footing." 1 K7 Absent  issuer abi l i ty t o  play favorites 
in the release of corporate information, analysts could report wi th greater 
candor. 1 8R Moreover, analyst performance would reflect abi l i ty and effort 
rather  than access to corporate i nsiders . 1 ::>!l As a resul t ,  be tter information 
would be provided to the marketplace, e i ther  through direct company 
d . l . d I f 1 '�0 1sc osure or 1m prove ana yst per ormance. · 
The SEC adopted the fi n al version of Regulation  FD on  Aug 24, 2000, 
wi th an effective date of  October 23, 2000. 1 � 1  Consiste n t  with i ts in i tial 
proposal , the SEC designed Regulation FD to be an issuer  disclosure rule ,  
not  an antifraud rule .  As  moclifiecl ,  Regulation FD conti n ues to prohibit 
i ssuers and those acting on their behalf  from selectively disclosing material 
nonpubli c  information to securities industry professionals ,  i nst imtional 
. d . h l lJ') mvestors, an certam ot  er persons. · -
Regulation FD applies to issuers with "securi ties registered under 
Section 12 of the Securi t ies Exchange Act" and those " required to fi le 
reports under Section l 5 ( cl )  . . ' 1 �n The regu lation covers only commun ications 
by an issuer's sen ior management,  i ts i nvestor-relations professionals, and 
1 8:\. !d. 
1 84.  !d. at 72 ,59:\.  
1 8:> . Jd. ;t[ 72 .605. 
1 86 .  Sele ctive D i sclosme a n cl l ns ic ler Trad i n g , li·-1 F e e l .  Reg. at T:! . l)05 .  
1 87 .  !d. 
I 88.  fd ; t t  72,60:)-06. 
1 8 9 .  !d. at 72 ,606. 
1 90 .  !d. at  72,607. T h e  propos;tl pru,·okecl i nn n e c l i at e  cuntnwers\'. Tl w SEC n:ce i n" c l almost 
COOO comment letters. a n cl ;t ! t l t o t tg! t  mos t  i ncl i ,i clu al i m·estors su pported the n c\1· regu la t i o n ,  
issuer and ana lyst reacri on 1vas lt�ss lztvorab l c .  Sci' E .. risry L. Cm·e,·, [),,,,!'iojJ ;nr·nts in ihl' Subtion ti;w 
!Jiw: Rtgulotion ID Contmve1s)', Tt::\ . L\\1'. ,  Dec. 1 � . 2000, at  84 ( clc.scrib i t t g n t l e  as ge n na t i n g 
·'sign i ficant oppositiou from \-\';til Street" ) .  i\>Iam· cr i t ics clcnouncecl the ru l e .  arguing r! tar i ts 
guidel i n es ,,·et-c ambiguous and 1hat  fear of l i abi l i tv '''ottld reduce i n formation tlo\1· to ri le 
markets. Sel' Sclecr i ,·e D isclosure : tnd Insider Tr;td i ng. tl:'i Feel . Reg. ,-> 1 ,  7 1 6 . : d .  7 18 (Aug.  24. 
2000) (w be mcli fi ecl a t 1 7  C: .F .R .  p t .  24:� ) .  The t J t t t c.Tv p ro m p ted rl te SEC to c:-; t c nd tl te i n i t i ;tl 
u' m m e n t pni ocl ;l!lcl t u  moclif\ the pro posed rule s t tbsta m i alh . Iii. 
I �i I .  !d. 
1 92 .  !d. 
1 9:; 1 / C F . R. � 2-U. I U \ ( b )  ( 21102)  
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those who regularly c o m m u n i cate wi th  market pro fessionals  a n d  securi ty 
h olde rs. 1 0.1 I t  does n o t  cove r every l ow- or mid-level e mp l oyee.  N o r  does the 
rul e  apply to  a l l  d isclosures, but o n ly those made to specifi c  categories of 
j >)') • d reCipients :  brokers and dealers;  · · investment  aclv1sers an certain 
i n s ti tu tional i nvestm en t  managers; 1 %  investment  companies and h edge 
funds; 1
' '' and h ol ders of the "issuer 's  securi ties,  under c i rcum s tances i n  
wh i c h  i t  is reasonably foreseeable that  t h e  h o l d e r  'vil l  purchase or  s e l l  t h e  
issuer's  securi ti es on t h e  basis of th e i n formatio n . "  1 9s T h us analysts, 
i n s ti tutional i nvestors, and other m arket professionals are i ncluded under 
the rul e . 1
' '�' In add i ti o n ,  the rule expl i c i tly exem p ts disclosures to people 
owing "a duty of trust or confidence to the issuer" (such as professional  
l . 
) ·>rHI j . fi l . 1 ·  "O I [ ac v1sers ;- persons su )j e c t  to a n  express con 1c e n t1 a  1 ty agre e m e n t;- anc 
cre d i t  rati ng agen cies?'� The SEC has further stated that i t  does n o t  bel ieve 
the rule cove rs disclosures to the m edia or those i nvolved i n  ordinary 
business communications with the issuer such as customers or suppliers . 20
'  
The rul e  covers disclosure of material n o n publi c  i n formation o t h e r  
than com m u n i cations m a d e  i n  c o n n ection w i t h  registere d  o ffe ri n gs. �04 The 
SEC did not c larify the defi n i tion o f  materi a l i ty,  despite requests that i t  do 
so. �,,
-, Noneth e l ess, i n  an e ffort to provide i n c reased guidance about  
materiali ty, the SEC l isted seve ral categories for which " c l ose scru ti ny" is  
warran ted, in cludi ng disclosu res rel ati n g  to earnmgs, m e rgers and 
acquisit ions,  n ew products or discoveries, ch anges m con trol or  
managem e n t, changes i n  audi tors ,  even ts regard i ng c o m pany securi ties ,  and 
ban k ruptcies or receive rsh i ps .
�01' The SEC specifically s ingled out  private,  
o n e-on-one discuss ions  betwee n  c o m pani es and an alysts regard i n g  earni ngs 
esti mates as an area raisi ng special  concern. Cal l i n g  this  an area i nvolving "a 
high degree of risk, .. th e SEC n o ted that even in direct gu idance such as 
" expressi ng comfo rt' '  could amount  to selective d isc!osure . �111 
l CJ-l .  Jrl. 
] �) :c> . 1r/. � 2 - l :'\ . J OO ( h J ( l ) ( i ) .  
1 % .  !rl. � 2-t::U O O ( h ) ( l ) ( i i )  
1 9  7 .  !d. ::; 2 4 :\.l  ()() ( b )  ( l ) ( i i i ) .  
1 9� .  l 7 C: .F.R. � 24 'l l 01 J ( b ) ( l ) ( i\ ) ( 200:! ) .  
l 'J� J  !r/. � 2-lcl. I OO ( b ) ( l ) ( i ) - ( i\· )  
200 . 1r/. � 2·-ri. l 00 ( b ) ( 2 ) ( i )  
2 1 1 ]  /r/. � 2·'1:l . ] ( ) ( J ( b ) ( 2 ) ( i i ) . 
202 . lr/ � 24'l. I OO ( I J )  ( 2 )  ( i i i ) 
'HJ:l. St-kct i \·e Disclosurt- ;tnd I nsit ln Tr:tdi ng. !):) Fed .  Reg. :) 1 , 7 1  ti , :) 1 ,  720 ( .\11g. 2· ! ,  2000 ) 
( t < >  lw cndil ied al 1 7  C: T . R .  p t .  :! ·L'• ) .  
'! I l-l .  lr/. : I t  :·J I .  72 ! .  :"1 I . I:!C'• .  
'! I I:·J /J 
21 / i i .  id. 
:!0/ /rl. 
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Regulation FD divides sel ect ive disclosu res i n to two categories: 
i n te n tional and u n i n te n ti onal .�0� For se lective disclosures that are 
i n te n tional  (or reckless) ,  the issuer must s i m u l taneously disclose the 
i n fo rmation to the publ i c .
2w1 
For se iective disclosures that are u n i n tention al , 
the issuer must discl ose promprJy, m ean i ng wi th i n  twen ty-four h ours o r  
befo re the begi n n i n g  of the next  tradi n g  clay, whichever i s  later. 2 1 0  Issuer 
options for effective disclosure i n cl ude the fol l owi ng:  fi l i n g  the i n formati o n  
th rough I te m  5 of Form 8-K, furn ish i n g  t h e  i n fo rmation through I tem 9 o f  
Form 8-K, o r  otherwise disse m i n ati n g  i t  i n  a m a n n e r  " reasonably designed to 
p rovide broad n on-exclusio n ary c overage .� 1 1 l'vfethocls that satisfy thi s  t h i rd 
option i n clude press releases di s tribnted through widely c irculated n ews or 
wire services and confe re nces with p ublic  n otice and access.
2 1 2  
The SEC 
expl ic i tly warned that p ub l icati o n  of the i n formation o n  an issuer's \Veb si te 
" ! '' 
does n o t  const i tu te public  di sclosu re . - ' 
The SEC has stated repeatedly that Regulat ion FD i s  designed as an 
enforcem e n t  tool rather than an exte n s i o n  of p rivate civi l  l i abi l i tv.� 1 �  
Respond i n g  t o  the concern that Regu l a ti o n  F D  m ight c h i l l  issuer 
c o m m u ni c a tions ,  the SEC clari fied th e fi nal ru l e  to p rovide that issuers 
wou l d  be l iable o n ly ''wh e n  an issuer's  pe rso n n e l knows o r  i s  rec kl ess i n  n o t  
kn owi ng that t h e  inform ation se lecti\'e l y discl osed i s  both material  and 
n o npubl i c . " � 1-, I n  add i t i o n ,  the fi ned rule exp l i c i tly  states that the fai l u re to 
make a p u b l i c  discl osure recp. 1 i red by Regu l a t i o n  FD is n ot a v i o l a ti o n  of  
Rule lOb-5 . � 1 , ; Thus,  Regulat ion FD should n o t  expand t h e  scope of 
ant ifraud l iabi l i ty. � 1 7  Nonetheless. the  SEC can bri n g  adm i n istrative o r  civi l 
e n forcem e n t  acti ons  against  v i o l ato rs and i n dividual  e m p l oyees,  and analvsts 
may be l iable for caus i n g  violat ions and for aiding a n d  abetr in g  as wel l . � �. ,  
c .  'n1e !mprtct rj"Regulation }TJ 
I n clustr,, reaction to Regub t ion FD \\'as extre m ely nega tive . Both t h e  
com m e n ts !n  response t o  t h e  SECs p roposed rel ease a n d  r.h e  i n i tia l  
responses to tl1 e final  regulat ion w�u n e d  that  tlw n ew ru l e  wend el ha\'C th e 
-----------·----- ---- -
208 . 1 7  C.F.R .  � 243 . 1 01 J ( �t ) ( i ) - ( 2 )  ( �01 12 )  
:!l l�J . fd � 2-I'U O !  (a) ( l ) .  
2 1 0 . M � 2-l'U UO ( �l )  ( 2 ) , 'l.:f'i 1 0 1  ( d )  
2 1 1 .  /d. 'i 24:U i ! l  ( c ) ( l ) - ( 2 ) .  
2 1 2 .  Selecti\·c f)is(·losure � lnd 1 nsider TLldi n g .  :l:-1 ��cd .  Reg. 0 1  .7� ·+ ,  :1 l ,  72-!-��) C-\ug. �-� .  
�()00) ( ro ])t" codi fied d t  i 7 C. F. R .  p t .  � t:\ ) .  
2 1 :1 .  /rl. 
'.! l l .  !d. ; ; t  ,-) l , 72 (i. 
�� 1 0 . 1 7  C . F .R .  S �� 1 :1 . 1 () 1  ( d )  ( �1 )0� ) .  
2 1  b .  !d. � 2-U Ui'2 
� 1 i .  id. 
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effect of substan tially decreasi ng i n fo rmation fl ow to t h e  m arketplace ? �� 
Cri tics also p redicted that th e regulati on woul d  i n cr e ase price volatil i ty .��o 
Ini tial public discussions refl ected these concerns.  On April 24, 200 1 ,  
the SEC held a rou n d table discussion i n  New York C i ty to consider  the early 
experi ence of analysts, i ssuers , and i nvestors wi th Regulati o n  FD .n1 At that 
time ,  issuers related their  efforts to p rovide equal i nformatio n al access, but 
described th e i r  fear of l i abi l i ty exposure . 22:z Analysts s tated that  the quality of  
co rporate i nformati o n  had been reduced d ramatically by t h e  e nactme n t  of  
the rnle.��1 I n  addition , mult iple  participants identified rec e n t  i ncreases i n  
price volati l i ty and attrib uted those i ncreases to the rule.
��
·! 
Com missioner Laura S. U nger, the o n ly Comm i ssi o n e r  to vote against  
the rule , prepared a report shortly after the rul e ' s  adop ti o n .��' I n  this  report, 
Commissioner Unger made seve ral recomm e n dations to m a k e  Regulatio n  
FD function m ore effi c i e n tly.  First ,  she urged t h e  S E C  to provide m ore 
guidance on the defi n i tion of mate rial i ty. �:zt; This  reco m m endation respon ds 
directly to a concern expressed by issuers ,  analysts, a n d  l awyers-that 
without be tter guidance,  com panies m ay err on the side of not rel e as ing 
infonnation for fear  of cross i n g  th e material i ty l i ne .  S e c o n d ,  the rep o rt 
assenecl that the Comm ission should explore addi ng disclosure m echanisms 
tc i ts approved methods of distrib u ti o n , i n cluding,  for examp l e ,  vVeb site 
postings. ��' Third,  the report urged the Commission to study the chi l l i n g  
effect, i f  any, of Regul ation FD on corporate com municati o n s .:!�x 
It is d iffi cul t e mp i rical l y  to assess the i m pact of Regul at i o n  FD due to i ts 
n:::c e n t  adopti o n .  N o n et h el ess, i n itial  research suggests that t h e  p urpo rted 
negative effe c ts of Regulation FD o n  i n formation f1 ow a n d  volati l i ty may be 
m erstated. Several studies are particularly worthy of note.  Firs t ,  Phi l ip  Shane 
::' I  al .  im estigatec1 the effect  of Regu l a tion FD on t h e  info rm a tion 
.,._.,, e>wirol111 lell t . -- )Jthough the au thors observed an i n i tial  reduct ion i n  
i d<wm ation flow. thev found rhat analysts a re no\v gat h e ri n g  m o re 
- ------ - --·---------
2 1 9 . fr/. ;lt. :1 1 , 7 l )') . 
�20.  fr/.. C 1t  ::1 1 ,/;) l .  
� 2  I . S1'P. t.g. , .J t"'ff D. {)pdyke . \ Full .\irN'/J SFC 1 Jiscuss ''Nrg /-1) " ot Rrnuulta!Jie, \•\'ALL ST. J. � r\p r .  
'2:\ 200 i .  a t  C Hi. 
2:22. irl. 
:22-i-.  Id. 
�!':2:,. L \ L ' R.\  S. L' C.: UY, SPLt L\L STU J)\': RFt : U L\TIO>: FAI R  Dis< :LOSL RE RE\ ' I S ITm (200 1 ) .  
nvo i!ohir ol  intp://,,-._,,,· .�;,.c .g-m· l ! t e ''·�/swdies/ regfdsrt tclv. h t m  (un file ll' i th rhc low<l Lt,,· 
E�·-. ·ic\,· ) .  
�26 .  !d. 
� 2 7 .  ir/. 
�: 29 .  Ph i L p  :-; l t :t l i :. :  ct �d . ,  E ; trn i n !l.·s ;u icl Price D i:-;cuYf't�\· in Lhc  Po:-:. t- R��-- F[) lnfo rn1 ar inn 
:-: : 1\ - i i" ! : n l!l.:� ! l t :  : \  Prt· ; i : 1 1 i ! 1 :1 i ·\ .-\ d�� ksi:; ( ��u;·_ l:) .  2 ! /(} i )  ( u l l p i tb l ishcd n l a n u:.;c ript . o n  ti l e  \V i t h  the 
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i nformatio n  during the peri od b e tween q uarterly earnings a n n ouncements, 
with the resul t  that, by the end of the period,  analysts ' forecasts, h owever 
debatable ,  are as accurate as those pri o r  to Regu latio n  FD.�:Io M oreover, their 
study fou n d  that price discovery h as i m p roved i n  the post Regulation FD 
period and that rec e n t  price volati l i ty has actually decreased ,  suggesting 
h igher overall l evels of m arket i nformation.2" 1  The stu dy concluded that  " i n  
t h e  post-Reg. FD e nvironm ent,  firms have fou n d  e ffective al ternative m eans 
of i n forming analysts and i nvestors about forth coming quarterly earni n gs . "�m 
Second, a stu dy by Brian ].  Bushee et al. employed two p re-Regulation 
FD sam p l es and compared them to each oth e r  i n  the post-Regulati o n  FD 
e nvironment.2�� The first set of firms i n cluded those that restricted access to 
c o n ference calls before Regulation FD became effe c tive .�:H The second set  
i n cluded firms that h ad u n l i m i ted access .n·, To exam i n e  the effect of 
Regulati o n  FD, the study ' s  authors considered the tim ing,  use, and 
'>'\C i n form atio n  content of confe rence calls .- ·  ' The authors fou n d  that o n ly 
those firms that were l i kely to benefi t  l i ttl e fro m  the calls discontinued 
them.2:17 They also found that the amount of i nformation released duri ng 
c onference cal ls  has  not  decreased.2'\� Further,  they found that the amount 
of  i ndividual i nvestor trading during confere nce cal ls  has i n c reased, an d 
that price volatil i ty h as in creased for fi rms i n  the group previously restricting 
access.239 They concluded,  therefore,  that Regulation FD h as i m p roved 
access to company i nformation for all i nvestors, and, with t h e  exception of 
the small amount of in creased volati l ity for a small  subset of firms, the 
criticisms of Regulation FD appear to lack m e rit . �-111 
Third, a study by Frank H efl in et a l .  focused specifically on price 
volatil i ty.24 1  Although the study identi fied i ncreased stock market  volati l i ty 
fol l owi ng the adoption of Regula ti o n  FD , the authors concluded th at the 
Regul ation was u n li kely to be the cause .�4� i\Joreover, the study fou n d  that 
a l though volati l i ty i n c reased around earnings pre-an n o uncements ,  i t  
�:10 . hi. at 1 8 . 
23 1 .  !d. at  1 0. 
23�.  fr/. < I I  20. 
�3:', . Rrian J Bushee ct a! . ,  iVL t n ager i a l  <tnd !nn:stor Responses tu Disc1ost lrc Regula ti" n :  
T h e  Ctse of Reg. F D  ancl Conference Cdls (A J lL  2002) ( 1 1n p u h1i :,hed lll < t t l l tScr ipr ,  on  lilc 1vi t h  
the  !o\\'a L!\\' Reviell' ) . 
2:H. Id. 
2:'>:) !d. 
236 .  hi. 
237 .  !d. at  1:\. 
23(-i .  Bushee ,  su.jJra n o t e  :233,  ar  1 S .  
2c\9. frl. ar 2 l -2 2 .  
240. frl. at ::' !1. 
2-1 ! .  Ft·;mk Hefl i n  c t  a !  . . Srock p_,, l u m  '- 'o Lt t i l i t\ Befort: : t t i d  .-\ftn Regulation FD ( 2U0:! )  
(unpt tb l ishecl m :tnuscripl .  on file ·,·:i t  i t  rlw i o1'·" L;m· l·�t·,· iew J .  
2-1 :2 . !d. <1 1 :10. 
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decreased around a n n o u n c e m e n ts of actual earnmgs.- · T h is fin d i n g  
suggests t h a t  an i n c rease i n  the i ncorporatio n  of earni n gs i n formation by 
the market m ay be reducin g  the i n formati onal  i mpact of a c tual ear n i n gs 
��� 
announce m e n ts.  
Fourth , a study by Shyam V. Sunder used b i d-ask spreads as a p roxy for 
the p resence of selective d isclosure and i ts effe c t.2r' Sunder fou n d  that p rior 
to Regulation FD, bid-ask spreads were h igh e r  in firms e m pl oy in g  selective 
disclosure pol icies than for those choosing n o t  to do so.�4" S u n d e r  furth e r  
fou nd a decrease i n  bi d-ask spreads s i n c e  th e enactm e n t  o f  Regulat ion FD­
arguably i nd i cating that Regu l ation FD is decreas i n g  i n formational 
asymmetries and the correlative i n formational advan tages some i nvestors 
garnered-but h i s  work also revealed that despite th e c o n te n ti o n s  of 
companies a n d  analysts, Regulat ion FD h as not cause d  fi rms to decrease 
i n formation provided th rough vol u ntary disclosures. 2-17 Importan tly, 
Sunder's  study offers reason to question other academ i c  d e fe n ses of selective 
disclosure, i n cl ud i n g  Goshen and Parc h om ovsky's  l i q u i d i ty-based defe nse . �48 
2 .  Regulation AC 
Iro n i cally,  the SEC's i n i tia l  m e thod for address i n g  analys t  confl i cts was 
to warn i nvestors about the risk of re lying on analyst recommen dations.  I n  
s u m m e r  2002, t h e  SEC posted a bro c h ure, A nalyzing Anal_)'st Recommendations, 
on i ts \t\Teb s i te warn i n g  i nvestors about pote nti al analyst c o n fl icts of i n terest 
that may undercut the i n tegri t)' of t h e i r  recomm e n da ti o n s  and advi s i n g  
i nvestors about h ow t o  u ncover various types of  con fl i c ts . 2·1
' ' I n  l i gh t  of t h e  
i n c reased focus o n  and con troversy ove r analyst confl icts,  t h i s  approach was 
c learly i nadequate. Subseq u e n tly, in Februa1-y 2003, t h e  SEC adopted 
:24cl .  !d. a t  22. 
244. Iri. a t  25.  
2"l5.  Shyam V. S u n der,  lnn·s 1 o r  .-\cccss to C < m f erence Ctll Disclosures:  l ll l p�lCt of 
Regulation Fair  D i sclos u re o n  l n furm�1 t i o n  ;\s\'n nnen\· (Jm .  l l l ,  2002) ( 1 1n publ ishcc l  
man uscript, o n  fi l e  with t h e  Jo,,·a L111 Re1·ie11' ) . 
2'1 0 .  !rl. <I t 29. 
247 . !d. 
2'18.  Another s tlldy, e m p l oy i n g :1  c l i ffnc n 1 appro:tch . �1 lsu f inds t h a t  Regulat i o n  F D  h:1.-; 
reduced selective c l isc lo.'i t m ·  n f  i n fu n n :1 t i o i l .  .'in· Eri c  Zi tze,,· i tz ,  Regt tbtion Fa i r  Di-;cl t>sure and 
1 h e  Private I nform ation o f  Anah sts ( Ap r. 201J2 ) ( t t n p u h l ished man tN:ri p t ,  o n  ! ile with t l 1 e  l ow;1 
Law Rcl'iew) . In h i s  s rucl1·. \ J r. Z i t ze,,·i t z  m c:lsu rccl the  ! l U IH I Jer of a n a l)·sr fn rec1sts released 
i n d ividually (solo !OJTC<ISI .'< )  :me! c o \ i i parecl t lLl t  JHl m b c r  In those n·l easecl un t l w  ."u n e  clav as 
other a n a lyst rcpons ( n 1 1 1 1 ti-cl : t)' forectsts ) . !d. ;u ·4 . H<: fC Jund that so lo forecasts clecre:tsecl a CttT 
the enactment  of ReguLi t i O i l  FD a n < i  t l l : t r  m u l r i-d:\1· forcc:1sts i ncreased.  frl. Prior to Regu l a t i o n  
FD, approxim ately 70'/�J of fort'C:tSt. 'i ,,.eiT s u l n  f()rectsiS and t h ose t()lTCtsts co n ta i ned 6:1 %  t i e\\. 
i n form:1 t i o n .  !d. �\ftcr R•::gu b t i < l ll fD.  :tppro�i i iLt i L' h  :-,iJ?i� of furecast.'i \';ere solo furt:C :1s ts ,  : L I H I  
1 h e  percen t. of ne11· i n fnn n :t t i ( ! \ 1  to t i l t> H larkt: t fn l l n  r i lem w;ts doiiTl t o  27�(, . It!. 
2'!�1. u . s .  S!J : .  \ :\ !)  l:: Cd I I . C :U \ 1 \ l ' :\ ,  .\c-;. \ 1 .\i'. I '\ C  .-\:\ .\ 1 .\ST R F C (J \ 1 \ ! [c-; [ J \TI <J:<S ( 2 ( ) ( ) :' ) . 
m•tii/iibit' nl h t tp:/ ;,,."·"·.,c c . ;.;"'· i i m·,.s ! < , l· i pu i Js / a n :t h s rs . l i n n  ( o n  I lk ,,·i t l • i lH- i < 111·;t L111· Re\·ic·l,· ) . 
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Regulation Analyst Certificatio n ,  or Regulation AC.�"1 1  Regulation AC m irrors 
the certification approach adopted by the SEC for corporate CEOs and 
CFOs.�'1 The new Regulation requ i res all brokers,  dealers, and certain other 
persons associated with brokers and dealers to add certifications to their  
research reports stating that the research analyst believes that  the report 
accurately reflects his  or h er personal views and disclosi ng any compensation 
o r  other pay m e n ts received in connection with the rec o m m e ndati o n s  or 
views.2"2 In addi t ion,  analysts wi l l  now h ave to p rovide periodic certifications 
to broker-dealers i n  connection with analysts ' public appearances.  The goal 
of Regulation AC is  to " promote the i n tegri ty of research reports a n d  
i nvestor confidence i n  the reports . "
�''3 I t  i s  i m portant t o  note t h a t  Regulatio n  
A C  creates n o  private right o f  acti o n .  
1 .  NASD / NYSE Regulations 
Recen t  controversy over analyst activi ties also has led to the p ro posal 
and pro m ulgation of additi onal regulations from the self-regul atory 
o rganizati ons.  The SEC recently approved n ew SRO regulati o n s  targeted at 
decreas ing c o n fl icts of i nterest. �
-.� The rules make several c hanges to the 
c u rrent i nvestm e n t  banking and a n alyst structure .  
First, the rules attempt t o  regulate ties between research reports and 
client sol i c i tati o n .  For example ,  th e rules prohibit analysts fro m  tying 
favorable rati ngs to i nvestm e n t  ban king servi ces. �
-, ,, The rules a lso establ ish 
250 . Regulat ion Analvst C e n i fictt ion.  17  C.F .  R.  ::3 242 ( 2002 ) ,  rlvaila!J!e at h tt p : /  .hn1w.sec. 
gov/rules/final/3')-8 1 93.htm (on file "· i rh the l c JI,·a Law Re1iell' ) .  
2 5 1 . Order Rcqt t ir ing t h e  F i l i n g  uf S1mrn Statements Pursua n t  to Sect i on :? 1  ( a )  ( l )  of the 
Secm i t. ies Exch an ge Act  of 1 9:14, File No. 'l--·+tiO ( U .S.  Sec. and Excl t .  Corn m  'n .J une 2 7 ,  2002 ) ,  
flVflilable (1/ h ttp:/ /www.sec .gov/rules/or h er/· 1--i60 . 1 t t m  (on r i le ll'ith t h e  Iowa L<tll' ReviCII' ) .  
2 5 2 .  1 7 C.F . R . � 242. 
253.  !d. 
2:">4.  Srr Research Analvst Con fl icts o f' i n l erest.  !i7 Feel. Reg. ')4 ,<:J68, ')-t,9Ci�l ( i'vl ay 10 .  2002 ) .  
i\t the t inte this  Artic le  ll'en t  to press. a c ld i t iunal  SRO proposed rule changes 11·ert· p e n d i n g  . . \r'r' 
l\L\SD and �'YSE Rult :making:  Prup"scd Rtdc C h a n ges Rela t i ng to Exch a n ge Rules �)'1-t, �'A5A, 
')5 1 ,  a n d  472 a n d  the N;tt ional  Associa t i o n  of Sec u ri t i es Deal ers, I n c . ,  Exch a n ge .-\ct Release N .  
:1-1--4 7 1 10 ( proposed D e c .  3 1 ,  2002) .  (lmi/obif' at lmp:/ /ll·ll·\\· .scc.gov/rules/sr/:)+4 7 1 1 0. h tm ( o n  
fi l e  11·i rh the I owa L111· Re\·iell' ) . These rule c h anges arc designed t n  address a n a lvst c o n fl i cts o f  
i n t e rest b y  restri c t i t tg 11·ho c a n  prcp<�re <t t J d  ; 1ppro1·e research repons; l i mi ti n g  •.vho can be 
i m oh·ed i n  com pensat ion decis ions :  l i n t i t i n g  tr<t c l i l t g  ;tcti ,·i t ie:;: re q u i r i ng addi tional  d isclosures 
of conllins; req u i r i n g  member org;uJiz;.t t ions  w cloc u m c t t t  an alyst com pe n s<tt iun and to i ncl ude 
th;u contpensat ion in certain st::ttem c J J i s  riled 11· i th  t h e  SEC: requir ing registration of a n alysts 
u n d e r  cenain  new catego ries and q t la l i t ictt iu t t  ex;J m i nat ions for an ah·sr.s ; and creat ing 
conr inuing educat ion programs for an;\h sts a t t cl superviscn�,· �mah'St� clesigt tecl ro provide 
i n forll l a t i u n  on rules, regubt ions ,  e t h i cs .  ;tnd o 1 l t n  pro fessi o n a l  respon s i b i l i ty issues. lrl. These 
p m posecl rule c l t ;�n ges are nut .'; ign i l i c ; t l l t h  cl i lfe:rc· n t  fr< 1 1 1 1  m am· COJn pone!Hs nf the l\I e tTi l l  
L;·ncl t  .�greemcnt .  S1't' mjin P; Lrt l l l . C : . :: .  
'2:,:, . Research ,\nal:·st Conl1 ic rs  d i n l e rL·s t. .  ( i7  Fed . Rq;. a i  3'L�Iti9. 
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quiet  periods during which fi rms act ing as  m anagers o r  c o-ma nagers of 
offe rings are p ro h i b i ted from issu i n g  reports on IPOs and secondary 
offe ri ngs, b u t  only for forty clays after the offering, n o t  for the e n tire l o ck-up 
<J:"f 
p e riod .-·" 
Second, the rul es atte m p t  to restruc ture the nature of t h e  relationsh i p  
b e tween a firm 's i nvestme n t  banki ng and research departm e n ts .  T o  d o  so ,  
the rules p ro h i b i t  i nvestme n t  banking departme n ts fro m  h avin g  supervisory 
relati onshi ps with research analysts. �"' Counsel must m o n i to r  any d iscussi o ns 
b e tween the two departm e n ts about research reports. �:·�' I n  addit ion,  cl ie nts 
. ?�q m ay reVIew research departm e n t  reports only for factual accuracy . -· · T h e  
rules  also p r o h i b i t  l i n ks b e tween an analyst ' s  compensati o n  and specific  
i nvestmen t banking transactions .21'1 1  Noticeably, h owever ,  t h e  rules do n o t  
b a r  any compen satio n  that i s  connected t o  i nvestmen t b a n ki n g  business i n  
gen e ral .  Instead, t h e  rul es req u i re o n ly that t h e  l i n k  be disclosed.2"1 
Third,  the rules require d isclosure of fi n an ci al ties b e twee n  i nvestme n t  
banks a n d  their  analysts a n d  t h e  com panies w h o  h i re the m .  Securities firms 
m us t  disclose i n  the i r  research reports i f  they had a managerial  role  i n  a 
public  offering of securities o r  had any other i nvestm e n t  banking role wi t h  
that company during the prior twelve m o n ths.21'2 Securit ies firms also must  
disclose information i n  a prospective m a n n e r. �';:; If they own 1 %  o r  m ore of a 
c o mpany's  shares or expect to receive,  o r  intend to seek, c o m pensation for 
i nvestm e n t  ban king servi ces from a company duri ng the next three m o n th s ,  
. ''1)-J 
t h ey must cltsclose that fact.-
Fourth ,  th e rules focus o n  an alysts '  personal  trading pol ic ies .  If th e 
com pany is in the sector for which an analyst provides c ove rage , the rules 
restrict the analyst and m e mbers of h is o r  her h o u se holds from i nvesting i n  
securi ties o f  a company prior to i ts IPO.�';' Analysts arc also prohibited from 
trad i ng in securi ti es of issu e rs they foll ow fo r thirt y  clays before and five clays 
after they issue reports abo ut  the company.�'; ' ' ,"'.nalysts m ust disc l ose if they 
own shares o f  companies reco m m e n cl e cl .2"7 The rules also require analys ts 
wh o make public appearances to d iscl ose conflicts of i n te rest,  including 
� 'l 6 .  lrl. a t  'H�I74-7'l . 
'25 7.  !d. at ?"! .972 .  
2S8 .  !rl. 
'2.'Jl) ld. at �>· l,\) ()ll . 
260. Resc1rch ,\na!ysr C o ! l ll i c t.> u l l mc rest,  67 Feel .  Rc:g. ct t  :\ - l .9 7c1 . 
26 1 .  frl 
2 6 2 .  !d. 
26:1. !d. 
2G:1 .  Rcst" ; l !Th r\nalvst C:ontl i c rs f l f  i n r e rcsr.  f)/ Fed .  Reg. ; r t  ::q.971) .  
�?\)(). It!. 
207 .  /rl. 
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wheth e r  they o r  the firm for which they work own secuntles i n  a covered 
issuer or  if  the issuer is an i nvestment banking cl ient of th e fi rm .
�":i 
Fifth , the rules seek to provide clarity on the mean i n g  and purpose of 
securit ies '  firms rating m echanisms.  Fi rms h ave been cri ti c ized for using 
euphemisms for their  stock ratings . �69 Now, firms m ust explain in their 
research reports the meaning o f  the terms they use,  and they m us t  use terms 
i n  a manner consistent  wi th thei r  plain m eaning. �70 In addition , those firms 
must provide statistics on the p e rcentage of ratings per term , relative to the 
n umber of i nvestm e n t  banking c l ients in  each category. 27 1  O t h e r  s tatistical 
i n formatio n  must be relayed in the form of a chart or graph .�7� Here,  
securities firms must depict  histo rical  price movements of a particular 
security ,  juxtaposed with their own ratings and ;J1anges i n  those ratings, as 
11 l fi ' . f' h . ) d we as t 1e 1nn s own pnce targets o r  t e 1ssuer. - · 
2 .  The M e rri l l  Lynch Settlement  
The settl e m e n t  of the New York Attorn ey Ge ne ral ' s  i nvesti gation i n to 
M e rri l l  Lynch has created anoth e r  form of regulation that is best classified as 
self-regulatio n .  Pursuant to the settl e m e n t  agre e m e n t  ( th e  "Merril l  
Agre e m e n t" ) ,  Merri l l  Lync h  agreed to m ake c e rtai n refo rm s  and disclosures .  
2133 !d. at 34,97:1. 
269 . See Siconolfi, sujna note l 2 c1 .  
:2 70.  See Research ,·\nalysts Connicts uf l llterc:st, ( )7  Feci. Reg. � It ')4 ,970.  
2 7 1 . Id. at 34 .�1 74. 
2 7 2 .  !d. 
:!73.  /rl. These rules address the recommendat ions of the Securit ies Industry Associ�nion ,  
one o f  the earliest proponents  for changes i n  analyst/issue/ undenHirer rela tions .  Ke)· 
components of the recommencbtions i n clude ( 1 )  Research clc:panmcnts should not  report tu 
i nvestment  bank ing  or any other business u n i ts that might compromise the i r  i ndependence; 
(2) a nalysts slwulcl be encouraged to i n d i cate bu th  when a stock should be bought and when i t  
should be sold, and management  should support the use uf the ful l  ratings spectrum: ( :J )  
analysts should no t  rracle against  their recommendations and should disclose their holdings i n  
compan ies they cover; ( 4 )  a nalvsts' pav should n ot be directly l inked to investment .  ban king 
transactions, sales ,  and trad ing t-c\·enues or assd m �1nagement  fees. [d. :  Sl'e also SEC. l '\ D L'S .  
ASS''\,  BEST PR.-\CTI CES: SOFT DOLL-\R .-\ '\ D  OTH ER C0\1 \ I ISSIO'\ A.RR. \:\CD!Ei\TS ( 1 997) . avai/abll' 
a/ hrtp:/ ;'www.si ;u:mn /publicat ions/pdt/bpdol lar .pell ( o n  fi le ''' i th the Iowa Law Rel'ie''') . 
l n  Jan uatY 2002. Joh n  Rams:tv, senior regularotY counsel at The Bond [vlarket 
A ..'>ociat ion and former cleptny general counse l  ell N.-\SDR. repurted th,tt  a joi n t  reguhllli} 
effort ,,,as unclem·ay bt't\\·een the SEC, the NASD zmcl the \lYSE tn make the SfA':i best practices 
rn:mclator\'. See SJT. ,  Rl'gulalun /o Fimnali:e Btsl Pmclius fur .·\ nalysls. CO\IPLL·\:\CE REP .. Jan . '2.7 ,  
2002 .  rmoila!J/� r11 h ttp:/ I W\\lv. cornp l i : t l l Cereponer. c l  nn/ ne11·s/ regu latnrs+to+fonnali ze+besr+ 
practi ces.asp (on l i le  11·i t h  the lm,·:t Lm· ReYie\1 ) .  
i n  Canada. the Securi t ies l 1 1dusrrv Commi t tee  on .-\ 1 1 �1 1 \';;t Sr.;uid�trds, knu'.Vil as the 
Cr;mtorcl Commi ttee after  i ts l eader,  Purch- Cr;nd'o rcl. m�1de sim i la r  recom menclat ious.  
pri mari h for d i:<c lusure of atLtlvst contl i cts uf i t t tnt:s t .  i n  � : n  e ffort lo protect retail i nvestors. 
I n t eresting!�-. t h e  Cr�l\d"ord Report ;tbo l t rgc·c! ;t d-::gt ·ee or inst iLU t ion �tl i n l'eStur ac t i l·isn ! ,  
recommending t h a t  insti w r ions nw<tsure r h e  �-�: l i t e  ::cicicc! h\' :.ma]y,'it rest> < trcl l  <ind ,  11' lwre 
pt>ssibk. a l loctte thl- ir  tr:td ing business lu relku t k:l  1 :\l i iL,. 
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Because the i nvestigation 'Nas not l i rni ted to Merri l l  Lynch ,  the terms of the 
Merri l l  Agreement are expected to spread to other firms as wel l .  
In addit ion t o  paying $ 1 00 mil l ion i n  penal ties, Merri l l  Lynch  agreed to 
change the way it compensates i ts stock analysts . �74 Now, i nvestment  bankers 
wi l l  have no role i n  determin ing how m uch analysts are paid.n" The bankers 
are not al lowed to evaluate an alysts ,271' communicate with analysts about 
their salaries, or  communicate wi th anyone else responsible for determin ing 
salaries.m Merril l  Lynch also agreed to  prohibit  people i nvolved in  
determining analyst compensation from sol icit ing or us ing  information  
about investment  banking revenues received from covered companies . 27H 
Finally, anyone i nvolved i n  determ in ing  analyst compensati o n  is pro h ib i ted 
from considering any information about analysts received from i nvestment  
bankers.279 Analyst compensation is to  be  determi ned o n ly by  the research 
2HIJ department managers. · 
The Merri l l  Agreement  specifies the appropriate factors to be 
considered in compensation decisions, stating that analyst salaries are to be 
"based primarily upon":z::> l the q ual i ty of the research and performance of 
. ').'-)') . � ·>,�·� . recommendatiOns;- - compeutJve compensatiOn factors ; - · mput from 
investor c l ients ;2M and input  from other,  non-investm ent banking divis ions 
at Merri l l . �s
·, Pav i s  to be based solelv on services intended to ben efi t  Merri l l ' s 
investor c l ients
1
. �01' These se1-vices i �1el ude the form ulation  of research and 
reports ;207 communicati on of  investment information to investor c l ients ; ��s 
"cooperation ,  accessibi l i ty and resp o n s r,·e n ess consisten t  with se r-vmg 
investor c l ients" ;:!X'I and partic ipation 1n identificati on of i nvestment 
. . ��){) opponun1 tres. 
:274.  Patrick McGeehan,  $ 1 00 ,\ /11/iou Fine Jin Merrill l.y nrh, N .Y.  TIOilcS. t\lav :n ,  '200'2;  see also 
Agreement Between the Atto rney CencLt!  of t h e  Srate of Ne11· York and \lerri l l  lxnch , Pierce ,  
Fen ne r  & S m i t h ,  Inc .  � [  7- 1 1 ( l\hv ':2 1 ,  '200'2 ) .  ovoilable 111 h t tp : /  / n e\\·s . curpoLttc . !indla\\·.com/ 
legalnews/clocumen ts/arch ive_n l . h tJ n l  ( o n  ti l e  with t h e  10\,·a La11· Review) [ hereinafter M erri l l  
Agreement] (settlement agreem e m  cle w i l i ng changes in a n ;t i y>t cutnpe nsati on ) .  
':27�.  See M cGeehan, sujmt nor e 274 .  
:276 .  Merrill Agreement,  sujmt n o t e  '2 74.  ·� 9 ( b ) .  
2 7 7 .  !d. � 9 ( c ) .  
'2 7 8 .  frl. � 9 ( a ) . 
279.  lrl 'l[ 9 ( d ) .  
280 . !d. 'l[ 1 0. 
28 1 .  M e rril l  Agreement,  sujmt n o t e  '2 7 1 .  9! l 0 .  
:28'2 . !d. ,[ l O (a ) .  
283.  !d. 'll lO (b) . 
:284 . !d. 1[ lO ( c )  . 
:!85 . !d. 11 l O ( cl) . 
'28G. M e rril l  Agreement. sujmt n o te ':2/·t. 11 S.  
287. !d. � 8 (a ) .  
2S8. M 91 S ( b ) .  
2 ,'!,9 .  /d. 11 S ( c )  
'2�JU !rl. '][ S ( d )  
17-JB SECURITIES ANAL YST AS A GE'NT 1 073 
I n  addi ti o n ,  the Merril l  Agre e m e n t  requi res M e r r i l l  Lyn c h  t o  set  u p  a 
new Research Recom m e n dati o n s  Commi ttee ( t h e  " RRC") . T h e  role of the 
RRC i s  to m o ni tor and supervise research re commendati o ns for "obj e ctivity, 
i n tegri ty, and . . .  rigorous analy [sis]  . "�'1 1 RRC members h i p  wil l  i n clude both 
sales and research people . ��12 The RRC will  h ave the p ower to approve any 
i nitiati o n  of or change in research re c o m m e n dations .2�1'l Analysts requesting 
the power to make s u c h  c hanges wi l l  b e  required to p rovide i n formation as 
to their  c onfl ic ts with the c overed compan i e s . 2'H 
The M erri l l  Agreem e n t  also regulates the role of an alysts i n  the 
sol icitation of i nvestm e n t  ban king business. The Me rri l l  Agree m e n t  makes 
clear that analysts wil l  c on ti nu e  to partic ipate in th e sol ic i tati o n  of 
busin ess.2� 1-, Manage ment of their  divisi o n ,  h owever, must app rove any such 
partic ipati o n  i n  advanc e . 2lJii Analysts wi l l  be required to i nfo r m  the RRC of 
any such partici pation .2�17 Fu rth er,  the M e rr il l  Agreement s ta tes that M e rri l l  
h as agreed to p ro h i b i t  analysts "from p ro m ising, i m plyi n g ,  offeri ng, or 
communicating i n  any way th at a specifi c  recomme n datio n  o r  c h ange of an 
existing recomm endati o n  wi l l  be m ade in exchange for the award i n g  of an 
i nvestm e n t  ban king transacti o n . "2''s An alys ts also are p ro h ibited from 
l owering ratings in retri b ution for l oss of busi ness.2'1�1 
The Me rri l l  Agree m e n t  also req u i res Me rri l l  to disclose,  in i ts research 
reports, any compensati o n  " i t  h as received o r  i s  e n tit led to re ceive" from 
c o m panies cove red in those repo rts .  ;oo M e rrill  m ust i n c l u d e  a standard 
state ment o n  all such re p o rts te l l i n g  i nvestors that they s h o u l d  assu m e  that 
M e rri l l  has sough t and will  conti n u e  to seek i nvestment ban ki n g  busin ess 
w i t h  c overed c o m pa n i e s .  ; 1 , 1 Merri l l ' s  research reports wil l  i n c l ude speci fi c  
disclosures,  on a p e rce ntage basi s ,  of ratin g  categories used b y  M e rr i l l  fo r 
other s to c ks in that com panv ' s  i n d ustry,  stocks fo r whi c h  M e rr i l l  p rovided 
:29 1 .  i\ I c rri l l  Agree m e J l L ,  sujmt n o t e  27·1 ,  � 1 :2 . 
:.!'):.! lr/ -� 1 :.!  ( a ) . 
29:l . It/ �[ l :.! (h ) . 
:_JtJct .  See id. 11 l :.! ( c )  ( '" [T i l l e  rc lc\ �lll t research a n a l yst s h a l l  disclose to t h e RRC : �u tv 
p�uti c i pa t inn hv t h e � rn�dyst wi th i m·est m e n l  b�mkers in �m i n n·s t : n c u t  b�m k i n g  t r�msaniu n  lor 
t h e  �;u bj ec t  cum pam \>; i r l t i n  i n  t h e  last 1 :2  l l l O i t t l l .s . " ) .  
:2�1:1 .  Sec id. 11 1 -1 (st·u iug fort h p rocedure ru be fol l uwecl i n  sul ic i t a t i o t t  o f  i m·cst m c n t  
b a n k i ng bus iness ) . 
2�JC .  s,�c \-krr i l l  Agre e m e n t ,  supra note :2 7-1, 9[ 1 4 ( a )  ( re q u i ri n g  Rese�trc h \Lm agcmelll  to 
approve sul i c i ta t i u n s  for i n vestm e n t  banking tcms<tc t iuns) . 
��) 7 .  ,)·n· ir/. �[ 1 ·-H h )  ( clcnLt ncl i n g  research analysts to disc lose " i n te n ded partic ipat ion'' i n  
sol i c i l �t r inn ) .  
29�) .  lrl. 1I l --t ( cl ) .  
:29�1 . See iri. i! 1 4 ( e )  ( p roh i b i t i ng · ·analysts fro m  c h a n g i n g  �mv research rt:cu t n n t cndat iun '' ) .  
C),()()_  !r/. �1 :-, ( b ) .  
,>,() i .  See \·i c ni l l  . \gret·mcnt .  wjnu I t O te 2 7-1 , 91 :1 ( c )  t i l i c l ud i n g  
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i nvestm e n t  banking servtces, and other s tocks cove red by M e rril l  in 
:W:l 
general. 
The l'vlerril l  Agreement  requires the disclosures in sol icitation 
11)'' 
docu m e n ts to be changed.' J U nder the settlement, those docum e n ts must 
n ow state that Merri l l  prohibits i ts employees from offe r i n g  pricing or 
recommendations as part of the solicitation p rocess.
'ltH 
The docum e n ts also 
must state that analysts are prohibited from being compensated i n  
con nection with the i nvestm e n t  banking business excep t  i f  their  work is  
i n tended to benefi t i nvestor cl ients .
. 10" 
The M e rri l l  Agreement furthe r  requi res M e rri l l  to p rovide disclosures 
whenever it terminates coverage of a n  issuer. :
>ot; 
The disclosures must state 
th e rationale for the decision"07 and that the last recomm e n dation should 
n o t  be relied u pon in the future.
'10� 
To ensure compliance with these 
p rovisions ,  Merri l l  m us t  appoint a one-year compliance rn o n i tor . :1w1 That 
person ' s  job will  be to ensure that the p rovisi ons are enacted and to serve as 
. :I I 0 
an ombudsperson for Merrdl staff. 
3 .  The Impact of Regulation o n  the Conflicts 
As discussed in Part II of this Arti cle ,  the rol e  of security analyst is r ife 
wi th potenti al confli cts of i n te rest.  Both the n ewly adopted NASD 
regulati ons and the M e rril l  Agreem e n t  p urport to revise the ways analysts do 
business i n  order to e l iminate th ese confl icts .  Regulati o n  FD s imilariy 
atte mpts to reduce conflicts i ndirectly by regulating iss u e r  conduct.  
Regulati o n  AC regulates analysts directly,  but focuses primarily on disclosure 
rather than e l i m i n ation of confl icts.  Toge ther,  the rules  remain fraugh t with 
loopholes. As described above, one so urce of analyst confl i c ts i s  the analysts ' 
personal  trading i n  covered securiti es.  Regulation FD does not purport to 
speak to th is  issue.  The Merri l l  Agreement does not  address i t  e i th er. By 
requmng ce rtl!l cation of analysts ' bel ief i n  th e i r rec o m m e n dations, 
Regulation AC arguably addresses this issue, but in an i n di rect  fash ion and 
only thro ugh disclosure . The power of disclosure-based remedies to fi.x the 
prob l e m ,  however ,  is open to considerable debate . 
The NASD regulations do restri ct owne rs h i p  i n  two ways. First, analysts 
may not  hold pre-TPO shares, but o n l y  in the sector fo r which the analys t 
c)U'2 lrl. 'll ;"; ( cl )  ( i ) - ( iv) . 
:103 .  See id .  ][ 15  ( s e t t i ng forth disclosure require m e n ts during :;nl ic i t�ttion of publ i c  cquilv 
umlen,Tit ing) . 
:104 .  !d. 'fi l :i (a ) . 
cw:, Jrl. 11 F l (b ) . 
')() 1 ) .  Merri l l  ,\grecment .  sujHa nute '2 7 :! ,  � l G.  
:',()7 !r!. 'll l li ( a ) . 
:\08.  !d. 'll l l i (h ) .  
:;u�J til. 'li l 7 .  
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provides c overage. For exam p l e ,  a bank analyst cannot own bank securities 
pre-IPO ,  but she can own securities in an I n ternet  fi rm. The refore,  analysts 
can h e l p  each other o r  buy venture securi t ies i n  firrns i n  which their 
employers do ve n ture i nvesting and can st i l l  benefit from each o th e r ' s  
posi tive ratings a n d  i nvestm e n t  banking work. T h u s ,  the r u l e s  d o  n o t  address 
the basic ven ture conflict  that exists when i nvestm e n t-ba n ke rs h o l d  shares i n  
c o m panies they take public .  Second, eve n though analysts can st i l l  hold post­
IPO shares i n  companies they cover, the i r  abil i ty to trade securities of those 
c ompanies is l i m i te d  u n d e r  the NASD regulations.  This l i m i tation pro hibits 
analysts fro m  trading these s hares fo r th i rty days p ri o r  to releasi ng reports 
and for five days after.  This restrict ion l i m i ts t h e  p o te n tial  seve rity of the 
conflict  but  does n o t  e l i minate i t  
S i m ilarly, both the NASD and the Merrill  Agre e m e n t  atte m p t  t o  address 
bus i n ess confl i c ts by drawing l i n es betwee n  i nvestm e n t  ban k i n g  and research 
departme n ts .  Neither does so successful ly. Although both seek to e l i m i n ate 
the supervisory role of i nvestment banke rs over analysts, n e i t h e r  p reve n ts 
analysts from participating i n  the i nvestm e n t  ban king s ide of th e bus in ess so 
long as the analyst's  participation is m o n i to re d-e i t h e r  by counsel or by a 
special c o m m ittee and e n h anced disclosure. T h e  NA.SD rules also pro h i b i t  
ti es between specifi c  i nvestme n t  banking work a n d  anaiyst  compensati o n ,  
b u t  n o t  gen e ral i nvestmen t  ban king work. Again ,  t h is sign i fican t poten t ia l  
l oophole makes clear that  analysts are st i l l  expected to work in  in vestment 
banking and to parti c ipate in cl ient  meetings. U n d e r  both sets of rules,  
analysts can sti l l  sol i c i t  busin ess, b u t  they can not  promise rati n gs i n  
exchange for business o r  punish companies when they l ose business. I n  
add i ti o n ,  t h e  l i n ks betwe e n  the i nvestme n t  bankers a n d  covered companie:; 
m ust  be disclosed. 
The NASD rules also restrict  research reports post-IPO in  an :1tte m p t  to 
prohibit  the h igh ly cri ticized ·' booster s h ots . "  U n fo rt u 11ately,  the ru] es 
p rovide only a forty-day quie t p e ri o d ,  n o t  a quiet  period tied to the length of 
the l ock-up .  Thus,  if  the l oc k-up agree m e n t  is for 1 80 days, the investm e n t  
ban k ' s  research depart m e n t  can n o t  release a report during the  ±irst fo rty 
days after the IPO, but is free to do so thereafte r.  At that  p o i n t  i n  ti me, the 
analyst can hold shares in th e com p<my, so the owners h i p  conflict  still exis ts . 
Finally, the NASD rules prevent  cl i e n ts from c o m m e n t i ng on n:::3carch 
repons , except  to confirm t h e i r  accu racy . The valu e  of this restriction 
appears l i m i ted-to the exte n t  that the c l i e n t ' s  c o m m e n t  i s  m clteria i ,  
Regulati on F D  arguably prohibits  i t  anyway. 
Although t h e  n e w  rules i m p rove anah'st regubti o n ,  they fail to 
el i minate exis t i n g  conf1icts.  Analysts are sti l l  perm i tted ::; imultaneously to sel l  
securiti es a n d  to p rovide ev;:duations of those sarne sccuri! ics .  ,�\naiysts are 
st i l l  allowed to trade in sorne securit ies for wh i c h  t h e i t· fe l l ow emploYees 
provide cove rage. In add i t i o n ,  under  the new !-egu l <<i:on ;-:�gJ me,  2\:-,al\'s ts 
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m ust s t i l l  atte m p t  to mai n ta i n  confl ic t i n g  duties t o  their ern p l oyers, t h e  
m arke t, their i ssuer clients ,  and t h e  i nvestors .  
Final ly ,  and most i m po rtant ,  the existing regulatory reforms are purely 
reactive . They i d e n ti fY  conflic ts of  i n te rest that have been problematic and 
attem p t  to prohibit  the re lati o n s h i ps that give r ise to those c onfl i c ts .  This  
approach i s  fun dame n tal ly flawed .  Freedom from investm e n t banking ties,  
even in th e stric test sense,  does not guaran tee analyst i ndep e n d e n c e .  Rathe r, 
as th e h istory of analyst fun d i n g  demo nstrates, analyst research trad i ti o n al l y  
b as b e e n  subsidized th rough other busi n ess activi ti es.  Th e re is  every reas o n  
t o  b e l i eve t h a t  this  practi ce of c ross-subsidizatio n  w i l l  con ti n u e .  As o n e  of 
this  Article ' s  authors h as argued elsewh e re ,  because of i ts publ ic  goods 
qual i ty, analyst  research can not  be sustained without  addit io n a l  fi n an c i n g  
support. 0 1 1 If  i nvestment banki n g  revenues subsidized a nalyst research 
befo re ,  some other source of fun d i ng wil l  h ave to take t h e i r  p lace .  
I nves tm e n t  banking c o nfli cts are l i kely to  be replaced by other-perhaps l ess 
transpare n t-busi n ess relati onsh i ps.  I ndeed,  m any research fi rms that 
q ual i fy as i ndependent under the m os t  rece n t  reforms h ave busi n ess 
rel at ionships that coul d jeopardize the re l i ab i l i ty of thei r rep orts _ :n:z 
D. TI-n� SA EUJA M�s-Oxu.r A c- r  or 2002 
O n  July 30 , 2002, Preside n t  Bush s igned the Sarban es-Oxley Act of 2002 
( th e  "Act") . :l l :\ The Act addresses a b road range of issues relati n g  to 
corporate governance,  disclosure,  a n d  fraud. I n c luded among the many 
provisions i s  secti o n  50 1 ,  wh i c h  focuses on analyst c o nfl ic ts o f  i n terest. :\ ! !  
Sect ion 5 0 1  amends the Securi ties Exchange Act of 1 934 by a d d i n g  a new 
secti o n ,  1 5D .  Secti o n  1 5D i mp oses a mandatory rul e m a k i n g  obl igation o n  
the SEC. Withi n one year, th e SEC i s  req u i red w adopt o r  aut h o ri ze a n  SRO 
to adopt rules "reaso nablv designed to address [analyst] contl icr.s of 
i nterest ."
'\ J -, Th e Act i d e n ti fies t h e  object ives of " foste r [ i n g] greater publ i c 
confi d e n c e  i n  securit ies 1-esea rch " a n d  '' p rotect [ ing]  the obj ec tivi tv and 
in depen den ce o f  securit ies analysts . " :\ J , ; Congress expl ic i tly i d e ntified a 
\'ari et;' of struc tural safeguarcb to establ ish m o re e ffective C h i n ese wal l s  to 
i nsnlate analysts from i nvestm e nt banking i n t1 u e n ce i n  o rd e r  to accomp l is h  
3 1  J .  Sl'e gl'lll'mlly Stephen Choi & J i l l  Fisc h .  How t o  l·i·:·: Wall Strerl: :\ Fourhn 1-i'I I{I I/Cinp: l'mjii!.IIIL 
for Snwities fll ll'mlPdirnil'.l. l l ?, \'.\LE l . J  ( l o rr h co m i ng 200c'l ) . 
:'> ! 2. s�·e, I'. g. , Susanne Cr;1ig. 11 'ill f l l :wslrn l Dnujil Jiwn \Vol/ .'ilrccl 's SjJ!it P, WALL ST. J,  Dec . 2 •\ ,  
2002,  at C l  (ubsening tha t  S<l i l l orc\ C. Be mst e i n & C o .  ;md Pruclen t i<l l fi nanci :d  C n . ,  tl\'0 tirm' 
cummunly c i ted :1s inclepenclen 1  rese< trch lwuse,. ; t r e  parr of  la r·ger en t i t ies 11 i t l 1  s n bs t< tnt i ;d  
rn uwal fund operations 1,·h ich  r;·t ise "< t t  le : Is r  r.h e  potenri ; t !  for confl ict" ) .  
c) l ::\ . S<lrb;In cs-Oxle,· .'\cr o f 200:! ,  l ' t t h .  L. :\ u .  1 0 7-20-L � :)0 1 ,  1 1 6 Stat. 7-F> ( 2()1 1 2 ) .  
3 1 4 . M 
:l J :-, . /d. § 00 1 .  I l l) St:t t .  : 1 1  I'l l .  
:) I i i .  !rl. 
THE SECURITIES ANAL YST AS A GA1,/T 1 077 
these oqj ectives . :1 1 1  In additio n ,  the Act mandates rulemaking to i n c rease 
disclosure of analyst conflicts of i n te rest, i ncluding the exte n t  of an analyst's 
i nvestme n ts i n  securities of a covered issuer;  busi ness relationshi ps b e twee n  
covered issuers a n d  brokerage firms;  compensation received from t h e  issuer 
by the analyst or  the brokerage firm; and any other m aterial conflicts .3 1 8  
E. SEC-SPnn� AGRE.lciW::�vT TO REFORM 1NVES1Mhi.VTPRAC71CES 
O n  Decembe r  20, 2002, the SEC and N ew York Attorney General El iot  
S p i tzer announced that  they had reached an agreement in principle  with 
the various SROs and state regulatory authorities to refo rm i nvestm e n t  
p racti ces. � 19  T h e  agreement  is  designed t o  operate a s  a global settl e m e n t  o f  
Spi tzer's i nvestigation i n to allegations of analyst m isconduct at  t e n  m aj or 
\Vall Street  fi rms.  As of March 2003,  the agre e m e n t  had n o t  been final ized.  
The substantive terms of the agreement  i n clude severing l i nks b e tween 
analysts and i nvestment  banking, i ncluding any compensatory l i n ks and the 
s tandard p racti ce of including analysts in road shows and oth e r  p i tches;  
ban ni n g  spinning to corporate executives and directors; requiring the 
covered brokerage firms to contract wi th i ndependent research firms to 
provi de research to that firm ' s  customers, with regulators i nvolved in the 
process; a n d  disclosing publicly analyst recommendations, rat ings ,  and price 
targets . :1�1 1 In addi ti o n ,  the settl e m e n t  calls for i nvestm e n t  banking firms to 
pay a total p aym ent of $ 1 .4 bil l ion in fin es ,  penalties and restitu tion, with a 
portion of the money designated for i nvestor education .?'� 1  ·when finalized,  
the agreement wi l l  requi re ful l  C o m m ission approval .  The m ost sign ificant 
portions of this  settl e m e n t  are arguably th e ban on spinning and the 
p rovisions for i n de pendent researc h .  Because the actual language of the 
agreem e n t  has not been agreed upon-and was apparently st i l l  the subject  
of debate at the ti me this  article went to press:1�2-it is  not possible to offer a 
critique of the p rovis ions . :��·� 
3 1 7.  Jrl. 
el l S .  Sarbanes-Oxley Act. � 3 0 1 . 
3 1 9. P ress Release . U.S.  Securit ies and Exchange Commission , SEC, NY Auorney General ,  
NASI) , N/1.SAA, NYSE ancl State Regubrurs Announce Historic Agreem e n t  To Reform 
I nvestm e n t  Practices ( Dec .  20, 2002 ) ,  mm ii([{J{p ut h tt.p :/ /11-ww.sec.gm/ ne11/ press/2002-1 79. h tm 
(on fi k  ll'i t h  the Iowa La11· Revi ew) . 
:l20 .  ld. 
;) 2 1 . T h e  amoun t uf this settlement is quite small relati\'C to i nvestment banking re,·enues 
�mel much of i t  wi l l  be tax clecl u c t i b l e .  H i l l a ry .-\. Sale,  Gatekeejms, Disclosure, and hs11.er Choice, 82 
\\'.\SI I .  U. L Q. ( forthcoming 2003 ) .  
322 .  SPI'. e.g. , Ch arles Casparino,  A n alyst fJilcl is Held UjJ by v\ 'orrls, WALL ST. J . , Jan.  1. 6 . 2003, 
a t  C:l ( desc ribing tig h t  Ol'er l a n g u age n fs e t t le ment) . 
323 .  (j C h o i  & Fisc h .  sujna Ill\te :H 1 ( cr i tic iz ing pro, is ion obligati n g  !inns to prm icle 
i n clepencle n t  researc h  and propos i n g  ; t l terii d l i\·e m e t h od of su bsi d i z i ng i n c!t' p e n d e n t  rest'arch 
t h rough ,·oucher dol lars ) .  
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IV. SU::Vl:\HRY OF DEFICIENCIES IN EXISTING REGULUION 
Existing attempts to regu l ate securities analysts , including t h e  Sarbanes­
Oxley Act, are flawed.  The flaw is the fai l u re to conceptual i ze the analyst 's  
role  properly .  Of course, securi ties analysts m ight be viewed simply as 
salespeop l e .  If  we accept the fac t  that analyst are,  by and l arge, e m p l oyees of 
i nvestment banks that generate most of their revenue sel li ng securities i n  
publ i c  offeri n gs, the analysts' ties to the i nvestment banking business are n o t  
confl icts of i nterest. Sim ilarly,  i t  i s  n o t  i n appropriate t o  c o m p e nsate 
salespeople with a sh are of th e revenues gen e rated by the i r  effo rts; 
salespeople are routi n e ly paid on commission .  Even personal trading does 
not p resen t  a p roblem i f  i t  i s  ful l y  disclosed because salespeople owe no 
confl icting duties to poten tial buyers oth e r  than the obl igation to refra i n  
from fraud.  Viewed i n  this  l ight ,  existing regulato r;' efforts a r e  unwa rranted. 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, h owever,  i s  s imply the most recent i n di cation 
that courts, regulators, and c o m m entators d o  not bel i eve that  analysts 
should be treated as trad i tional salespeople .  Despite evid e n c e  rai s i n g  
troubling questions about the e1Iectiveness of analysts i n  conveying 
i n fo rmation to the marketplace, these clecis ionm akers appare n tly bel ieve 
that analysts serve a valuable role in doing so. Moreover, because of analysts ' 
abi l itv to obtai n ,  evaluate ,  and disse m i nate informati o n ,  p o l icymakers view 
analysts as gatekeepers ,  enabli ng the market to disc i p l i n e  manage m e n t  
through pric ing. I n  Dirhs, the Supreme Court based i ts decis ion t o  afford 
favorable regulatory treatm e n t  to analysts on the analysts ' the o re ti cal role i n  
i m provi ng market efficiency. Existing favo rable regulatory treatme n t  stems 
from the belief that analysts "are crucial players in the m e ch anisms of 
marketplace effi c i e n cy that lead to opti mal al locati o n s  of cap i tal  
resou rces . '' :;� ,  S imi larly, recent  call s  for i ncreased analyst independence are 
pre m i sed on the theory that, by serving as gatekeepers,  analysts can reduce 
the i n c idence of fraud and o th e r  wrongdoi n g  by corporate managem e n t. 
Motivati ng th i s  approach is the recogni t i o n  that analyst reports and 
recomme ndati o n s  remai n infl u e n tial  and can have a substa n tial  ef''cct  0 1 1  
t h e  price a n d  vol um e  of securi ties transactions.  S i mply put,  analyst reports 
atfcct  market p rices . :;�c, Although investors m av be aware that analysts h ave a 
vari e tY of i ncentives to recom me n d  stocks i n appropriately ,  there are 
u n count<1.ble cases i n  wh ich analyst hype alone seems to h ave resul ted in 
signifi ca n t  stock price m ovements . :;�,; I n te resti ngly, stock downgrades, ".vhi c h  
o c c u r  conside rably l ess fre q u e n tly,  result  in e'\C n more dramatic market 
reactions than do oosi tive reoons. :;�, J .  . .:. . 
-- ---·------- -
3�-L L;\ l lge-.. uort, s !Jfmr note ��.  ;H J li�'i . 
:�:?:) .  Rogers 8.: Fog;;trr.> . s t tjJro 1 1 o t e  � 1 ) ,  �t t -L 
:1��C. . Stt> C( ) J .F. . .  '\ ltjno n u t t'  -L' :) . ( It  � J/- 1 1 �) ( c i t i 1 1 g  c :-��t n : ple ." ) .  
: \ � ! .  .).l'l' !!-i'l!rm//y Scutt  E .  Stickl' l .  n,, . .  · \ n ulomr uf the Pofomrf/1/(l' oJ Bur  and Sdi 
Nr ·r(J.'ii nt:';trfot iu.'IS. :) l Fl :\. ,\�<-\I . . . J . :!;:) ( 1 �-_) � ) :) ) .  
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This m a rk e t  response leads to the concern that, if analyst i n fo rmation is 
sufficiently affe c ted by the confl i c ts and i n ce n tives describ e d  above , it l eads 
to d istorted stock prices and reduced market effi c i e n cy.  Accordingly, i n  
addition t o  m is leading i nvestors w h o  trade o n  t h e  basis o f  i naccurate 
recommendations,  conflicted analysts disru p t  t h e  operatio n  of the securi t ies 
m arkets .  The result ing i n efficiency i n terferes with appropriate a l locations of 
capi tal . Hyped IPOs generate l arge sums o f  cap i ta l  for companies that h ave 
no realist ic p rospects of success and which subsequently become insolve n t, 
leaving i nvestors holding the b ag. At the same tim e ,  viable c o mpanies with 
reasonable p rospects find it diffic u l t  to attract the n ecessary analyst atte n tion 
to obtain fi n an ci ng. For established companies,  reports that  are based on 
the i n c e n tives created by personal tradi n g  and the prospect o f  i nvestme n t  
b a n k i n g  revenue fai l  accurately t o  convey corporate i n formati o n  t o  t h e  
marketplace .  Further,  i n  an effort  to meet  analyst expectati ons  o r  curry favor 
with h igh profile analys ts ,  issuers m ay make inappropriate corporate 
decisions.  I n  particular, an alyst d e mands for h igh-paced growth m ay l ead 
companies to adopt u n real istic busin ess plans. \Vhen these plans fai l  to meet  
their  goals ,  corporate officials m ay resort to  outri ght fraud.  Joseph Full e r  
a n d  Michael  Jensen posi t, based o n  this reason ing,  that ana lyst p ressure was 
responsible ,  at l east i n  part, for the dem ise of E n ro n . ;�� 
As a p racti cal matter, analysts play a dual role ,  seeki ng to furth e r  the 
busin ess o f  the fi rms that e m p l oy th e m ,  i n c l u d i n g  brokerage a nd i nvestment 
banking operati ons,  whi l e  at the same ti m e  conveying suffi c i e n tly rel iabl e 
i n formation to i n flue nce market prices.  Th ese two compo n e n ts o f  the 
analyst role are n o t  read i ly separated. The an alyst ' s relatio n s h i p  to his firm 
ancl the fi rm ' s  other busin ess activities provides fi nancial  support for the 
a n alyst 's  research . Society cannot reason ab ly expect an alysts to engage i n  
costly research a n d  t h e n  disseminate the res u l ts o f  that research t o  the 
m a rket  for free,  absent  some other source of fi n a n c i n g. Furt he rm ore , 
analysts can o n ly i m pe1fectly recover th e costs of t h e i r  research th rough 
market transacti ons,  and, absen t  subsidi zatio n ,  rhe h i gh cost of qualitv 
research is l ikely to im pede i ts ful l  disse m i n a tion i n to the m arketplace .  T h e  
ana lyst ' s  so-called confl i c ts also m ay be the source of  usefu l  i n form ation and 
val uable synergies i f, fo r exa m p le , th e fi rm p roduc tive ly deploys the research 
that i n forms analyst recommen dations in the c o n text of IPO p ri ci ng. 
i\11oreover, the access afforded by the a n alyst 's  busi ness relat ionships 
l e n ds credib i l i ty to the analyst 's  repo rt . Inves tors rely on a nalyst research ,  i n  
part ,  because they b e l i eve that analysts h <we b o th s u perior i n fo rmati on and 
an incen tive to convey that i n formati o n  to the m arketp l ace Z\ccurately. The 
analyst  role i n  i n creas ing rnarket efficiency cle p e n cls c ruci a l l y  o n  th e analyst 's  
ab i l i ty to i n f1uen c c  pricing and tradi n g  decis ions .  Reg u l ato rs do not  wan t  
the publ ic  ro vi ew analysts merely a s  salespeopl e .  Such a view, C\'e n i f  
·- ·- --------
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accurate , would undercut the analyst ' s  abi l i ty to affect market p ri c ing. Yet, 
only i f  i nvestors are wil l ing to trust a nalysts, wil l  the analyst ' s  gatekeeping 
role  be possible .  
V. A BETTER SOLUTION-TI-lE QUASI-AGENCY MODEL 
A. DEVELOPMENT OF 1HE QUASI-AGENCY iVIODl: . .  L 
Existing regulatory efforts can n ot  adequately address the confl ict  
problems identified earlier  because they fai l  to capture the dual  aspects of  
th e analyst's role .  Accordingly, th i s  Part  proposes an altern ative framework 
for examining security analyst behavior: the quasi-agency m odel . Th e 
motivation for this model i s  threefold .  Fi rst, existing effo rts to regulate 
analysts have paid i nsuffic ient attention  to the need to fund analyst research .  
Second, although recen t  scandals have l ed  to  the promulgation of  
prohibitions on  existing analyst conflicts,  they are piecemeal solutions that  
do l i ttle to  address the m ore general proble m  of analyst i ncen tives . Thi rd ,  
even i f  i t  can be obtained,  independence a lone i s  i nsufficie n t  to engender 
analyst reliabi l i ty as a source of  m arket information .  
Based on these conclusions ,  l ogic suggests that regulation should 
impose two pr imary constraints on analyst behavior .  First ,  analyst behavior  
should not  be compromised by the  analyst 's  business obj ectives.  Second, 
analysts should be required to p rovide certai n  assurances about the 
i nformation that they dissem inate to the m arket. Both of  these constraints 
are related closely to the fiduciary p rinciples applicable to a tradi tional 
agency relationship .  In  l ight of  th i s  s imi larity, therefore,  a quasi-agency 
model is better tail ored to the problems relating to analyst rel iabi l i ty than a 
''gatekeeper" m odel .  
The quasi-agency m odel  starts from the premise that a nalysts are 
economic agents in the sense that they act for the benefit of  o th e rs. :l�q The 
in teraction between these economic  agents and their p ri ncipals c reates 
certain costs that Jensen and Meckl ing identi fy as "agency" costs. These 
agency costs consist of monito ring  expenditu res by the prin cipal , bonding 
expenditures by the agent ,  and residual losses not preve nted by e i ther  
mon i toring or bonding. :no These costs can  occur even where there is  no 
legal or  formal agency relationship . :l:l l Ult imately, agency costs are the result  
of two things:  ( 1 )  the difference between the goals of the agent and those of 
the principal an d ( 2 )  i n formational  asymmetries between agent and 
329. Jensen & Meckli ng, 511/Jm n o te 1 2 , at :105.  
330. SeP id. at 308; Sl?e alw E ugene F. Fama & M i ch;tel C. .Jense n ,  StjHmrtion of Owllnsh ijJ and Con trol, 26 J.L. & ECO!'\.  30 I .  304 ( 1 983) (deli n ing agency costs as · ' the costs oC structur i ng.  
m o n itoring,  and bonding a set of con tracts among agen ts 11·i t l t  c o n ll icr ing i n tl'resrs '' ) .  
;.;� I .  <\s .J en sen and 1\-'!eckl i ng obserYc<l: "Agenc,· costs ; t rise in  ; t J J \' s i w a t ion i t J WJh" i n g  
cooperatiYe etfurt . . . lw two or m o re people e\·en r h nuglt  t h e r e  i s  no c l e a r  cut  pri nci pal-agen t  
relatio nsh i p . "  . Jensen & Mec k l i ng , sujHrr n o te I ':.! , ar  ?.OC). 
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p r in c i p a l . :: ::� E co n o m i c  age n cy the ory the refore focuses o n  address i n g  these 
'l ''q two prob l e ms. · ·'· 
Analyst confli cts of i n te rest  i n c rease age n cy costs due to the d i fference 
b e tween the a n alys t ' s  goals  a n d  t h ose of the p r i n ci pal .  Ye t,  the e ffor t  to 
reduce these costs by e l i m i n ati n g  a nalyst confl i cts i s  flawe d .  Eve n w i th i n  the 
gatekeeper model ,  an alysts wil l  be su�j ect to confl i c t i n g  obj e c tives because 
they act as e c o n o m i c  agen ts for several distin c t  pri n ci pals .  A nalysts act o n  
behalf of t h e i r  employers, whose i n te rests are often ,  b u t  n o t  always, a l igned 
wi th those of the i ssue r  c l i e n t . An a lysts a lso act o n  b e half of i ssuers through 
t h e i r  rece i p t  o f  m arke t-s e n s i tive corpora te i n formation a n d  dissem in ation of 
that i n formati o n  i n to the cap i ta l  m arke ts . This fu nction furth ers various 
corp o rate p u rposes, including i n creas i n g  p u b l i c  awaren ess o f  th e issuer and 
i ts o p e rations to faci l i tate capital fo rmat i o n ,  i nc reas i n g  secu ri ti e s  sales i n  a 
publi c  offe ri ng, a n d  i n creas i n g  the exte n t  to wh i c h  m a rket p rices accura tely 
reflect the c o rp o rati o n ' s  p rese n t  and future o p e ratin g  resu l ts .  Final ly, 
an alys ts act on behalf of i nvesto rs and the m a rkets gen e rally w h e n  p rovi d i ng 
rel i ab l e  i n formation i n te n ded to i n fl u e n c e  m arke t p rices.  
Th e fact that an alysts act fo r the benefit of several d i ffe re n t  groups­
a n d  that the l aw and regu l at ions  p resur n e  that they d o-creates a n  
u n avoidable confl ict .  I n depen d e n t  o f  a n y  self- in terested behavior,  a n alysts 
face con fl i cti n g  i n ce n tives to th e exte n t  th a t  o n e  gro u p ' s  i n t e rests diffe r 
from those of a n o th e r  gro u p .  The m u l ti p l e  c o n f1 i c ts faced by t h e  securit ies 
analyst are n o t  u n i q ue .  Age n ts commonly face the c o n s trai n t  that the 
i n terests of one pri nci pal l i m i t  t h e  a n alyst 's  discretion ary behavi o r  on behalf  
of a n o th e r .  Fo r exam ple ,  partners i n  a l aw finn a re age n ts of both their  li rm 
and the fi r m 's c l i e n ts;  i n deed,  t h ey owe fi duci�U)' d u ties to both . The fi rm 
has an i n terest i n  maxi m i z i n g  i ts reve n u e  from c l i e n t  r e p rese ntati o n ;  the 
c l i e n t  h as a n  i n terest in obtai n i n g  the best q u a l i ty se rvice poss i b le fo r the 
l owest fee .  A l t h ough these in terests are in te n s i o n ,  we do not co n c l u d e  that 
the c o n fl ict  i s  i m perm issi b l e .  Instead, the a tto rn ey ' s discre t i o n  to rnax i m ize 
finn re\·e nues i s  constrai n e d  by the atto rn ey's fi d uci ary duty t o  the c l i e n t, 
which p recludes the attorney fro m charg i n g  m ore than a reasonabl e fee .  
A'i i n  th e a tt o rn ey exam p l e ,  fi duci;:u;1 p r i n c i ples o ffe r o n e  m e c h a n i s m  
fo r  l i m it ing the exte m to wh i c h  a n  age nt 's  obj e ctives m ay dive rge fro m those 
of th e pri n c i pal . In trus t law and corpora te law, the d u ty o f  l oya l ty req u ires 
the age n t  to give p ri macy to the i nt e rests of the pri n ci pa l . In a custo m e r­
supplier re lationship,  tl1 e duty o f  l oyal ty does n o t  apply,  b u t  t h e  con tract  
doctrine of gcod bith p rm·icles a n  a n a i ogous c o n s t ra i n t .  Th e q uasi-age n c\· 
model su ggested here uti l izes a d u tv s im i la r  to th e s e .  Th us,  i n stead of 
barr i n g  analyst  bus i n ess relationship:> as oth er p roposal s suggest, we propose 
.·t)'� ·  j,�� t t h l t·t·n !\·I .  !:jse J d Ltrdr �  .-\p_-:. · i l () '(l!r'OIY: .-l n .Assrssmenl  a n d  Nn�inP. 1 -+  :\L.-\D.  \ [C\!T.  RE\· .  
:i 7 .  :iii ( I  lJ:-\�)) . 
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that such relationships should be constrain ed by a "duty of rel i ab i l i ty . "  Wi th 
respect to conf1icts ,  an analyst would b reach this  duty of rel i ab i l i ty if h e  
i ssued a report or  recommen dation that wou l d  n o t  have b e e n  issued b y  a 
reasonable p e rson, s imilarly s i tuated, who lacked the c o nfl i cting 
relationship.  As wi th the attorney's  fee discussed above, standard m arket 
practi ces would p rovide a b e n c hm ark for the l e gal  standard .  
B y  framing t h e  analyst's obl igation i n  terms of a duty of r e li ab i li ty, t h e  
analyst i s  given greater freedom t o  cross-subsidize research by providing 
sen,ices to oth e r  business operations than under the recen t  regu latory 
reforms. At the same tim e ,  the analyst would be precluded from al lowing 
those services to influen c e  the nature or qual i ty of his  research o r  the 
resu l ti ng recommendations.  The standard also would reach other 
po ten tially confl ict ing i n te rests, i n cluding those that regul a tors h ave not yet 
identified. Thus, the duty of reliabi l i ty would provide the same type of gap­
fi l l i n g  and f1exibi l i ty that are val u ab l e  compon e n ts of tradit ional  fiduciary 
duties. 
The a nalyst' s duty of rel iabil i ty wou l d  reduce age n cy costs in two ways. 
First, it would decrease the n e e d  fo r investors to i nvestigate a n d  evaluate 
poten tial analyst confl i cts. In companson to i ncreased disclosure 
req u i re m e n t" ,  a duty of re l iabil i ty wou l d  p lace the burden on the analyst to 
<ivoi d  being i n fluenced by competing bmi ness consideratio n s .  Second, the 
c!my would reduce m o nito ri n g  costs. I nvestors would not face the need to 
keep tabs on the analyst's related business activities to ascertain potential  
motives for analyst statements .  
Another con cern about analyst behavior is  that  a n  analyst 's  report o r  
:·econunendati on may false ly  im p l y  that t h e  analyst has en gaged i n  a n  
;1.ppropriate amount o f  research a n d  possesses a s u i table  factual basis for t h e  
cnncius ious there in .  T h e  p robl e m faced b y  the m arket i n  eva l u a ti n g  analyst 
: ·::se?.rch in th is CZlse involves an i n form a t i o n a l  asy:nm ett-y. It is i m poss i b l e  
for i nvestors to verify wheth e r  t h e  analyst h as engaged i n  suffi c i e n t  research 
to justify his con clus ions.  At the s<.1 m e  t i m e , u n d e r  c u rre n t  law, the analyst is 
u ndc!- no obligation to disclose factors that may u ndercut th e rel i ab i l i ty of 
the conclus ions u n l ess those factors r i se to the l evel of a d isabl i ng confl ict .  
Imposing a duty of rel i abi l i ty also can a l l e\' iate this concern . Accordingly,  we 
propose that the duty of rel iabi l i ty i nco rporate the treatme n t  of analyst 
recomn1endarions as i m pl ied fac tual  state m e n ts,  in wh i c h  the analyst i s  h e l cl 
�lccc: ; n table  both for his or h e r  bel ief i n  the stateme nts a n d  for havi ng a 
n::J:::Ol!�::ble basis for m a ki n g  t h e m . Thi s  component  of the duty of reliabi l i ty 
Lv-[s sn�port i n  th e Supreme Court" :.; analysis i n  Vilginia Banhshares, In c. v .  
Sf!n db'\�·. ·.:: ; Virginia Bauhslw res i nvolved �1 1 1  effo rt by an issue r ' s  di rec to rs to 
;t\·oicl l i <lbi l i ty fo r  securi ties frand on t h e  basis th a t  the statem e nts t h a t  they 
;1' !ldc in p ; ·oxy materia l s  th�1t  ch;u·acteri zecl a proposed m e rger as "fai r" were 
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m e rely opinions rathe r  than fac t. The Court recognized that statem e n ts of 
bel ief  or opinion ' 'are fac tual in two senses:  as s tatemen ts that  the d i re c tors 
do act for the reason s  given or hold the belief stated and as state m e n ts about 
the subject  matter of t h e  reason o r  belief expresse d . "
'l:l'> 
It is unl ike ly that, under c urren t  J aw, courts would h o l d  a nalysts to the 
s tandard of disclosure art iculated in Virginia Bankshares. First, the s tate m e n ts 
i n  Vi1ginia Banhshares were misleading, i n  part,  because they fai l e d  to 
disclose all  the relevant i nformation that the directo rs possessed about the 
value of the fi r m ."?.li The Supreme Court h as s ta ted repeatedly that o m i ssions 
are actionable under the fed e ral securi ties laws only when the speaker has a 
d u ty to disclose. :m Al though corporate i nside rs are often c harged with such 
a d u ty,  based o n  their fiduciary obligations under state corporate law,"
''� 
analysts do n o t  possess an analogous obligati o n .  Second, the Vi1ginia 
Bankshares Court expressly premised i ts h olding on the fac t  that the 
defe n dants were corporate d i rectors, reasoning that stockholde rs would view 
d i re c tors' s tate m e n ts as rel iable b o th because of the dire c tors'  expe rtise and 
k nowledge and because of the d i rectors '  state law fiduciary obl iga tions .3
'1'1 
Nonetheless,  th e Court's reason i n g  applies with equal force to analyst 
recomm e n dations.  I nvestors bel ieve that analysts h ave superi o r  i nformation 
and expertise,  and that knowledge is what gives analysts the power to affect  
market prices .  rvioreove r, for analysts to act  as  effective gatekeepers,  i t  is  not  
o n l y  desi rable but also n ecessary that i n vestors rely on them in the manner 
described i n  Vi1ginia Bankshares. Fi nal ly, the i nformational dispari ty between 
i nvestors and analysts i s  best  addressed by a nde that  treats analyst 
recommendati o ns as factual s tate m e n ts and h ol ds analysts accoun table if 
they do not actuallv bel i eve those state m e n ts or if thev lack a reason able 
basis for making a
' 
part icular recommendation _ :�-� � �  Such an " impl ied fact" 
rule ,  implemen ted as the second compo n e n t  o f  the analyst 's  d u ty of 
rel iabi l i ty, gives analysts an incentive to reduce age ncy costs by disclosing to 
i nvestors al l relevant  i n formation about the basis for thei r recom m en dati o n ,  
i ncluding any l i m i tations o n  t h e i r  research , c o n f1 ict ing evidence,  and s o  
�c)S .  Iri. at 109�. 
�3G. Sl'l' it!. at l 094 (describ i ng how sutemen ts f�1iled to disclose evidence: of the thinness of 
rhe ma rke t � tnc l  about the going concern valne of t h e  finn ) .  
�37. See Chiarella v. U n i ted States, ·HS li .S. ?.22. 2:10 ( 1 980) ( noting that silence may be 
frau cl u !t: n t  b u t  only when there is a d ury to cliscluse ) .  
�38. Set D i rks Y. SEC, -16:1 U.S.  646, GS4 ( 1 'l:3:� ) ( identifyi n g  "independent fid uciary duties·· 
owed bv corpor�tte i nsi ders to the corporati o n �u1cl i ts s i l �; re h o l clers) . 
339. Flrginiu nrmhsh(//PS, SO l U.S. at 1 09 1  ( '"Shareholders know t hen d i rectors usually have 
knowl edge and expertness far exceeding the n ormal i m·estor"s  rc:;nt trces,  �mel r i le  di rect.urs' 
perceived s u pe riori ty is l l l �tgn i fiecl e1·en furth e r  by the c o m m o n  k ti<m· lcclge that state law 
c u s tomari l\ o b l i ges t:llem to c :-�ercisc t.l !c ir j l l ( \gmem in  t i l e  s lurclwlders ·  i n terest. "" ) . 
:')�10 .  Set \''nlca1 1  lvleta i s  C(). \'. S i ! n l n o n s  �\'1 (�. C :o . ,  �--!-8 F. (!,:);\, X:-:-; {) (2d (: j r. 1 9 1 8) ( '',\n 
o p i n i o n  is  a fact  . . . \Yh c n  the parties arc so s i w ;·t ted r l l <t t  t h e  lwvcr ;1 1 � 1 :' J"C�\SOJ JalJh· relv upon 
the cxpn-·ssl 0 1 1  of the sel i c t·\ o p i n i o n ,  i t  i s  n o  c:....: c u :-�:.- l o  gi\·c a Ldse t � l l c . " ,L 
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fo rth . Regulation AC provides part of the m e c hanism fo r c reating such a 
duty-requiring analysts to certify th e i r  bel ief  i n  what they say-bu t  is  
l i m i te d  ro the subj ective component of th e duty of reliab i l i ty proposed here.  
Moreover, Regulati o n  AC does not c reate a p rivate right of  acti o n  and, 
absent significant new provisions for l i ab il i ty ,  is  arguably i ne ffective i n  
creati ng a functioning duty of rel iabi l i ty .  
A quasi-agency approach to analyst regulation is  also j u s ti fi e d  by the 
l e gal and regulatory roles i mposed on analysts as gatekeepers who have the 
capacity to harm issuers,  shareholders,  and the market generally .  Under 
state law, corpora te i nsiders owe fiduciary duties to the issuer and i ts 
shareholders because of this capaci ty to do harm . In defending traditional  
i n si der trading l iabi l i ty ,  for example,  Gosh e n  and Parchomovsky focus on 
agen cy principles,  demonstratin g  that m u c h  of the harm fro m  i nsider 
trading stems from th e fact that it  generates i n ce n tives and conflic ts that are 
i n consiste n t  with the corpora te official ' s  fiduciary obl igations to the 
corporation . At a m i n i m u m ,  i nsider tradi ng may distract corp o rate i n si d e rs 
from focusing on corporate operations . More i m p o rtant, t h e  abi l i ty to 
exploit  corporate i n formation for personal profi t  creates a confl i c t  be tween 
the ins ider's  i n terests and those of the corporati o n  and i ts share h ol d e rs . :H I 
This agen cy analysis can be extended to analyst regulati o n .  Althoug·h 
the Supreme Cou rt has distinguished between analysts and tradi ti onal 
corporate agents,
'1 1� i ts argu m e n t  i s  based on false assumptions . :\4:\ Securi ties 
•1 . [-i analysts are not standard corpo rate agen ts i n  the l egal sense. · ·  N o n e th e l ess, 
;�"1 1 .  For exam p l e ,  i nsiders m ay l ! o�trd co rporate i nfnnn;�tion for t h e i r  p ri\·ate tradi ng 
beJ 1efit ,  redu ci ng the overall qua l i ty and quzuuirv of c o rporate cl isclosu re. They face greater 
i n c e n tives to d i s tort corporate disclosure itl meier to en hance r h e i r  lracl i n g  p rofi ts. To ach ie\·e 
t h i s  goa l , i nsiders may man ipu l ate the t i m i ng and e\·en the s1 tbstance of cnrpo rar.e deci:, ions.  
'W2 . D irks v. S . E . C. .  463 U.S.  646, 6:!8-59 ( 1 9:3'1 ) .  
343.  S i m i l a rly,  Gosh e n  and Parc h o m ovk.w argue that because atulysts Me n o t  co rporate 
decisionmakers, thei r use of nonpublic  i n forma tion does not cre�Jte comparabl e agency costs. 
Goshen & Parchomovsky, sujHa n ote ! 64.  at I �6 I ;  sn' also ir!. at I :!59-60 ( reaso n i n g  that, u n l ike 
t radi tional insiders,  analys ts  C : \ llnot in f l u e nc e f irm dccision-ma.king for the i r  personal  ben e11 L, 
nor can thev c o ntrol scope or t i m i n g  of c o rp• 1rat.e c l  isrlnst  1 re ) .  
:344. The c l assic c l em en ts of l egal agency-conse n t ,  bcndi t  and cotHrnl-are prese n t  i n  t h <' 
analvst's relati onsh i p 11·i t .h h i :;  emp!twer. r h e  is.'i t ter ,  a n d  the invest i n g  publ i c .  Sr'e. e.,g . .  Ha nson \'. 
!'�) ' !last,  494 N . £.2d 1 09 1 .  1 0 9-1-96 ( Oh i u  1 1!811) (sett ing forrh basi c e l e m e n ts o f  agency) . T h e  
an alys t 's role is cle�tr!y consensu;d from the p e rspective of a l l  part ic ip�m ts, i n c l ml i n g  the 
analys t ' s  e m p lon�r.  the issuer J l t ;u \ O! u n : a rih· t Jscs ana!y.< ts both to diss·::ll1 i nate i n format ion a n d  
to conrro l  that in forma tion a n d  t h e  manner i 1 1  wh i c h  i :  i s  c l issemi n att�d. and i nn�s tors who r e l y  
o n  anal;·st reports ;ll1cl p;1y, directh· a n d  i 1 l d i rcc rh·,  li > r  �ma lvs t sn,ices.  
Wi th respec t to c o n t rol . �ul ah·st:; � l i T  subjt: c t  to the control  of their  e m p l oyers. A nalys ts 
are ; 1bn accou n table tu. �md h e n c e  ll i lclc r t. lw C<W trol of. i nYcs t m c n t  b �m ki ng c l i e n ts .  Issuers 
exercise subst;nHi�d con trol OYer ;ln� J !,·sts C\'Cll  t h tm g l l  th e\· arc n ot 1 h c  a nah-s ts · c l i :-ect  
e l l l p l oycrs. ; 1s  dem onstrated ! J ,· the t'\'i d e n c c  i n  P�1rt I I  o f  t h is .-\rt i c l t· .  fi1 1 �1 l !y,  i n  prcp<t r i n g  
research and reporL'i t h a t  ; 1 re d i rt'C i e d  t o  the  i t l \ 'V'il i n g- m ;nkt' tpl �lct · ,  a t J a !:-·s t s  a re t m de r  t l 1 c  
i n d i re c t  c < n l l!'nl < >f i n n·stors.  
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agency confl i c ts create an analogous risk th at analysts wil l  use th e i r  i nfluence 
over market i nformation and finn d e c is ion-making to benefit t h e mselves o r  
competing bus in ess inte rests. 
The gatekeeping m od e l  of the securit ies analyst i s  premised on the idea 
that the analyst ' s  i n terests wi l l  be aligned with those of the issuer and the 
marketplace. Analysts tradi ti onally h ave received market-sen s itive corporate 
i nformation that they are supposed to use for corporate p u rposes.  These 
p urposes may i nclude i n c reasing public  awareness of the issuer and i ts 
operations to faci l i tate capi tal  formatio n ,  i ncreasing securi ties sales i n  a 
publ ic  offe ri ng, or i ncreasing the exte n t  to which market prices accurately 
refl e c t  the corporati o n ' s  present and proj e c te d  operating resu l ts .  Analysts 
c o n trol the degree to whi ch this  i nformation actually b e n e fi ts the 
corporatio n  by varying the extent to which they release it  in a t imely and 
accurate fashion.  Confl i c ts of  i n terest i nduce analysts to disto r t  this 
i nformatio n  flow. The ownership i n te rests of analysts and th e i r  p e rsonal 
trading of covered securities create an i n c e n tive for the m  to distort o r  h oard 
i nformation and to manipulate the ti rning of disclosu res in order to create 
and exploit tradi n g  opportu n i ties .  Likewise ,  busin ess interests ,  such as the 
desi re to pro m o te i nvestme n t  ban king business,  c reate an i n c en tive for 
analysts to generate u n duly optimistic reports and rec o m m e n dati ons .  The 
resul t  of these conflicts is  a tension b e twe e n  th e business i n te rest  and the 
gate keeping rol e .  The access and i n formation in terests may cre ate furthe r  
analyst bias b y  i n te rfering wi th analysts '  abi l i ty t o  m o n i tor managem e n t  
e ffectively. 
Like corporate insiders,  analysts can affirmatively harm corp o rate 
operations.  The ti ming of o p e ratio n al decisions m ay be m o tivated by the 
t i m i n g  of fi nancial disclosures, such as a pendi n g  I OQ release, rathe r  than by 
business factors .  Analysts' own ershi p  and bus i n ess i nt e res ts can combine to 
create an e m p h asis on short-term results ,  which m ay affec t  their  own 
portfo l i os and those of  their  c l i e n ts ,  but may cause manage m e n t  to under­
i nvest i n  research and development  and other  l o n g-term proj e c ts ,  thereby 
sacrific ing long-term growth . Analysts also can cause stock price m ove m e n ts 
that i n terfere wi th m e rgers o r  other ope rational decis i o ns.  Most i m p o rtan t, 
by demanding rapid growth and re l easing un real istic proj e c tions,  analysts 
can pressure co rporate o±11ci al s  to i nvest in excessively risky proj ects ,  to 
"man age" earn in gs and other fi nancial  data, and C\'en to e ngage in fraud. 
Last. �tnah·st.> prm·iclc a Yari ety of b e n ef i ts for· iss u ns , i n 1·esturs, and the m arke tplace.  If  
their i n formatio11  i,.; accura t e .  issuers bendi t  from �� m o re efTeCi i\'t: and rel iable clisclos nre 
m e t h o d ,  im·est< >rs b e n e f i t  b1· rece i \·i n g \·a l ua b l c  secur i t ie.> i n /o r m a t i o n  as \1·e l l  as m o n i tori ng,  
an d rhe ma rke ts ben e l i t  from greater efliciency. EI'C i l  \\ hen t h e  info n n �ni on i s  d istorted 
t h rough the c on fl i cts described abon·. au;t!Ysts are 1\·ork i n g  pr i m ; ,r i lv for the ben efi t of o th ers . 
i nc l nc l i n g  iss u e rs 11 h n  b e n ef i t  ii·nm a n a h .q s '  :;en i c cs tktt l;t c i l i ta rc  t he i r  p u b l i c  offeri ngs a n d  
i nsti t u t i o n a l  i n ,·c:� rqrs ,,·ho c1n use prefl:'i"t' JHial i n fo n n a t i o 1 1  i u  lTe!lte t rading oppo rt u n i t ies. 
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T here is  n o  evidence to s h ow that th ese h arms are o u tweighed by the 
effi c i e n t  mark e t  benefits that  were emphasized by the Dirks Court. :w. Indeed, 
existing empiri cal evidence l eads to the opposite c o nclusi o n .  Alt hough truly 
i ndepende n t  research and analysis m i g h t  serve a valuable market function,  
analyst distortions curren tly are m ore l ikely to decrease market effic iency 
than increase i t. As D onald Langevoort h as explained, rec e n t  empiri cal 
research supports the view that analysts are contributing to m ispricing, 
rather than accurate pricing.:l-lti 
In sum , t h e  reali ty of the analyst posit ion reveals that  if analysts are to 
operate as gatekeepers-with a role in monitoring managem e n t, c o nveyin g  
i n fo rmati o n  t o  i n c rease m arke t e fficiency,  a n d  advising i nvestors o n  capital 
al location-the regulations s h ould treat analysts as quasi-ag e n ts and vest 
them with agen cy-like duties.  Specifical ly, analys ts s h ould b e  b o u n d  by a duty 
of rel i abil i ty. Analyst confl icts are l i kely to result  i n  agency c o s ts s imilar to 
those imposed by the self-deal i n g  of tradi ti onal c o rp o rate i nsiders .  
Incorporatin g  an agency perspective w i l l  h e l p  t o  decrease the conflicts 
c reated by t h e  analyst role.  
B. THE QUASI-AGl�NCl' MODEL APPL!l�D TO REGULA TION FD 
The e m pi ri cal and anecdotal evidence reviewed i n  t h is Article  
demonstrates that  t h e  traditi o n al hands-off approach to analyst regulation is 
inap propriate .  The theory of analyst regulatio n  articulated in this  Articl e ,  
h owever, i s  n o t  premised o n  fairness considerations o r  t h e  presence o f  an 
u n e rodable trading advantage . T h u s ,  we rej e c t  as insuffi c i e n t  the SEC ' s  
focus o n  fai rness a s  t h e  basis for i ts theory o f  an alyst regul ati o n .  In stead, t h e  
quasi-agency m odel i ncorporates an efficiency rationale .  Specifical ly ,  w e  
a rgue that Regulation F D  is j ustified a s  a m e chanism for reducing agen cy 
costs .  
As J e n s e n  a n d  Meckling explained,  age ncy costs const i tute t h e  s u m  o f  
m o n i torin g  expendi tures b y  t h e  principal ,  bonding expenditu res b y  t h e  
age nt,  a n d  residual losses n o t  p reve n te d  by e i th e r  m on i toring or  bonding.
'1-17  
T hese costs ccm be reduced in a varie ty of ways . In parti c ular, it  i s  possibl e to 
reduce agen cy costs through obl igations that  are i mposed on t h i rd parties, 
345 . Di-rks, 463 U.S.  <l l 658-59 ( J :lf\3) .  S i m i l a r  a rgn m e n t.s h ave been made b) '  other scholars. 
See, e.g. , Goshen & Parchonuwsky. sujm1. n ote l G4. �H 1 258 (no ting lack of a na l ys t i n fluence on 
corporate decis ion-m aking) ; Craft, .111jm1 n ote 1 6 . at 1 2 7-28 ( argui ng that analysts '  expe rtise 
e nables them to digest com plex cnr:>or<t t C  i n formation) . SPe gl'nnolly Peter L. Cholakis,  ComjHI IIY 
Oisrlosnn• oj' J�'arni11gs Projections: Si! o u !r l  fn rfh,idwd lm'IIS/ors ]J,, Allowed into !ill' 'Ballj!llrk " 2, 39 
SX\T.\ CL\R.-\ L. REV. 8 1 9  ( 1 9<19) ( argui ng that an;t!yst� \·er i n formation r.l lrougl1 their  
d isclosure, provi d i n g  a tvpe of d is i n t erested seal of appro\·a l ) .  
3-tf). Dona l d  C : .  Lmge\·oorL. Tr1 111ing the . \ 1/imril ,)jJirils oJ' Ihe Slork .\lmlirls: .-\ !3ehovioml 
:ljJjnortch to .')Pcw ilil's Regulation. SJ7 i\'\1'_ U. L. Rn· . l :\5 ,  l GC-70 (:200:2 ) .  Lmge\Uort suggests that 
a va ri uv of b e h avi oral biasc� e :-: : tcnbate Lhe i nc c n tiYes c rcttecl bv analyst. c o n 11 i c ts a n d  b t r:; i ness 
l't:Ltt ionships .  id. 
:14 7 .  Jensen s� L'vkcJ.J i ng.  S llj!l(/ l lUt l '  1 :2 . ; 1t  :'lOS.  
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rather than directly upon the age n ts .  The SROs,  for exa m p l e ,  are c harged 
wi th m o n i toring analysts and their  e m p l oyers.  The purpose of this 
m o n i toring is to decrease agency costs to i nvestors. 
The SEC's promulgation of Regulation FD can be rati onalized as 
another m e th o d  of reducing age ncy costs by restri cti n g  the conduct o f  a 
third party. I n  the case of Regulation FD , tbe restriction is i m posed o n  the 
issuer .  Regu l atio n  FD does n o t  regulate analyst behavior d i re c tly .  As 
described in Part II C above , selective disclosure can i n terfe re wi th a nalysts' 
abi l i ty to perform their  roles as age n ts to their  e m p l oyers, the issu e rs,  the 
i nvestors, and the marketplace. Regulation FD reduces analysts '  i n c e n tives to 
distort their  reporting in order to gain better access to corporate 
i n fo rmati o n ,  thereby reducing the i nformational asymm e try betwee n  
i nvestors a n d  analysts . I n  addi tio n ,  Regulation FD p reven ts selective 
discl osure fro m  i n te rfering with the c o m pany's obligations  to i ts 
shareholders.  Like trad i ti onal i nsider trading regulatio n ,  the refore,  
Regulation FD p reven ts m anagem e n t  from using selective disclosure to 
manipul ate analyst behavio r  by increasing the abili ty of analysts to function 
as effective gateke e pers and enhancing th e valu e  of the analyst to the issuer. 
Considering Regulati o n  FD under the quasi-agency m o de l ,  i t  becomes 
evident  that by barring selective disclosure , Regul ation FD reduces the 
abi l i ty o f  management to subj e c t  the analyst  to a confl i c t  of i n terest by 
conditioning the analyst 's  recei p t  of corporate i nformation o n  the analyst 's  
wil l ingness to issue reports consistent  wi th managemen t's i nstructions.  
Regulation FD also i ncreases the reliabil i ty of the analyst ' s  product by 
p reve nting the p roduct from being the subj e c t  of such management 
i n fluence.  
Several commentators have sough t to j ustify selective disclosure based 
on presum e d  efficiency e n h ancern e n ts that analysts p rovid e .  For example ,  
Ste p h e n  Choi  argues that  some corpo rate i nformation may b e  too sensi tive 
to permit public  disc losure."�s vVidespread release may reduce firm value by 
providing i n formation to competi tors or may expose the company to 
securities fraud l i tigation. 'WJ Choi  argues that selective disclosure al lows 
m anagem e n t  to release the i nformation to a small grou p  and thereby 
reduces the risks associated with the clisclosure. :F,o The evi dence 
demonstrates,  h owever ,  that m anage m e n t  can use selective discl osure as a 
tool to manipulate and often block cri tical evaluations,  thus underm i n i ng 
th e capacity of market i n formati o n  to monitor manage m e n t  behavior. :\-, ]  
",4 � .  See Stephen J Cho i ,  Sr1erti;;c !Ji.,clu, u u•s i u  the Public CajJiial ,\Iiukets, ��:') U . C. D.\\ ' 1�  L .  
RE\ . 033. :1 4 1 -42 ( 2002 ) . 
3-J.9 . !d. at 542.  
:ViU. iri. 
3::-J I .  '\ l o t-co, er. 'ele c t i \ ·e disclo-; u JT "r t lw t'·l w � t rh ncl!cd b,· Clwi i s  m o�;t l i keh· t n  "ccur in 
the cu nt e :\ l  ot due cl i l i ge net· .  ; 1  c o l l te :\ t  l lc ; t  acld resst·d ln·  Re::iubti < n l  FD.  
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Goshen and Parchomovksy argue that fi rms also can use i n formation 
access to induce analyst coverage that they would o th e rwise be u nable to 
obta i n  . . 1'1� Although in theory this mechanism should benefi t i nvestors ,  i n  
practice issuers can use selective d isclosure to "buy" m o re than m e re 
coverage, they also can buy analyst hyp e .  Small  capitalization c o m panies  are 
particularly vul n e rable to the risk that this  hype wil l  be used to raise 
excessive capital to o r  al low i nsiders to exit at  in flated prices. And the buyi n g  
of s u c h  coverage i nterfe res with a nalysts '  role as efficien cy e nh a n c e rs .  
Final ly, C b o i  a n d  Tal l ey argue that selective disclosure t o  l arge 
blockholders m ay subsidize valuable monitoring activi ty, thereby i mp rovi n g  
fir m  value for al l  shareholders. :��:� T h i s  argu m en t  fai l s  t o  recognize that  t h e  
financ i al pressures faced by m on ey managers and t h e i r  n e e d  to main tain 
sufficien t  l iquidity gen e rate a greate r need for i nstitutions to  deman d  
protecti o n  from the price effect  o f  analyst downgrades than to demand 
governance c hanges from corporate management .  Insti tutional resistance to 
downgrades may partial ly explain th e o p ti m istic bias of analyst 
recommendations.  Moreover , the pattern of i n s ti tutional trading reveals 
that ,  when a company is  in troubl e , i ns tituti o n s  consisten tly p re fe r  exit to 
VOlCe.  
Selective disclosure c o m p ro mises the analyst role in  oth e r  ways as wel l .  
It  al lows corporate officials t o  purchase analyst complaisance a n d  even 
cooperation with the currency of an i n formational advantage . This 
c o m p l aisance sacrifi ces i ndepe ndent i nfo rmation-col lecti ng efforts .  The very 
existence of se l ec tive discl osure makes i t  easier for an a lys ts to rely o n  
company-provided information . rath e r  than e ngaging i n  i n dependent 
research .  An alysts grow i ncreasingly dependen t on company i nsiders for 
i n formation , furthe r  dec reasi ng i n depe ndent efforts at c o l l ect ing 
i n formati o n .  Selective disclosure thus enables m anagement to buy analyst 
opti mism an d to si lence critics of manageme n t  decisions with the threat of 
curtai l ing i n fo rmation Dow. :;,
·
,., As a result ,  the abi l i ty of a nalysts to act as 
gate keepers and inclepencl e n  tly c h e c k  manage m e n t  decis ion-making 
decreases, an d the added value analysts theore t i cally provide to the m arket is 
e l i m i nated. 
As the i nce n ti ves for independence fade ,  so does the qual i ty of analysts ' 
informati o n .  Analysts who depend on selective disclosures of company 
352. Goshen & Parchommskv . . wpm n o te I l i - 4 .  a t  1 2G8-6�l. 
:'FJ ') .  Ste p h e n  J .  C h o i  & E ric  L. Tal l t\. l'/(lyiug 1-in •r!l iln with Slwrcholdm. 7 5  S .  C.\L.. L .  RE\·. 
2/ l ,  29+-90 (2002) . ,\l t lwuijh C h n i  <llld T<t lkv recogn i ze t kH such o;cleci.i\e disc losmc al l ows 
l arge i nvestors ro ubta in special trading profi ts .  th e,· reason rhat t h eo;e pro l i ts upe r<ne as a 
subsidy fu r the risks associated "· i t h ;� L t rge ,-,1\"n ns h i p  pos i t i u n .  i n cl ud i n g  recl ucccl l i q u icli tl·. !d. 
The arg11 1 n e n t  does not aclcl rco<s t h e  ques t i o n  of "·h e r h c r  i t 11·csturs <He ,,· i l l i n g  lO pav 
blnckhulders fo r St iCh m o n i to r i n g .  
�)�>4 . Sn} Lange,·unrr. , s uj;ro nu lc  � :! . a t  I 0-l n--t:) (c ;..:.; u 1 1 i ; � i ng · · is�ucr-anaiYst bch��\·ior·· u n der �� 
.><ystcm of > l··kct i l"t· cl isc l usu rt� ) .  
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i n formati o n  are co-opted. As dependence,  not i ndependence,  becomes the 
n o nn ,  fewer analysts search for i n formation in the o ld-fash ioned,  d i g-up-the­
numbers or p o u n d-the-pavem e n t  fash i o n .  The analysts fai l  to chal lenge the 
i n formation given them ,  s imply i n corporatin g  i t  i n to forecasts, and the 
resul t  is i naccurate, and, arguably, m e a n ingless i n fo rmati o n .  The forecasts 
are about currying manage m e n t  favor o r  i nvestm e n t  bank i n g  b us i n ess,  o r  
both , rathe r  t h a n  providing the al legedly n o n-biased, cleansed review o f  
manageme n t  that courts and commen tators have used t o  j ustify a nalysts' 
privileged i nformation access. 
As analysts i nc rease th e i r  rel iance on company-provided i n formation , 
the th reat of b e i n g  cut off i n  response to n egative reports becomes m o re 
pote n t. Analysts who depend o n  company sources for i n formati o n  cann o t  
afford t o  anger t h e i r  sources wi th n egative reports . Analysts who d e p e n d  on 
company sources can n o t  affo rd to be frozen out of cornpany m e e ti n gs.  
Analysts who depend o n  company sou rces have to WOIT)' when those sources 
th reaten to h ave them fi red. I n  sh o rt ,  analysts who depend on company 
sources for the i r  i nformati on can n o t  afford to cri t ic ize o r  upset those 
sources. 
Furth er,  when analysts rely, some would say excessively, on selectively 
disclosed i nformation ·wi thout doing th e i r  own i nvestigative research and 
fac t  checking, the i nformati o n  is  s u bject  to bias or  outri g h t  m a n i pulatio n .  
T h e  i n formation then shared w i t h  t h e  marke tplace actually does n o t  
pro m o te accurate s tock pricing o r  imp roved i n formation flow. I n s tead, i t  
compou nds t h e  effe c t  o f  company hype \vi thout provi d i n g  a c h e c k  on that 
hype. The i nfo rmation to the marke t i s  disto rted by the company's  own lens .  
The analysts become only com pany conduits ,  no t i ndepen de nt val u e-adders,  
a n d  fai l  to fulfi l l  the theore tical garekeeping ro l e for wh i c h  they were 
accorded p rivi leged status.  
Selective dis c l osure also c a n  h u n corporate pe rform ance.  Ove r t ime,  as 
the symbiot ic  rel ationsh i p  b e twee n corporate officials and an alysts develops 
and i ncreases, corporate officials may begin to m anage earn i n gs and other 
fi nancial i n formation in order to confo r m  to analyst  forecasts . Th e process 
becom es c i rcular with both actors m an i p ulati ng predictions,  but with only 
one s i de k n ow i n g  the tru t h .  The existence o f  s e l ective disclos u re can thereby 
create i n c e ntives for corporate decisio n-maki ng foc used on analys t 
proj ec tion s ,  rath e r  than com panv goals . 
Recent analyses suggest that th i s a rgumel l t  has me ri t-a nalyst pressure 
can directly afie c t  corporate decisi o n-maki ng.  T h e re is reaso n to b e l i eve that  
the rece n t  corporate focus o n  earn i ngs announ cements and short-term 
stock prices i s ,  i n  part , '' response to a nah·st c l e nnnds. The market p l ac es 
e:�tre m e  i m portance on these criteria ch;e ,  i n  pan, to th e "con trib u ti o n "  of 
analysts . That rel iance supports the p roposi t ion ot· Fu l l e r  an d J e n s e n  that 
ma nage m e n t  efforts to res p o n d  to analyst  pre:; :;ure on earni ngs esti mates 
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was an important factor in the demise of Enron and Norte! . :��-, Pressure to 
meet  unrealist ic analyst predictions spu rred management  to reach for 
unattainable earnings growth, leading to an unsustainable  cycle of ever­
in creasing earni ngs announcements and share prices . :F,n Th e m arket reacts 
strongly to any divergence between operating results and analyst 
predictions.�"' Analyst activi ty i ncreases pressure for officials to man age 
earnings in order to meet  expectations . '1''� Analyst focus o n  predictions,  
short-term numbers,  and earn ings data thus in fluences  managerial 
decisions. :>'i\l Ful ler and Jensen ' s  view is that this misplaced management  
focus may i mpact operational decis ions and ,  u l timately, sacrifice long-term 
corporate profitabil i ty .%0 In this scenario ,  the analysts have assumed a role i n  
corporate decis ion-making. 
Selective disclosure also can align analysts wi th  managem e n t' s  personal 
i n terests in a manner i nconsisten t  with other corporate or  shareholder 
i n terests. For example,  managers who are paid largely in options,  as were 
those of the In ternet era ,  cannot afford to miss their analysts '  earnings 
expectations .361 As long as favorable analyst reports keep stock prices h igh,  
managerial compensation tied to company performance wi l l  increase .  
Favorable analyst coverage also may improve managers ' repu tations and 
faci l itate their  future employment  opportuni ties .  Man agers the n  have an 
i ncentive, at best,  to harn ess analyst optimism, and, at worst, to manipulate 
i nformation to increase their private gains .  As the relati o nship bui lds, the 
power of accurate stock-market prices to disci plin e management  and i ts 
decision-making through the takeover market erodes. Select ive disclosure, 
then ,  can lead to a relationship in which the analyst is promoting 
management 's  interests, rather than those of  the shareholders .  
Selective disclosure enables managem ent  t o  buy insti tut ional  i nvestors ' 
complaisance wi th the currency of superior trading opportun i ties .  Contrary 
to the position taken by Choi and Tal l ey, se lect ive disclosu re reduces rath er 
than 1ncreases the potential for productive moni tor ing by large 
stakeholders.  Selective disclosure enables i nstitutions to profit at the 
expense of other traders, even with i nvestments in  subopti mal  m anageme nt. 
Because of their opportu n i ty to exit before negative i n fo rmati on h its the 
marketplace ,  i nsti tutions receive protection again st downside risk. Further, 
the negative reactions by insti tutional i nvestors to any downgrades of  the 
stocks they own adds to the analysts ' incen tive to ma intai n posi tive ratings . 
3 5 5 .  Ful ler  & Jense n ,  sujna n o te L'Hi . 
35Ci. !rl. at -+3-44. 
'l:i 7 .  !d. a t  -l:', _ 
:t� S .  !d. at.  42. 
:\5 9 .  /d. 
3(i0 . Fu l l •.o r & jensen,  1 l ljml l ll1 tc  I : l l i .  at -1 � .  
;)() l ! I  i i l�n:· . \ .  S;de .  jwlg;in,!',· 1-/i-u risr in. •F, U. C D.-\\IS [ . .  RIT �10:1. 'J:',;l " . l:-U ( :!00:!) . 
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Selective disclosure thus contributes to the agency costs i nherent  i n  the 
confl ic ted analyst rol e  this Artic le describes. Regulation FD recognizes these 
agency costs and respo nds by prohibiting the selective disclosure that 
aggravates the quasi-agent status of agen ts .  The resu l ting  reduction of 
agency costs provides an effic iency-based j ustification for Regulation FD's  
prohibition on selective disclosure. Significantly, Regulation FD reduces 
analyst agency costs without directly imposing state l aw agency principles 
such as fiduciary duties .  By decreasing agency costs,  Regulation FD i ncreases 
the rel iabili ty of analyst research and reports .  
Importantly, this  argument  is  fundamentally different from attempts to 
j ustify Regulation FD i n  terms of fai rness or equal access to i n fonnation .  ;L;� 
The agency argument  p rovides a substantial departure from the SEC's stated 
reason for promulgating the rule . :l1i� As with tradit ional i nsider trading 
regulation ,  efforts to j ustify the prohibition i n  fai rness terms are only 
partially convincing. For example ,  i t  is difficult to identify the i nvestors who 
are disadvantaged by se lective disclosure . S imilarly, the presence of 
systematic informational disparities i n  the marketplace undercuts claims 
about investor expectations and frustrates attempts at principled l ine 
drawing.364 Regulation FD can i nstead be justi fied as  reducing agency costs 
and thereby improving market effic iency. '11;,; 
Regulation FD is a valuable supplement to existing law. It fil l s  the gap in 
current  regulation of i nsider trading. Moreover, because Regulation FD is 
not a fraud-based approach to regulation ,  i t  cannot  be avoided through 
disclosure. Th e Supreme Court ' s  analysis of i nsider trading regulation is 
premised upon the idea that insider trading is  deceptive. Accordingly, 
l iabi l i ty under secti on l O (b)  can, in theory, be avoided through appropriate 
disclosure. If  selective disclosure to analysts were regulated through insider 
trading law, i t  would be possible to argue that, by disclosing their poten tial 
confl icts of interest, such as personal trading or  investm e n t  ban king 
relationships,  analysts would e l iminate any possible deception and thereby 
avoid l iabil ity. 
As the SEC has perhaps in advertently recognized i n  prom ulgating 
Regulation FD , disclosure of analyst conflicts ts un l ikely to reduce 
�-) ()� - See, e.g. , John C Coates IV,  Private v. Politiml Choices of Secu rities Regulntio n :  .-\ Politiml 
Cust/lJenPjit Analysis, 4 1  V.\. J. l t\T. L L 53 1 ,  5 5 7  (�00 1 ) ( crit icizing Regulation FD as "effort to 
compel 'equal  access' to i n forma tion " ) ;  Wil l iam .J. Carne>'• Jurisdictional Choia in Sl'mrit ics 
Reglllatiun, 4 1  V\. J 1'\T' L. L 7 1 7 , 727 ( � 00 1 )  ( c i ti n g Fox ,  sujJm n ote 1 7 1 ,  as d e m onstrat ing t h a t  
b i rn ess argume n t  " i s  ho th misguided a n d  triYial " ) .  
3G?> .  .')e,•. e.g . Fox, sujHa nute 1 7 1 ,  �tt l\()4 ( describing fai rn ess as SEC's nui n j u�t i fica r. i"n for 
Regul<tt ion FD ) ;  W i l l iam K S .  Wang,  Sell'clive 1)/srlostu-c by Issuers. Its 1-"galil\' a n d  Lx :\ n tc f fnnn: 
Some Obs!'IW!Iiuns in NesjJ/1 11.\t' to Pmji.·swr 61x, 4� VA. J l:\'r 'L  L 869, 87 1 (2002) ( no t i n g  Lt i rn e�s 
considera t ions i t t  ra t ion a l e for Reg u l a ti o n  FD ) .  
364.  s,.,, Fox, sujm1 n ote 1 7 1 .  <lt ()(19-70 (disput ing e ftlctcy o f  fai mess ratiutulc lor 
Regulation FD ) .  
3ti:i . Ser id. < l l  I)�J2 (explai n i ng ReguLl l io l l  FD's i mprovem e n ts l o  m a rket e fticiu Jc\· ) . 
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subs tan tially the agency costs generated by these confl i c ts .  Fi rst, as the 
preceding discuss ion demonstrates, analyst confli c ts are vari ed and often 
subtle .  An analyst may, fo r examp l e ,  h ave n o  existing i nvestm e n t  banking 
relationship with an issuer, but wil l  be looking at  poten tial  cl i e n ts .  A 
require ment that t h e  analyst disclose exist ing investme n t  banking 
relationships does n o t  e l i m inate this  conflict .  Second, although disclosure 
m i g h t  p reven t  investors from unduly re lying on analyst recom me ndations,  i t  
would play n o  rol e  i n  reduci ng t h e  p ressure that  analyst beh avior imposes 
on corporate decision-making.  D isclosure would not stop the col lusion 
be tween analysts and corporate manage m e n t  over the m a n ipulation of 
earnin gs esti mates.  Finally,  a key premise of Dirhs is that secu ri ties analysts 
play a rol e in collecting and diss e m inating i nformation to t h e  securi ties 
m arkets . :l<i<i D isc losure of analyst confli c ts m ay preven t  i nvestors from 
claim i n g  they have been m is l e d ,  but i t  is in consisten t  with mai n taining t h e i r  
i mportant gatekeeping role .
'1''' 
;)66. See D i rks v. SEC, 463 U .S .  64ti, liSS-50 ( 1 08c)) ( di scussi n g  anah sts' benefi c i a l  
contri b u tion to h ect! thy s e c u ri t ies markets ) . 
3t17. The age n cv anal;·sis suggests that  some mod i ficat inns to Regnla t i o n  FD m av be 
appropriate .  For exam p l e ,  t h e  SEC h as restr ict.in:·lv i nte rpreted the d egree of d isc losure 
necessary to meet t h e  n i le 's  req u i re m e n ts .  Gi1·en its selective disclosure t a rget, issuers should be 
able ro emplu)' any m a n n e r  of dissem ination sufticient  to alleviate t h e  se lec tivity p roblem a n d  
pre1·e 1 1 t  h1·or i t ism.  A> a resu l t, discl osu re m ethods assuring broad d issemi na t i o n ,  i n c l u d i n g  
webcas ts, a r e  arguablv sullic i e n t. S i m i l arly, t h e  Regulat ion s lw u\cl n u t  pre c l u de an issuer from 
select.ivelv disclosing i n fo n n a t i o n  to i nvestors d u ri n g  ;t s h ,trt· lw l d c r  m ee t i ng t hat is not  o p e n  to 
t h e  gener;d p u b l i c .  St·e. l'.g., SEC. D I\'. OF COR!'. F I :\.\:-; < :t:. i'vl .\:\ L ' .\L OF PLTI LiCLY .-\V,\ IL\l{LL 
TELU' I IOi\E l:\TERPRET,\TIO:-;s (4th Supp.  Oct.  2000) . m•ailahft· a/  i mp:/ /mv1,·.sec.g01/ i n terps/ 
te l e p h o ne/ p h onesu p plem cn t4. l t tm (on fi le  l,·i t l l  the lo1,.,l L111· Re1·ie11·) ( achisi ng tktt s u c h  
disclosure 11·mdd be i ncun s isten t 11· i th  Regulat ion FD's pttbl ic  cl isc l nsu re req u i rem e n t )  
Regula tion F D  also nul· b e  u n cleri n c l usi1 e i n  e l i m i n at i ng opport u n i ti e s  for issuers to 
oflc r  analysr.s selcc ti1·e i n format i o n al ben efi ts .  The SEC t e l e p h o n e  i merprcta t io n  nLu t ua l  
suggests t h at cln issuer m ;w p rupe rl;· d i sc lose material  i n l.orm atiun t o  a favored group of 
a n a lysts , i f  t h e  issuer m akes s i m u l ta n e o us disc l osure of the i n l.orm;Hi o n  t h ro ugh an E D GA R  
fi l ing. Set' id. ( s ta t i i l g  t h a t .  l ! I l cler I n te rpretation 6, " [ p ] rio·, ·  ro  I n a k i n g  disc los u re ro a selec t 
aud ie nc e . t h e  issuer l l t:l·cl on!) ·  confi rm th at  t h e  fi l i n g  nr furnished report has received ;1 ti l i n g  
cLue ( ;1s determi ned i n  accordance 11·i th Rules 1 2  a n d  1 3  u l  Regnbtion S-T) t l n t  i s  I H l  Li ter than 
the elate of t h e  s e l e ct i 1 e cl isc l o,;u re" ) . T h is pr�tc t ice �dlows sclectt'cl c l l l a l vst 'i <I l l  i i 1 formarional  
ach·al l tage n1·er t h e  rest  of t h e  m; trk.etplace.  SEC e ndorse m e n t  uf i t  f·ac i l i tares Etvorec! gro u ps nf 
analysts 11· i th  11' ! 1 0 m  issuers m a in t;t in speci al relat i o n s h i p s ,  fu rther genna t i n g  cun flicts 
i nc:unsistent 11 i th rhe anah·st 's  age ncv rol e  and rhe nbjecti1·es of the Regu l a t io n . 
Fin al ly ,  Regulat ion FD could be moclili ec! to I-em o,·e i t  furth er from the fra nd-basecl 
j u risp mcknce from 11·h ich it arose, b1· adopt i n g  a c! i fleren t  s t a ndard for m a te ri al i tv . .-\s C \ I ITcn th· 
i n terpret<.:d.  Rq:( t i LHion FD p roh i b i ts th e sel ect. i1 e disc l os ure uf a l l  m ateri a l  i n f( m n;tt i o n .  bsuns 
i la1 e c o n l pl a i n ec l  th at the l l < <\ l e r i ; t l i t,· standard is  urmo rkable ge n nalil · and t i L lL  i r.-; < t p p l i ct t iu t t  
t o  t h i s  cire<I pLicL·s c l  h e�\IY IJ urclen on corpur;t t ions t o  I n ;; ke l l i ianccd kg<d cleTL:rm i tut ions  i n  t h e  
c o n text ol Lis t  p;Icec l  clis c l os u rc dec i s i ons .  \\'h en vic11·ecl as a regul ;nion de-; i gned t o  e ! i i n i na tt· 
q t <asi<<gc n t  c o n ll i ct s ,  l i ke t he use of �Iccess lO i n fu n n <l linn ciS C < I lTt·ncl·, a na iT< >I,·er cleti i l i ti o n  o f  
m; t te i· i ; i l i t l· n t ; l l· he ll·;nT<·, n recl .  The Americ< I l  Lt·.,· I nst i t u te ' s  fecil" l ' <d Scc i t ri ri c·s Code· c o n c l· p r  , , .  
<1 ·' f;Ici < > I '  s : wc i ; l i  sign i iictnce" pn.JI · ides a pute n t i c l i  >< > ur c e .  The Code rel i t·,; : J i l  rh i:' L'l J I I C< ' j l t  f" ,. 
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C.  ]•liRTHER AfJPLfCA HONS OF THE QUASI-AGf_iVCY l'VIODEL 
A complete resoluti o n  of the in dustry 's  problems i s  beyond the scope of 
any single artic le .  As the previous secti o n  reveals, the quasi-agency model  
provides an alternative efficiency-based justi fi cation  for Regulati on FD . 
S imilarly, the model can provide a s tarting point  for addressing other analyst 
confl i cts. 
For exampl e ,  Part II  described conflicts created when  analysts i nvest i n  
th e securi ties o f  covered compan i es.  Th ese i nvestments create the potentia l  
for analysts to obtain coll ateral profits from the analysts ' eval uation and 
dissem ination of information to the i nvesting publ ic .  Class ic agency law 
principles prohibit  age nts from obtaining this type of benefit at  the expense 
of the principal-any personal profits obtained by agents in the course of 
the agency relationship belong to the employer, whether  or not the agent  
obtained the profit through wrongdoing.
'l!ii! The agency l aw rationale for this 
rule ,  which was derived from th e l aw of trusts, is  that the potentia l  for 
personal profi t  creates an in heren t  confl i ct for agen ts and undermines  their 
abi l i ty to privilege the rights of the principal .%9 Yet, with respect to trading 
in  covered securit ies ,  analysts and prin cipals were both p rofi ting from th e 
situation .  M oreover, analysts ' trading was taking place with e i ther  the 
express or im pl ied consent of thei r employers. 
Under curren t  l aw, investors are expected to pol ice this conflict. Yet, as 
detai led above , they do n ot-and nei ther does the market. Presumably, 
investors and the market fai l  to monitor adeq uately because of information 
costs ,  the same costs that led to the development of a rul e  of forfe i ture in 
t h e  scope of ins ider  trading ktbi l i tv, defi n i n g  such a fact m ore narrmdy t h a n  materi a l i tY i n  
general: 
INSIDERS' D liTI' TO D ISCLOSE \\'HEN TRADING 
SEC. 1 60ct (a )  GE0JERAL-It is unlawful for a n  i n sider to sell  or buv a security of 
the issuer, i f  h e  knu11·s �t Ltct of specia l  significance with respec t to the issuer o r  the 
securi ty t int is nut  gcneral lv ava i lab le ,  unless ( 1 )  th e ins ider reasonably bel ieves 
that the bet is generally :t\·a i lable, or (2 )  the idemity of the other party to the 
transact iot l  (o r· h is age n t )  is  knum1 to the ins ider  and (A) the i nsider rea:;onably 
believes tkll r.lnt pan,· ( o r  h is agem) knows the bet, or ( B )  that party ( o r  h is 
agent) kn o\\'s t h e  fan from the insider or othenvise. 
FED. SE< :. CODC � Hi()?, ( l 'lSIJ ) .  T l te  Code also states the fol lowi ng: 
A fact  i s  'of specia l  s ign i ficance·  i f  (A) in addi tion to being m aterial i t  would be 
l i kely on being m �tde ge ner�tl ly aYailablc to affect the m arket price of a security to �t 
significant  e� tent .  < J f' ( B )  a reasonable person \mule! consider i t  espec ially 
impo rtanr under the circumstanCL'S in  determ i n i ng h is course of action in the l ight  
of s u c h  factors a s  the degree of i ts speci fici ty, the e� tent of i ts difference frol l l  
inf(mnat i"n ge l l c ra l h a,·a ibble pre,·iously. and i ts natu re and rel iabi l i tv. 
!d. § 202 (5 li ) .  
3liS . S1't. r.g . . T�1 1'l l l l l l > k i \ .  Rcsop ,  :1 1 .\J . \\' .2cl S O l  ( i\l i n n .  1 90 2 ) .  
?· li:J . Sn• id. �ll KfH-W>. 
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trust l aw. :170 Moreover, a l though disclosure may reveal the existe n ce of a 
conf1ict ,  i t  does n o t  convey th e extent to which the analyst's o bj e c tivi ty has 
been compromised.  Oth e r  pri ncipals ,  such as i ns ti tutional investo rs or 
venture funds,  m ay fai l  to obj e c t  because they benefit fro m  the a l i g n m e n t  of 
i n terests that occurs when an analyst owns covered securities .  
If the potential for personal profit when analysts trade fo r th e i r  own 
accou n ts u n dermines age n t  fide l i ty ,  a more appropriate regulatory response 
wou l d  l imit the p o te n tial for analysts to e n gage in abusive trad i n g .  Here,  the 
securi ties laws al ready p rovide a mode l .  Section 1 6 (b )  o f  t h e  Secur i ti es 
Exchange Act i mposes l i m i tations o n  p e rsonal trading by offi c e rs,  directors ,  
a n d  l arge shareholders . '17 1  The statute d o e s  n o t  m ake such trading i l l egal ; i t  
s imply p rovides that,  under specified circumstances,  p rofits gen e rated b y  the 
trades are forfeite d  to the corporation . :m I n  partic u lar, the s tatute requires 
forfe i tu re of p ro fi ts gen e rated th rough s h o rt swi n g  trading-a sale and 
subsequent p u rchase, or the reverse,  wi thin a six m o n t h  p e ri o d .�':' 
The law takes the position that sh ort swi n g  trades by i nsiders a re 
particularly subj ect  to abuse .  The abuse is of the duty o f  l oyal ty type ,  
consiste n t  with an age ncy rationale  for insider trading l i abi l i ty. I m po rtan tly, 
although the federal securi ties l aws also req u i re disclosure wh e n  c o r porate 
o ffi c ials trade i n  t h e i r  company ' s  securities, '\l-l the Jaw seem i ngly recognizes 
that disclosure is not a suffi c i e n t  mech anism for p reventing abuse.  Section 
1 6 ( b) is an age ncy-type remedy aimed at reducing the costs of t h e  manager­
s h areh o l der agency re lationship . :17� Given that the quasi-agency relati o n s h i p  
betwee n  analysts, t h e  i ssuer, and i ts s hareh olders creates analogous agency 
costs, a similar remedy seems appro p riate.  
The i nvestm e n t  ban king confl icts, o r  busi ness interests,  offe r the 
grea test chal l e nge from a regu l atory p e rspective. Recent  regul a tO I)' and 
media a tte nti o n  b as focused o n  these confl i c ts ,  and the Merri l l  Agreeme nt 
and NASD regulations are modest effo rts to address the i ss u e  th rough 
greater separation and i n c reased disclosure. The a ge n cy m odel  
demonstrates , h owever, that  the magn itude of th ese conflicts a n d  t h e  lack o f  
a s i ngl e defined principal  may be t o o  substantial for th e s c o p e  o f  the 
proposed remedies.  In  the i nvestm e n t  ban king c o n text, the i n terests of the 
:', 70 .  Sec In 1e Gleeso n ' s  Wi l l , 1 �4 N . E . :2cl ( )24 ( I l l .  App. Ct. 1 905 )  ( requiri n g  rh�n tmstee 
forfe i t  pe t·son a l  profit tel r.rust despite absence of demonstrated unfairness ) .  
�1 / l .  l :'i  L . S . C. � 78p ( �000 ) .  
3 7 "2 .  !d. 
:1 7-! .  Insiders are req ui red to disclose t h e  t i m i n g  and amoun t o f  their trad ing . . )'te id. � 
7Sp ( < t \  ( �000) . Si lll i la r discl o s ure of specifi c  a n a h s t  trades also m igh t be appro p r i �H e ,  r�nher 
than the c u JTt'll lh· p e nn i l tecl boilc rpbte p ru,·iso that analysts m av hold posi t i o ns i n  C<J\ e recl 
;-;t·curl t ics .  
:� 70 . Sn· Sre,·e Ti l t ' \ .  The  Ceu i us of Sntion J (;: 1-ii',!!, Uloting the ,\ Ju unget/1 1 ' 1 1/  o/ l'u/.Jiiclr Held 
C :uliljHt l l ii'S, -t� H \S I I '\( ;s l . .J :',l):' •. '1� 1 :1 ( 1 �1 9 1 )  ( n�pla i J J i ng· th<l l  sec i i o n  ] () can bt:st bt· ddendt'rl 
i n  tt: nns uf rcd nci n �·  agen c:· cos1s of J l l �J il�lgc m t' l l l·sktrcholcler  rela t iunsh ip ) . 
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sel l ing firm and th e i nvesting publ ic ,  for whom the analyst is  supposed to 
function as a gatekeeper,  may be i n  d irect confl ict. As a result ,  agency 
principles suggest that the pressures imposed by investment  banking 
operations may overwhelm the analysts '  efforts to adhere to their 
gatekeeping role . 
The most attractive solution to this problem may appear to be a 
complete separation of i nvestment  banking from analyst services, based on 
the proposit ion that a person cannot se rve two competing m asters.  Indeed, 
commentators have advocated a similar separation ,  for analogous reasons, 
between the provis ion of  consulting services and auditing servi ces by 
accounting firms.176 The his tory of the brokerage firm , hO\vever, suggests 
that attempting to remedy the confl ict  through a complete separation of  
func_tions may p rove problematic .  I nvestm ent banking has been l i n ked to 
analyst services not merely because of the natural synergy betwee n  the two, 
but because the information d issem ination and evaluati o n  functions 
performed by analysts may not be i n dependen tly viable absent the subsidy 
provided through i nvestment  bankin g  revenues. 
For some time, the i ndustry has touted i ts Chinese walls as the answer to 
the problem. The existence of these walls is ,  fi rst, proof that the problem 
exists and, second ,  an appeal ing but i neffective answer. In  theo ry, th ese wal ls  
provide an attractive short-term fix for the i mproprieties plaguing the 
fi nancial services industry. In  reali ty, the wal ls are porous. Moreover, efforts 
to eradicate completely the i n fluence of investment banking may resul t  i n  
the e l imination of analyst activi ty altogether. m As poi nted o u t  in  Part I I  
above, without thei r  role in  i nvestmen t  banki ng, analysts are not directly 
profitable to the firm . Thus, resoluti on of these problems req uires increased 
sensitivity to the role of analysts as quasi-agents,  including the 
appropriateness of leaving this question to the SROs. 
One possible alternative to SRO supervision is p rivate civil remedies .  
Histori cally, courts have been wary of  extending l iab i l ity to analysts for 
rnisleading reports or recommendations .  Private sui ts by investors, in 
particular, are barred by a variety of  doctri nal l imi tations,  most  ste mming 
frorn the l egal conclusion that analysts owe no fiduciary duty to i nvestors or 
the marketplace. :n.� Th e quasi-agen cy model support s  a broade r  recognition 
of analyst duties. At a minimum,  the model suggests that, consistent with the 
:l7Ci. So', r.g ,  Robe::rt  .\. Prentice,  'fhe SEC and MIJP. fllljJflmtions of tlu' Se!F'im•ing !has jor 
fn tlejJentlr·nt A uditing, 6 1  0 1 1 1 0  ST. LJ .  Ei9 7  (2000) . 
?,77 .  This  pro b l e m  could be redressed t h rough the r:mwision of an a l tern�ttive �ource o f'  
fund i ng for inclependc t l l  zmalys i s .  For  a proposal aclvuc a t i n g  i n clepcndem fu n d i n g  through a 
vouch e r  mec han ism sec gen e ra l ly Choi 8.: Fisc h ,  suj;m note 3 1 1 .  
?, 7S .  Ste. r.g . .  ivl nss \·. i'v lurgan S t an l e\' I n c . .  7 1 9  F.2d :'i ( �cl C i t· .  1 '18; ; )  ( d isl l l iss i n g  i m es t;ll· " s  
securi t ies frzu tcl su i t  agai nst  anah·sts because p la i n t i ff fa i led tn dcn JO J t s tL l t l' t h �t t  ;m aiysL'· nwr'd 
h i m  <t  d u tY < > t' disc lnsure) . 
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gatekeeper role ,  when analysts d issem inate information in to the market, 
they should be he ld  to a duty of rel iabi l i ty. '179 
Considerati on of the agency model would not  be complete without  a 
few reflections concerning the appropriate regulatory authority .  Historically, 
the SEC has taken a hands-off approach to analyst regulatio n ,  p refe rring to 
leave the matter to the SROs.3"0 Regulation  AC reflects the SEC's  current 
wil l ingness to address one concern of the quasi-agen t  status, the truthfu l n ess 
of analyst reports .  The potentia l  effectiveness of Regulation AC is reduced, 
however, by i ts l imi ted enforcement  m echanisms. Importantly, al though the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act reflects a congressional concern for increased analyst 
regulation ,  it permits the SEC to delegate analyst regulation to the SROs .3� 1 
Such continued delegat ion i s  problematic .  The SROs h ave proved 
themselves to be unable or u nwill ing  to impose and enforce meaningful 
restrictions o n  analyst confl icts and self-deal ing.  The NYSE and the NASD 
are run by, and primarily are accountable to , their  members, the brokerage 
firms. Given the importance of investment  banking business for member 
fi rms, i t  is u nrealistic to expect the SROs actively to curtai l a structu re that 
promotes these operati ons .  As Part II explains ,  the current rol e  of analysts is 
ideal from the perspective of the brokerage fi rms. Analysts fun ction as de 
facto salespeople who play a valuable role  in the firms'  m ost  profi table  
corporate fin ance business. I n  addi tion ,  brokerage fl rms often benefi t m ore 
directly from analysts ' work through proprieta1y trading i n  covered 
securities. I t  is n o t  surprising, then ,  that the scope of th e regu!ato1y response 
by the SROs has been l imited and that the SROs have fai led e f ectively to 
enforce even the monitoring fun ctions that they self-prescribecl . 1'"� The SROs 
have l i ttle reason to distu rb the status quo. 
Most recently, state regulators have taken an inte rest  i n  analyst 
behavior. Nevv York Attorney General El iot Spitzer led the h ighly publ i c ized 
effort described above to i mpose greater controls on analyst behavi or  
through state law l i tigation .  After Spitzer successful ly negotiated a set  of  
standards of conduct in  h i s  l i tigation against Merri l l  Lynch ,  New York 
379. A.s the court's reasoni ng i n  In n Credit Suisse Firs/ Bmlo11 CUJjl. SrnHilirs l.iligolion, 97 Civ. 
n60, 1 998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1 6560 (S .D.N.'r'. 1 998) , demonstrates, this ob l igatio n n e e d  n ot be 
prem ised on the finding of a l egal agency relationship b e n1Ten an ;th·sts  < tncl im·e s to rs .  
380 .  No tably, the Sarbanes-Oxley A c t  resoh·es a n y  potemia l  ;an b igu i ty dbout the  SEC's 
s tatu tory power to regulate analysts. 
:\S l .  S:rrbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub . L. N o .  1 07-24, � SO I .  l l  (1 Sta t .  7+-, (201 J2 ) .  
382. SRO rules req ui red them to keep trac k of a n alys t im·estments and tl t ev did not clo so. 
T h e i r  spotty h istory on m on i roring th e i r own brokers i n cl i c <ttes rhat riley are negleuful in other 
areas as  11·e l l .  Sn•, e.g. , Susanne Craig, Critirs Lash Out ol \Fall S! tl't'l o u n  llmhn !I t'll. WALL ST.  J. 
:\by 24,  201 J2,  at  C l  ( descri b i ng fai l ure ro catc h broker who clte<ttecl cl i en Ls C H I !  c >f  S 1 2:, m i l l i o n ,  
despite m u l t i p l e  red flags, i n c l u di n g  m a i l i n g  of st<H e m e n ts d i , e ncci t o  po:i l -< > fli c c  boxes. 
c l l l l m i  ng, and use of perso nal l aptop a t  desk e1 e n  t ho ug-h u1 111 p:my prult ib i  ted su ch nse ) .  
There i s  n o  re :1son to bel ieve that t he;• 11·ill b e  better rt"gu b t ( lrs t 10\1 . ,<;,.,, ,!!,ntrml/y S:dt• . .  wjn-rt n ote 
·�2 1  ( detai l i ng o t h e r  ! l O i t-;malyst confl i c ts of i nteres t in i n n: .stm c n t b:t n ks :u r d  u rg i n g  rci'orl l l ) .  
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Comptro l l e r  Carl McCal l ann ounced t h a t  t h e  state pension fun ds would 
refuse to do business with any brokerage finn that fai ls  to comply w i th the 
Merril l Lyn c h  standards vol u n tarily.
3s:> 
A number of  other s tate pension 
fun ds h ave a n n ounced s i m i lar  plans . o.�H 
Although s tate regul ators h ave recen tly shown themselves to be l ess 
confl i c ted tha n  the SROs, the desirabil i ty of  address ing the a nalyst role 
th rough state regulatory and e n fo rc e m e n t  efforts remai n s  questi o nable . 
First, there is n o  obli gation on the part of the states to coordin a te their  
activi ties.  A.s a result ,  extensive s tate activism could subj ect  analysts to 
confl icti n g  or i nconsiste n t  regu l ations.  Secon d ,  securi ties analysts p lay a 
signi ficant role i n  tb e national securi ties m arkets .  State regul ators l on g  h ave 
been restricted from regu l atin g  these markets ,  and there are reason s  to 
question wh ether they have sufficient  expertise to do so effe c tively. 
Concerns of  poten tial bias and provin ci a lism also counsel  against  l ocal 
efforts to regulate national markets. T h i rd,  regulati on of analysts is properly 
coordi nated wi t h i n  the existin g  regul atory structure o f  the securities 
markets, whi c h  is provi ded by the federal securities laws a n d  s u p e rvised by 
the SEC.  
Given t h e  existence o f  an adm i n is trative agen cy that h as l o ng p resided 
over the marke ts , th e re i s  l i ttle j ustifi cat ion for regulat ing an a lys ts through a 
separate body. The SEC h as suffi c i e n t  expertise to regulate securit ies  analysts 
as wel l  as to consider and coord i nate th e i n terests of broke rage fi rms and 
those who benef i t  fro m  th e analysts ' ro l e  in the marke tplace.  Accordingly,  
Co n gress ' d i recti on to the SEC i n  the Sarban es-Oxley Act is  appmpriate,  and 
the SEC s h ould accept the responsi b i l i ty.  Th e p ri nc i ples se t fo rth in this 
Arti c l e  should h el p  i n  fas h i oning the resu l ti n g  regulatio n .  
CONC:I .l'.S IOl\ 
The for e go i ng a na!vsis has several i m plicat ions .  Iu l ight of the 
own e rs h i p ,  busi ness , and access confl i c ts described i n  Part II , many of the 
j ustifications for t h e  analysts ' privi l eged regulatcwy sta tus are n n fo undecl .  
i nstead, t h i s  Arti c l e ' s  an a lys i s  d e m onstrates t h a t  i nc rease d a n a l ys t  regulation 
is appro priate because of the i nabi l i ty of private con tractual sol mions to 
address th ese p roblems. Analys ts , who i�tce rnul ti p l e  du ti es ,  are i n  the 
u n tenable posit ion of t1-yi ng to adh e re to c o n fl i c t i ng loyalt ies .  As quas i ­
age n ts ,  a n a lysts a1·e n o t  capable of fu lfi l l i n g  th e i r  m u l t i p l e roles .  
Th ;::re are th ree main reasons why regu lat ion i s  n c cessa t-y. Fi rst ,  as wi th 
m a ny age n cy costs,  th e n ature of the  confl i cts a n d  the scope o f  r h e i r  i m pact 
are di fficult  to ascenai n .  Second, alth ough we a rgue that analvsts a t"e q uasi­
age n ts ,  t h e re are lJC d i rect con tractual rela t i on sh i ps betwee n analvsts a n d  
: :,xg_  D�t\·id Ft' l c ihe in1 �Z..· C iL 1r!cs c;asp�t r i n n .  Pension-F!on (�/Jicin!s L.';n reil ,\ IoT't t o  fJ,.o/('(/ j)uh!ic 
Fu nds. \\·.·\LI . S i  . . J .  . .  J uh  �. �00:2.  ;!I C) . 
:-��..; - -l . .\r'f' ir/. ( i l 1 C ! t l d i ! l g' C�l l i fc , r t l i ; t : t J l d  \! ( _l r �h  C�tn ) J i n a ) . 
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the issuers they cover, the i nvestors, or the securi ties markets. Third, analyst 
activities are financed indirectly. Although investors and issuers bear the 
costs of analyst malfeasance ,  they are poorly positioned to discipline such 
malfeasance through market transactions. :;�,; 
Recognition of analysts ' quasi-agency s tatus allows for a coherent ,  
efficiency-based justification for prohibit ing selective disclosure to securities 
analysts .  As demonstrated above, analyst receipt and use of  material 
nonpublic information p resen t  analogous risks to the use of such 
information by traditional i nsiders . Selective disclosure compromises analyst 
independence, which u ndermines the analyst 's  role as information 
in termediary. Analyst pressure also may influence managem e n t  obj ectives, 
inappropriate corporate decision-making. Further, selective disclosure is 
unl ikely to increase market efficiency. 
Finally, as this Article poi nts out, Regulation FD is on ly one application  
o f  the  quasi-agency model .  Given that the  assumptions u ndergirding the 
privileged regulatory status of  analysts and investment  banks are not 
warran ted,  this Article proposes that analyst regulation be  reformulated 
from an agen cy perspective . An understanding of the analyst as quasi-agen t  
suggests that the regulatory challenge may requi re greater i n n ovation than 
the structural restrictions and disclosure provisions mandated by the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  In  particular, the Artic le proposes that analysts be 
boun d  by a duty of reliabi l i ty to the market and investors. Similarly, the 
quasi-agency model  offers n ew ways to reco nci le  the confl icts exposed in this 
Art ic le  ·whi l e  retaining the analyst ' s  role as information i n termediary .  
---- --- -
:',8 ;',_ .\u· Clwi & Fisch .  1 1 1jna t lote 'I l l . at 1 (expLl in ing  how publ ic goods proble m s  and 
i t l i': : :· t :l�tt; 0!l  �t:;;m nw tri <·:,; i n t c rfen: 1\·i t h  the marke t ' s  abi l i ty in disc i p l ine ;maivsts clfcct i\·e lv) . 
